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ABSTRACT
Jesus’ resurrection is considered by many to be a historical event, but objections are often
raised regarding to such inquiry into the past. Philosophy of history is thus an important field in
which various roadblocks to resurrection research have been raised. These philosophical
questions related to the study of the Jesus’ resurrection have become more prominent recently
and seek to undermine the very act of historical inquiry into Jesus’ resurrection specifically and
the past more generally. Accordingly, the issues addressed here have implications beyond
resurrection research.
This work seeks to identify and assess three common roadblocks to such research. The
first is the question related to the subjectivity historian and whether or not they can have
objective knowledge of the past or whether our knowledge of the past is ultimately a mere
construction of the historian. We note that both are possible and that what differentiates objective
knowledge of the past or a construction of the past is whether or not virtues or vices have been
cultivated by the historian. Second, since we can have knowledge of the past, two ways in which
it is possible for one to have this knowledge of the past are then presented. We present the
Minimal Facts Approach as one possible avenue and note the application of various historical
criteria as a second. These are not the only two methods, but two that we believe to provide
secure historical knowledge. Lastly, we argue that historians could, in principle, conclude that a
miracle has occurred. After offering some philosophical analysis of the issue of miracles and the
historian’s craft, we identify and assess to objections to our conclusion.
We ultimately conclude that these are more like bumps in the road rather than actual
roadblocks that prevent investigation into the past. They should be considered in historical
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inquiry, but they certainly do not prevent one from investigating Jesus’ resurrection in particular
or the past in general.

ix

CHAPTER ONE: THREE ROADBLOCKS TO RESURRECTION RESEARCH
There are three major challenges to answering that question [what led to the disciples’
belief that Jesus rose from the dead?]. First, there is the question of whether historians
have the proper tools to enable them to investigate an event that is miraculous in nature.
The second pertains to the general ability of historians to learn about the past, given the
many challenges they face with such an enterprise. And, finally, a few scholars have
recently questioned the effectiveness of tools commonly employed by historians of Jesus
known as the criteria of authenticity. 1
- Mike Licona
As one of the central claims of Christianity, Jesus’ resurrection raises a significant
number of historical questions. Was Jesus actually alive just a short time after being publicly
crucified? Was the event considered to be historical by its earliest believers? Is it the type of
event that only a Christian would accept as historical? Is it an event that skeptics reject as having
occurred simply because they are not Christians? Does one’s biases, either as a believer or
skeptic, make their assessment of the past invalid? Do contradictory opinions about the
resurrection show that we cannot know what actually occurred and that each explanation is
simply a reflection of one’s biases? How can one go about knowing anything historical about the
events surrounding the end of Jesus’ life? Must one accept the Bible as inerrant/inspired to
accept the resurrection as historical? Can historians investigate miracle claims like the
resurrection or does that belong to the realm of theology? What is the relationship, if any,
between history and theology?
Such questions are as old as the reports of the resurrection itself and have not lost their
significance today. For example, in a recent 2019 book on the historical Jesus titled Jesus,
Skepticism, and the Problem of History, scholars raised many of these questions and did so not

Michael R. Licona, “Jesus’s Resurrection, Realism, and the Role of Criteria,” in Jesus, Skepticism and the
Problem of History: Criteria and Context in the Study of Christian Origins, ed. Darrell L. Bock and J. Ed
Komoszewski (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2019), 285.
1
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just in regard to Jesus’ resurrection in particular, but also to the life of Jesus and early church. 2
Michael Licona’s chapter specifically seeks to address three historical questions which he
believes can be “major challenges” to belief in the resurrection. 3 For him, these three issues are
(1) whether historians can investigate purported miraculous events; (2) can one know the past in
light of our differing historical-cultural contexts; and (3) whether the criteria are valid tools for
knowing past events.
These three questions are, coincidentally, the very same three questions we came to
believe as important to current historical investigations into whether or not Jesus rose from the
dead independently of Licona. Instead of a chapter long treatment of all three questions,
however, we will dedicate a chapter to each of these issues in an effort to add greater nuance and
clarity, address reasonable concerns, and, hopefully, provide a way to advance the discussion.
These three issues are all important and should be considered, but they do not provide an a priori
objection to the inquiry of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection
We will be addressing these issues in a slightly different order than Licona. The questions
we will be examining are the following (stated in their broadest sense):
•
•
•

Can we know the past in light of our biases (i.e. our historical-cultural settings)?
How can we know the past?
Can we know a miracle has occurred in the past in light of historical methods?

Darrell L. Bock and J. Ed Komoszewski, eds., Jesus, Skepticism and the Problem of History: Criteria and
Context in the Study of Christian Origins (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2019).
2
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Licona, “Jesus’s Resurrection, Realism, and the Role of Criteria.”
2

Recently other authors have been recognizing similar challenges to the study of the past in
general and Jesus’ resurrection in particular. Indeed, these issues are an underlying thread among
the differing authors of Jesus, Skepticism and the Problem of History. 4
An Outline of the Present Approach
The present project will dedicate a chapter to exploring each of the three issues
mentioned above. It will do so by frequently “zooming in” on how these issues affect Jesus’
resurrection in particular to “zooming out” and observing how they also affect history in general
(e.g. historical Jesus studies and beyond). Thus, sometimes the discussion will be more tightly
focused on Jesus’ resurrection while at other times the questions surrounding Jesus’ resurrection
will function as a microcosm of larger issues also facing historical inquiry more generally and
still at other times we will start with broader principles before “zooming in” to issues of Jesus’
resurrection.
The first challenge considered is whether, and to a degree how, one can know the past
given the limited and subjective nature of human inquirers. Although recent objections by
postmodern critics have suggested that history is merely a reflection of the author, it will be
argued that the subjective nature of the inquirer is essential to obtaining objective knowledge
about the past. However, to an extent these critics are correct in that it is possible our biases can
distort our evaluation of the past and that some have indeed used history as a means to further
their own interests. It will, then, be argued that the subjective nature of the inquirer will affect
their historical inquiry. The question is not whether it will, but how it will affect their work. We
argue that it can affect one’s research positively or negatively by identifying three virtues and
Similar concerns could also be identified, with the exception of the question regarding historians and
miracles, in Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne, eds., Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity (London: T &
T Clark, 2012).
4

3

three vices of the subjective role of the historian. Ultimately, when one is virtuous in their
investigation of the past, they can have objective knowledge of the past despite the fact that they
are doing so as a subjective inquirer from a limited historical-cultural perspective. Contrarily,
one who has cultivated vices are more likely to present distorted descriptions of the past. Thus,
we can know the past despite our limitations, and this is done by fostering and developing certain
(epistemic and moral) virtues.
The second challenge moves logically from the first. If one can know the past, then one
may reasonably ask, “How does one acquire knowledge about the past?” In this section, two
avenues are presented in which one may begin to secure knowledge about the past. These are not
the only ways, but they are two effective means by which someone can proceed. The first
presents the “Minimal Facts Approach” (MFA) which we believe yields some of the strongest, if
not the strongest, facts about the past. It will be argued that this is an effective method in
beginning to investigate the past since it uses data that is (1) highly evidenced and (2) widely
agreed upon by a diverse group of scholars. As such, it seeks multiple lines of evidence (i.e.
arguments for how one can know a past event occurred) and agreement among scholars with
differing, even contradictory, worldviews.
After considering the MFA, one may wonder what some of these multiple lines of
evidence are or what is it that convinces scholars of these facts. One answer to both of these
questions, as well as an answer to how we may know a past event occurred, is the use of
historical criteria that are typically referred to as the criteria of authenticity. These criteria add
probability to the historicity of a claimed event. Lastly, a brief examination into the claim that
Jesus was crucified will be used as a test case for the criteria.

4

The third and final challenge investigates whether historians can conclude that a miracle
occurred. Here we build off the first section and discuss that the virtues of an open and free
methodology should allow the historian to investigate such claims. We do not argue for any
miracle claim in particular, but rather argue that the historian would be within their epistemic
rights to investigate such claims and it is possible that they could conclude a miracle has
occurred if the evidence warrants it. We reach this conclusion by noting the failures of
methodological naturalism and discussing the fact that historians already examine the actions and
intentions of agents (including non-human agents) in order to show that the historian could
identify the action of a divine agent given the right constellation of evidence.
It is believed that these three issues, if not properly addressed, could be used as a priori
roadblocks to investigating the past in general and the resurrection of Jesus in particular. 5 We
thus want to clarify these issues in greater detail in order to allow for a free and open
examination of the past in general and Jesus’ resurrection in particular. We do not provide an
argument regarding the actual historicity of the resurrection here but are seeking primarily to
show that the door should be open and allow for engagement. Such engagement with the
question is of vital importance for both believers and unbelievers alike as there is much at stake
(1 Cor 15:12-19).

As noted, these issues are not strictly related to Jesus’ resurrection or historical Jesus research in general.
With the exception of the issue of miracle claims, Alan Spitzer helpfully discusses how some of these issues affect
historical assessments in Alan B. Spitzer, Historical Truth and Lies About the Past: Reflections on Dewey, Dreyfus,
de Man, and Reagan (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
5
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CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORIAN AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST
The historical skepticism ignited by the careful study of the texts has been fueled by the
multiplicity of diverse portraits of Jesus constructed by scholars, ranging from a fairly
traditional understanding of Jesus as a servant and Son of God to Jesus as a political
revolutionary, or as one who expected the immediate end of the world, or as the center of
a mushroom cult. These widely divergent portraits, all claiming to be based on the use of
an objective historical method, have reinforced the notion that we really cannot know
much about Jesus at all, and the corollary notion that it is possible to construct almost any
portrait of Jesus one wishes. 6
-Marcus Borg
Rather than describing what occurred in the past, historians can be accused of
constructing the past. One may consider such an objection as a “historical roadblock” since calls
into question our ability to know past events more generally and the questions about Jesus and
the resurrection more specifically. 7 This chapter will argue that the subjective influences of the
historian can positively (virtues) or negatively (vices) affect those investigating the past.
Although we are subjective beings, we still have the epistemic ability to know objective truths
about the past. 8 Our conclusion will emphasize that historical knowledge is adequate, fallible,

Marcus J. Borg, Jesus: A New Vision—Spirit, Culture, and the Life of Discipleship (New York: Harper &
Row, 1987), 9–10.
6

Indeed, the issue of the subjective nature of historical work has become so significant that in one recent
work on the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, a scholar devoted over seventy pages to this topic Michael R. Licona,
The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010), 29–107.
N. T. Wright devotes a few pages in his book in N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3, Christian
Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003), 3–31. However, this is the third volume
in his series. In the first volume he dedicates almost 150 pages to the topic in N. T. Wright, The New Testament and
the People of God, vol. 1, Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 3–
144.
7

When referring to subjectivity (or subjective elements, influences etc.) in this paper it can be used in a
variety of ways and with different connotations. Anthony Thiselton’s comments may be helpful here. “To be sure,
pre-understanding is a negotiable and provisional starting point, for which the word ‘presupposition’ may
sometimes be misleading since it often seems to suggest fixed beliefs that cannot be changed.” He continues,
“Nevertheless, the idea of interest goes even further than pre-understanding, because it denotes a specific kind of
pre-understanding, namely, that which serves self-interest especially in terms of power, self-affirmation, or the
gratification of desire by the self.” Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2009), 32 (emphasis in original). The subjective influences of the historian will vary, and it will thus be
best to understand whether we are using the word positively or negatively depending upon the context. Additionally,
subjectivity could also refer to presently held probabilistic beliefs, personality traits, dispositions, and even moral
8
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probabilistic and provisional which ultimately affirms that one can examine the past in general
and the resurrection in particular (at least in principle). 9
We will accomplish our goal by looking at how the issue of subjectivity has especially
been raised in historical Jesus studies as well in the even broader discipline of history and other
disciplines in general. 10 From here we will note that those inquiring into a given research topic
will have to wrestle with the reality that their limited and subjective position as an inquirer can
be used as a virtue or a vice. We will highlight how the virtues of the inquirer are able to yield
greater understanding and that those that are directed by vices are likely to distort the past. Thus,
we will conclude that knowledge of the past is attainable and consequently so is, in principle,
answers to the question regarding Jesus and whether Jesus died and rose again.
The “Bad Joke” of Historical Jesus Research
There have been an enormous number of attempts to write a historical account of Jesus’
life using strictly critical methods over the last few centuries. The late British classicist Michael
Grant noted in his own depiction of Jesus that people “have been attempting to write lives of
Jesus for a very long time. There have been more of them than of any other man or woman in
history; 60,000 were written in the nineteenth century alone.” 11 Given Jesus’ impact, especially

outlooks. We should note that discussions on various types of bias (e.g. confirmation bias, anchoring bias, cognitive
dissonance, etc.) will not be discussed directly or treated in depth, but some allusions to them will be made.
The question of whether the historian can investigate miracle claims as the third roadblock to
investigating the question of Jesus’ resurrection.
9

While other considerations regarding postmodernism would be helpful, they are beyond the scope of this
present work. For a helpful survey of the issues and how they relate to the issue of objective truth in general and
historical truth in particular see Stewart E. Kelly, Truth Considered and Applied: Examining Postmodernism,
History, and Christian Faith (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2011).
10

Michael Grant, Jesus: An Historian’s Review of the Gospels (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 197. Hugh
Anderson estimates “sixty thousand biographies” have been produced by liberal Protestant theologians. Hugh
Anderson, Jesus (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 16. Warren Kissinger humorously references John
21:25 regarding this plethora of publications. Warren S. Kissinger, The Lives of Jesus: A History and Bibliography
11
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in Western culture, it may be unsurprising that so much attention has been given to studying His
life. What has been surprising, however, is that these countless studies “have come to
extraordinarily divergent conclusions.” 12
The problem of “competent and even eminent scholars producing pictures of Jesus at
wide variance with one another” has notably been referred to as “something of a scholarly bad
joke” by NT scholar John Dominic Crossan. 13 He believes that the “stunning diversity is an
academic embarrassment.” 14 Crossan’s comments can leave one wondering what explains the
plurality of conflicting historical reconstructions, especially if one aspect of history is to present
the “objective” truth about events that have occurred in the past.
Throughout the twentieth century scholars have sought to explain this “stunning
diversity” by placing the blame on the historian. In 1906 Albert Schweitzer, who wrote one of

(New York: Garland, 1985), 3. NT scholars Stephen Neill and N. T. Wright observed that the period between 18601900 alone produced a significant number of diverse lives of Jesus. Stephen Neill and N. T. Wright, The
Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861-1986., New Ed. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988),
120. James Charlesworth points out that the number of volumes continued to expand throughout the mid-1900s.
James H. Charlesworth, “Jesus Research Expands with Chaotic Creativity,” in Images of Jesus Today, ed. James H.
Charlesworth and Walter P. Weaver (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994), 1. More recently the
German scholar Gerhard Lohfink noted that “since the time of the Enlightenment the gospels have been dissected as
no other text of the world’s literature has been.” Gerhard Lohfink, Jesus of Nazareth: What He Wanted, Who He
Was (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 1.
12
Grant, Jesus, 1. It should be noted here that there is a difference between a multitude of descriptions is
not inherently a bad thing. See, for example, the comments in Beth M. Sheppard, The Craft of History and the Study
of History (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 16–18. For similar comments about a multitude of
descriptions, but in disagreement about the imposition of the historian, see Walter P. Weaver, “In Quest of the
Quest: Finding Jesus,” in Jesus Research: New Methodologies and Perceptions, ed. James H. Charlesworth, Brian
Rhea, and Petr Pokorny, The Second Princeton-Prague Symposium on Jesus Research 2 (Grand Rapids, MI:
Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2014), 29. The difference that we are highlighting here is between a plurality of historical
descriptions and a plurality of mutually exclusive (and thus contradictory) descriptions.
13
John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (New York:
HarperOne, 1993), xxvii (emphasis added). Similarly Dale C. Allison, The Historical Christ and the Theological
Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 8-9 (“To the outsider, theories about Jesus must seem to crisscross each
other to create a maze of contradictions. For the portraits… are to large degree not complementary but
contradictory.”).
14

Crossan, The Historical Jesus, xxviii.
8

the most influential works on the historical Jesus, observed that the “professedly historical Jesus
is not a purely historical figure, but one which has been artificially transplanted into
history….What is admitted as historic is just what the Spirit of the time can take out of the
records in order to assimilate it to itself and bring out of it a living form.” 15 Later, in 1913,
George Tyrell famously charged Adolf von Harnack of searching for the historical Jesus at the
bottom of a deep well only to find the reflection of his own “Liberal Protestant face.” 16 While, in
1923, A. C. Headlam recognized that “a cause of failure in many scholars” is that “instead of
following their texts, they allow themselves to be overpowered by some mastering idea, and then
pour the history into that mould….Many strands of varied colour are woven together into the
Gospel narrative, and we do not explain it by allowing ourselves to see only one colour.” 17 In the
middle of the twentieth century, German scholar Günther Bornkamm stated that it had become
“alarmingly and terrifyingly evident” that historians would inevitably bring the “spirit of his own
age into his presentation of the figure of Jesus.” 18
These observations have persisted in recent years. In 1991 the historian John P. Meier
echoed Tyrell when he observed that there are a “legion of scholars who have peered

Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus to
Wrede, trans. W. Montgomery (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 309. Schweitzer opens his work by describing the
Jesus produced by historians as a “kaleidoscope figure” (vii).
15

George Tyrrell, Christianity at the Cross-Roads (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), 44. Tyrell’s
notable phrase is one that continues to be used by scholars. See, for example, Ben Witherington III, The Jesus
Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 9.
16

Arthur C. Headlam, The Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ (New York: Oxford University Press,
1923), 164.
17

Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, trans. James M. Robinson, (NY: Harper and Row, 1960), 13.
German version Günther Bornkamm, Jesus von Nazareth (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1956).
18
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narcissistically into the pool of the historical Jesus only to see themselves.” 19 Crossan, in 1993,
observed that it is “impossible to avoid the suspicion that historical Jesus research is a very safe
place to do theology and call it history, to do autobiography and call it biography.” 20 Grant
similarly, in 1995, wrote that historians have been unable “to dissociate themselves from their
own environment and age, these writers have all superimposed upon the history of the first
century AD something which more properly belongs to their own time.” 21 While in 1998
scholars Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz argued that the “multiplicity of pictures of Jesus is
reason to suspect that they are in reality self-portraits of their authors.” 22
Similar explanations continue in the twenty-first century. In 2009 NT scholar Craig
Keener pointed out that Jesus scholarship is “often driven by scholars’ assumptions, which are in
turn often the product of the ideas dominant in their own era. Biographers and historians
addressing other ancient figures might interpret their subjects sympathetically, but Jesus
scholarship has developed this tendency more than most.” 23 While in 2014 Daniel Moore

John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, vol. 1: The Roots and the Problem of
the Person, Anchor Bible Reference Library (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 3.
19

20
Crossan, The Historical Jesus, xxviii. See also Robert W. Funk, Roy W. Hoover, and the Jesus Seminar,
The Five Gospels: What Did Jesus Really Say? The Search for the Authentic Words of Jesus (New York : Toronto:
Scribner Book Company, 1993), 5.

Grant, Jesus, 197. Similarly Stephen Neill and N. T. Wright observed that in 1860-1900 a significant
number of diverse subjective lives of Jesus were produced. Neill and Wright, The Interpretation of the New
Testament, 1861-1986., 120.
21

Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz, Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press, 1998), 13.
22

23
Craig S. Keener, The Historical Jesus of the Gospels (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 3. Allison
asks “Which Jesus should baptize our theology?” Allison, The Historical Christ and the Theological Jesus, 9. Luke
Timothy Johnson similarly notes a connection between historical realities for theological conclusions Luke Timothy
Johnson, The Real Jesus: The Misguided Quest for the Historical Jesus and the Truth of the Traditional Go (San
Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 1997), 55. Similarly See also pg. 48.
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observed that this “penchant to reduce Jesus to a mirror image of the reconstructor is a constant
hazard and dogged critique of the historical Jesus quest.” 24
Beyond Historical Jesus Research, Beyond History
As this survey indicates, historical Jesus studies have been concerned about historians
who inappropriately impose themselves into their historical work. 25 The situation is similar for
historians beyond this specialization. Indeed, in 1934 the socio-political historian Charles Beard
rhetorically asked: “Has it not been said for a century or more that each historian who writes
history is a product of his age, and that his work reflects the spirit of the times, of a nation, race,
group, class or section?”26 Two notable thinkers during the period referenced by Beard were
Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) and Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884). 27 These issues have
been debated more recently by thinkers such as Hayden White and Richard Evans. 28
Long before these discussions, ancient writers were similarly not oblivious to these
problems nor their negative consequences. Thucydides prefaces his work by noting a concern
Daniel F. Moore, “Jesus, an Emerging Jewish Mosaic,” in Jesus Research: New Methodologies and
Perceptions, ed. James H. Charlesworth, Brian Rhea, and Petr Pokorny, The Second Princeton-Prague Symposium
on Jesus Research 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2014), 71.
24

The key phrase here is inappropriately imposing. There are appropriate assumptions that can be made by
the historian. As will be seen, this phrase will be important throughout the chapter. For a discussion of inappropriate
impositions see Thomas F. Torrance, God and Rationality (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 34, 89. For a
description of appropriate assumptions for the historian see Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 156.
25

Charles A. Beard, “Written History as an Act of Faith,” The American Historical Review 39, no. 2
(1934): 220 (emphasis added).
26

Michael Maclean, for example, points out that Droysen “frequently cites the tendency of historians to
read their own ideas into the past as one of the greatest dangers facing the discipline.” Michael J. Maclean, “Johann
Gustav Droysen and the Development of Historical Hermeneutics,” History and Theory 21, no. 3 (1982): 361. For
an overview of these debates see Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, Third Edition,
3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 228–47, 268-290.
27

28
Hayden V. White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation,
Fulcrum.Org (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Richard J. Evans, In Defense of History
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000). One may find the older debate between the following two helpful as
well. E. H. Carr, What Is History? (New York: Vintage, 1961); G. R. Elton, The Practice of History (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967).
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that his own potential impressions of an event could be distorted while also pointing out the
partiality of some of his sources. 29 Polybius recognizes the biases of Philinus and Fabius and
adds that historians should not shrink from criticizing friends or complimenting enemies when
reporting the truth of the past. 30 Plutarch provides a discussion on how to delineate between
historical works that show signs of being affected by prejudice and those that attempt to be more
objective. 31 Tacitus recognized that the truth of history can be damaged or impaired (infracta)
due to one’s biases and partiality (typically due to flattery or hatred). 32 Both Josephus and Lucian
similarly identified the temptation of selfishness, especially flattery, as an inhibitor to the truth of
the past. 33 These ancient writers knew very well that the historians could present one-sided,
partial, or even blatantly false descriptions of the past. 34 These concerns were also noted by early
Christian writers as well. 35

Thucydides, History, 1.22. See also Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Letter to Gnaeus Pompeius, 3-4 who
views Thucydides as being biased towards Athens, causing him to enlarge failures and omit victories.
29

Polybius, Histories, 1.14; 12.25. Similarly, Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 21.17.1-3 (complains
against Timaeus for adding bad qualities and ignoring successes).
30

Plutarch, On the Malice of Herodotus. See also, for example, where Plutarch refers to Antiphon’s noted
unfair hatred and abuse of Alcibiades (Plutarch, Alcibiades, 3.1).
31

32

Tacitus, Histories, 1.1.

33

Josephus, Antiquities, Pref.1; Lucian, How to Write History, 13, 41.

Lucian shares a notable account where a historian tried to flatter Alexander by including a fictitious
battle into the historical report. The historian’s reward, however, was that he was threatened to be tossed into the
Hydaspes River for presuming to fight battles for Alexander! Lucian, How to Write History, 12.
34

For example, Irenaeus of Lyons complained against Gnostics for their distorted description of Jesus. He
writes that “Their manner of acting is just as if one, when a beautiful image of a king has been constructed by some
skillful artist out of precious jewels, should then take this likeness of the man all to pieces, should re-arrange the
gems, and so fit them together as to make them into the form of a dog or of a fox, and even that but poorly executed”
(Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1.8.1. See also Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity, 7.4 [cf. 1.18]). The Gnostics,
according to Irenaeus, had turned the image of Jesus and Christianity into a reflection of their own creation. More
recently, Kevin Vanhoozer has noted an interesting connection between early Gnosticism and postmodernity. Kevin
J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge,
Anniversary Edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), 120–21.
35
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The problem regarding the improper influence of the inquiring subject and preconceived
conceptual frameworks into their “object of inquiry” is not restricted to history but extends itself
into other disciplines as well. 36 For example, in the middle of the twentieth century two notable
works were written in which the authors highlighted how subjective factors that played a
valuable part in advancing (or rejecting) scientific theories. In his book Personal Knowledge:
Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1958), Michael Polanyi argued strongly that the subjective
component of the scientist was essential to their work but also a potential cause for error. 37
While Thomas Kuhn’s famous Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) emphasized that the
horizons of scientists impacted their work in a way much more significant than was generally
believed. 38
These comments illustrate how scholars writing at different times, in different contexts,
and even in different disciplines have identified a significant factor that has been persistently
tempting scholars and distorting conclusions. 39 Historians, as well as those in other disciplines,

As a result of this, throughout this work we will refer to the broadest possible: “object of inquiry.” The
reason for this is that our approach is not solely limited to history and we want to keep that in mind throughout the
work, but since our main focus is the historical component often times when we refer to the historian’s “object of
inquiry” in will generally refer to a written source. For more see fn. 61 below.
36

For some of his most valuable discussions on interpretations and science see Michael Polanyi, Personal
Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1974 [1958]), 3, 11,
19–20, 60, 138, 142–43, 150–60, 265, 268, 286–94.More recently, the atheist philosopher of science Bradley
Monton repeatedly identified aspects of subjectivity (as well as distinct bias and prejudice) affecting current
scientific discussions. Bradley Monton, Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design (Buffalo,
NY: Broadview Press, 2009), 48–49, 51–52, 59, 64-5 71-2.
37

Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edition (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1996 [1962]). He notes that “one of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a
criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions”
(37). Of course, these paradigms have the potential to “insulate the community” from important questions “because
they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies” (37). Another
interesting work in this area is by Bernard Barber who identifies three cultural influences and three social influences
that affect scientists and, subsequently, the scientific advancements. Bernard Barber, “Resistance by Scientists to
Scientific Discovery,” Science 134, no. 3479 (1961): 596–602.
38

Many of these comments predate the recent and major postmodern movements of the 1970s. Timothy
McGrew finds little benefit from recent discussions on postmodernism and argues, more strongly, when he writes
39

13

must avoid the belief that they can study their object of inquiry (e.g. the past, chemistry, etc.) as
though they do not have worldview or paradigm. 40 Not only is such a belief the very first fallacy
in David Hackett Fischer’s classic Historians’ Fallacies (“Baconian Fallacy”), but also because
it is impossible do so.41
Importantly, despite the claims of some, this emphatically does not mean that therefore
all truth is relative, all interpretations are equally true, or all historical descriptions are equally
true. 42 Rather, many historians have recognized a balanced synthesis that takes objective and
that scholars of the “stature of J. B. Lightfoot [for example] do not need the nattering of would-be literary critics
infected with bad epistemology to teach them to be judicious.” Timothy J McGrew, “Inference, Method, and
History,” Southeastern Theological Review 3, no. 1 (2012): 27.
Worldview, or Weltanschauung, is the broadest term that encompasses all our beliefs. Although
sometimes other words may be used in place of worldview, we are using it here in the sense that it our fundamental
beliefs about the world. These sorts of beliefs buildup various horizons, conceptual frameworks, biases,
presuppositions, paradigms, and preconceived notions within one’s worldview. From these fundamental beliefs we
interpret the world around us. Simultaneously, the world around us can also inform our worldview. Within one’s
worldview, we hold to various beliefs with different levels of certainty and probability, but sometimes probabilistic
beliefs can be held so tightly that they become certain beliefs in practice (i.e. they only interpret the world and are
not open to revision or revaluation) or because have a blind spot that prevents us from recognizing that such views
can be revised or reevaluated. Thus, one’s worldview does not just depend upon or is shaped by fundamental
epistemological assumptions, but it is also affected by probabilistic beliefs that have also shaped one’s worldview to
some degree. Additionally, although the terms conceptual framework, paradigm, and preconceived notions may
have different connotations (i.e. “paradigm” may frequently be associated with the sciences vis-à-vis Kuhn), they
will be used synonymously in the sense described above. In short, worldview refers to an entire web of beliefs while
the other phrases refer to a portion of the web and how its interconnected to other beliefs and contributes to the
entire web of beliefs. We will be arguing that both the web and the interconnectedness between beliefs within the
web should not be improperly imposed when conducting an inquiry. For more information on worldviews see
famously James W. Sire, The Universe Next Door: A Basic Worldview, 5th ed. (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic,
2009). For a recent overview on the definition of worldview, see James W. Sire, Naming the Elephant: Worldview
as a Concept, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015), 23–69.
40

41
David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper
& Row, 1970), 4–8. Carl Trueman writes that “we must acknowledge at the outset that history written without a
standpoint is not simply practically impossible—it is also logically inconceivable.” Carl R. Trueman, Histories and
Fallacies: Problems Faced in the Writing of History (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010), 26. Michael Grant reminds us
that it was just a futile for ancients to attempt to write histories devoid of a perspective. Michael Grant, Greek and
Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation (London: NY: Routledge, 1995), 68.

David Hackett Fischer lists five objections to the idea of such relativizing history in a footnote as he
believes such a view has been “sufficiently exposed.” Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 41-43 (esp. 42 fn. 4). These
errors include: confusion between the way knowledge is acquired and validating that knowledge; relativism
conflates being incomplete with being false; false distinctions between history and natural sciences; believe that
relativist supporters are exempt from the charge of relativism and thus inconsistent; relativist uses of subjectivity are
literal nonsense. For fuller treatments see, Evans, In Defense of History; C. Behan McCullagh, The Truth of History
(New York: Routledge, 1998); Perez Zagorin, “History, The Referent, and Narrative: Reflections on Postmodernism
42
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subjective components seriously when studying the past. 43 As the historian Thomas Haskell
rightly observed, one ought not to confuse objectivity with neutrality.44
Subjectivity: A Hypostatic Union with Objectivity?
N. T. Wright helpfully reminds us that to “discover that a particular writer has a ‘bias’
tells us nothing whatever about the value of the information he or she presents. It merely bids us
be aware of the bias (and of our own, for that matter), and to assess the material according to as
many sources as we can.” 45 There are a number of factors that all contribute to the historian’s
“bias” which legitimately shape the selection, arrangement, and description of past events.
Now,” History & Theory 38, no. 1 (February 1999): 1–24; Thomas L. Haskell, “Objectivity Is Not Neutrality:
Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream,” History & Theory 29, no. 2 (May 1990): 129–57; Perez
Zagorin, “Rejoinder to a Postmodernist,” History & Theory 39, no. 2 (May 2000): 201–9; Licona, The Resurrection
of Jesus, 79-89 (esp. 86-87).
Gary Habermas notes that since around the middle of the twentieth century historians have accepted a
synthetic approach whereby historians explicitly sought to take both objective and subjective elements into account.
Gary R. Habermas, The Historical Jesus: Ancient Evidence for the Life of Christ (Joplin, MO: College Press Pub.,
1996), 265. Fischer addressed the issues of extreme objectivity and extreme subjectivity as older problems which
occasionally resurface. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 4–8, 41–43.
43

44
Haskell, “Objectivity Is Not Neutrality,” 134; Trueman, Histories and Fallacies, 27–28, 30, 66. One
might similarly suggest that having bias is not the same as being biased.

Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:89 (emphasis added). Trueman writes “it is not a
historian’s motivation which renders his or her analysis invalid; it is improper use and interpretation of evidence
which does so” (Trueman, Histories and Fallacies, 30). Early, Gary R. Habermas likewise wrote that “it is
undeniable that everyone generally operates within his or her own concept of reality and usually views information
through multicolored lenses.” Gary R. Habermas, “Did Jesus Perform Miracles?,” in Jesus Under Fire, ed. Michael
J. Wilkins and J. P. Moreland (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995), 126. Jewish NT scholar Amy-Jill Levine
writes “bias in scholarship is inevitable and, more, it need not be a deterrent to good historical work: one can be
biased and correct” (Amy-Jill Levine, “Christian Faith and the Study of the Historical Jesus: A Response to Bock,
Keener, and Webb,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 9, no. 1 [January 2011]: 97). Haskell writes that
“among the influential members of the historical profession the term objectivity has long since lost whatever
connection it may once have had with passionlessness, indifference, and neutrality.” Haskell, “Objectivity Is Not
Neutrality,” 131. He adds, similar to Levine, that polemicists could, for example, be objective so long as they
properly engage their opponents (135). Paul Barnett likewise finds that “subjectivity does not imply falsehood.”
Paul Barnett, Finding the Historical Christ, vol. 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 5. James Tabor notes, “All
historians come to their investigations with selective criteria of judgment forged by both acknowledged and
unrecognized predisposed interests and cultural assumptions. There is no absolutely objective place to stand.” James
D. Tabor, The Jesus Dynasty: Hidden History of Jesus, His Royal Family, and the Birth of Christianity (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2006), 316. Joel Willitts similarly views subjectivity as something that can be positive. Joel
Willitts, “Presuppositions and Procedures in the Study of the ‘Historical Jesus’: Or, Why I Decided Not to Be a
‘Historical Jesus’ Scholar,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3, no. 1 (January 2005): 101.
45
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Cambridge Historian Richard Evans writes that it is “an illusion to believe otherwise.” 46 The fact
that historians (and their sources) cannot escape their own historical-cultural setting is something
that good historians recognize and take into account. 47
Historians need to “be aware” of a number of different worldviews or paradigms that can
affect their work. They must not only deal with (1) their own personal points of view, but also
those of (2) their sources and (3) other scholars who have also written on that topic as well (4)
possible new vantage points from which to evaluate the data and even (5) the audience to whom
they will be writing. These five areas could be further subdivided into additional categories, but
the main point is that all of these factors place high demands on this historian, but such are the
demands of wise judgment and good history which properly take into account the rich
complexities of the past. 48
No one person has a “God’s eye” point of view (i.e. exhaustive knowledge of all factors
involved from every perspective) of the past or the present. This has led some historians to use
photographs as an analogy to historical descriptions in order to help illustrate that our

Evans, In Defense of History, 217. Historian Carl R. Trueman writes that “it seems to be obvious (though
it is paraded as some sort of profound, brilliant insight by too many these days) that no historian writes a neutral
history and thus that every historical narrative reflects the author’s own approach in some measure, both as to
selection of evidence, shaping of story, and various emphases and purposes.” Trueman, Histories and Fallacies, 66.
See also 21, 25, 62.
46

47
W. H. Walsh, “The Limits of Scientific History,” in Philosophical Analysis & History, ed. William H.
Dray, Sources in Contemporary Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 73. In another essay, Walsh provides
four “factors which actually make for disagreement among historians” and they are: personal likes and dislikes;
prejudices and assumptions; conflicting theories of historical interpretation; and different moral beliefs and
anthropologies. W. H. Walsh, “Can History Be Objective?,” in The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An
Anthology, ed. Hans Meyerhoff (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959), 216–17. In 1934, Beard wrote that
“Every student of history knows that his colleagues have been influenced in their selection and ordering of materials
by their biases, prejudices, beliefs, affections, general upbringing, and experience particularly social and economic.”
Beard, “Written History as an Act of Faith,” 220. More recently James Dunn argues that “critical scholarship is
never critical enough unless it is also self-critical and with equal vigour.” James D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered,
vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 34 (emphasis in original).

We should add to these challenges that the complexities of the past are exacerbated when the historian
must judge between competing “voices” of the past according to their different sources.
48
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epistemological limitations are limitations and not epistemological eliminations. Despite our
limitations, we can still obtain, albeit partial, knowledge of the past. Just as each photo is taken
from an angle or vantage point, so too is each historical work written (or read) from a
perspective. 49 Photographs are able to nevertheless present objective and truthful information
despite the fact that it is taken from a subjective position which is inherently limited. It is similar
with historical descriptions. In 1961 E. H. Carr argued that it “does not follow that, because a
mountain appears to take on different shapes from different angles of vision, it has objectively
either no shape at all or an infinity of shapes.” 50 A plurality of portraits of Jesus (i.e. historical
descriptions), then, is not inherently problematic any more than a plurality of photographs. 51
More recently, historian Beth Sheppard has argued that a plurality of portraits is an
important feature of historical research. 52 The numerous historical depictions of Princess Diana
are perfectly reasonable because one “particular author might focus on her role as a mother,
while another might emphasize her work for charity…. Still one more writer might examine
Diana’s impact on hairstyles or fashion. The point here is that no single biography and no single
historian will ever create the sole complete portrait.” 53 Of course discussions and debates will

49
N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church
(New York: HarperOne, 2008), 61.
50

Carr, What Is History?, 30–31.

It should be noted that just as some historical descriptions distort the past, so too can some images distort
the image or create optical illusions. For helpful analogies between optical illusions related to our thought processes
see Mahzarin R. Banaji, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People (New York: Bantam Books, 2016), 3–21.
51

“Different historians, using different presuppositions or methods, may analyze the same evidence but still
provide divergent pictures of a single event or person…. One scholar may emphasize some bits of the available
information more than other pieces.” Sheppard, The Craft of History, 16–17.
52

Sheppard, 17–18. Adding, “There will always be room for additional, valid biographical portraits that
employ, as it were, different brush strokes, different pigments, or a slightly different sense of composition” (18). See
also Headlam, The Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ, 164; Allison, The Historical Christ and the Theological
Jesus, 12–13.
53
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arise when one portrait is emphasized too much, too little, or where there are mutually exclusive
portraits.
An inherent limitation of taking a photo from a certain position is that it will inevitably
have various blind spots. 54 These blind spots can be more or less relevant depending upon the
inquiry. 55 “Some ‘meanings’ or ‘interpretations’ will be…more appropriate than others….some
angles of vision do less justice to the information than others,” argues Wright. 56 Importantly,
while we may often see the blind spots of others much more easily, it is important to make sure
that we do not ignore the reality of our own potential blind spots.
James Tabor writes that when it “comes to the quest for the historical Jesus our need to
be aware of our own prejudices seems particularly acute. No other figure in history elicits such
passionate responses nor engenders such opposite conclusions.” 57 We do well, then, to
acknowledge the potential limitations (blind spots) of our own perspective as well as the
limitations of others. 58 This fact should lead one to humbly and critically consider other
perspectives. If one fails to take these considerations into account, they may become more

Wright comments that “All accounts ‘distort’, but some do so considerably more than others. All
accounts involve ‘interpretation’; the question is whether this interpretation discloses the totality of the event…or
whether it squashes it out of shape.” Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:92.
54

For example, if one is wondering what color the apple is on the table, vantage points from above the table
will provide a distinctively better vantage point than those under the table. The blind spots of those viewing the top
of the table are not relevantly significant for the question of the color of the apple. For an example in historical Jesus
studies see Benjamin C. F. Shaw, “What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: Historiography and the
Historical Jesus,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 15, no. 2–3 (December 11, 2017): 295.
55

56

Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:91.

57

Tabor, The Jesus Dynasty, 316–17.

58
These discussions may well remind one of R. G. Collingwood’s memorable comment, “The tailless fox
preached taillessness,” R. G. Collingwood, “An Autobiography,” in R. G. Collingwood: An Autobiography and
Other Writings: With Essays on Collingwood’s Life and Work, ed. David Boucher and Teresa Smith (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017), 46. For the fox could only see the world through the lens of “taillessness” and was
thus interpreted (and preached) through the singular, rigid, and dogmatic outlook.
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susceptible to forms of ethnocentrism (failing to consider one’s own limitations) or xenocentrism
(failing to consider the limitations of others). 59
A “community of conscience” is a great tool in helping to reflect upon multiple
perspectives as well as making one more aware of possible tensions or blind spots within their
own view and those of others. 60 Not only does it cause us to be more self-reflective and selfcritical of our own position, but we are also presented with other alternatives that we may
challenge or that may challenge us. In order to have a greater and more robust understanding one
must be able to consider a multitude of perspectives.
The photograph analogy, therefore, is particularly helpful for demonstrating the
importance of both the objective and subjective poles of historical reconstruction. Important
distinctions should be seen between the ontological reality of the past with our epistemological
access to that reality. There is something that has objectively occurred apart from the individual
recording or describing the event (i.e. the object being photographed) and there is also an
epistemological limitation (i.e. the angle taken by the photographer). This analogy allows one to
recognize and avoid the extremes of subjective relativism and the impossible dream of neutral
objectivity. Objectivity is not neutrality.

Problems that confront ethnocentrism similarly confront xenocentrism. Jörn Rüsen helpfully offers the
reminder that while ethnocentrism raises various dangers, so does its inverted form where the “other” is made
superior. Jörn Rüsen, Evidence and Meaning: A Theory of Historical Studies, trans. Diane Kerns and Katie Digan,
Making Sense of History 28 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 207–10.
59

60
Torrance refers to a “community of conscience” which is important for helping point out blind spots in
our thinking. For example, when we think we have eliminated inappropriate intrusions upon the object of inquiry but
in reality have not, then the community can help bring this to our attention. Torrance, God and Rationality, p. 202.
See similarly Mark Allan Powell, “Evangelical Christians and Historical-Jesus Studies: Final Reflections,” Journal
for the Study of the Historical Jesus 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 127; Willitts, “Presuppositions and Procedures in the
Study of the ‘Historical Jesus,’” 101–2; Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 54–56.
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Although historians and their sources have worldviews, presuppositions, and biases
which influence how they interpret the world (and subsequently the past events), these elements
do not prevent one from accurately knowing (or describing) the past. People can simultaneously
have biases and objective knowledge about the past. However, in the context of historical
investigation, one may think of a historian’s accepted paradigm as a double-edged sword. 61 They
can be an asset, but one must not forget that they can be a liability that may cause damage. Just
as fire can both cook and burn food, so too can a horizon shed light or bring darkness to our
understanding. 62 A few important considerations will now be made regarding the active role of
the inquirer into the past so that one may embrace the benefits while avoiding the dangers. 63
Subjectivity as a Double-Edged Sword: A Virtue or a Vice
This section will begin by discussing how one’s subjectivity could be a virtue before
considering its potential as a vice. The reason for this is because some of the vices may seem (at
least initially) odd, abstract, or possibly over dramatic. Hopefully, by providing a description of
the virtuous application of subjectivity first, the vices will then be made clearer by their
deviations from the virtues. By discussing this issue and contrasting these characteristics, the

61
If one wishes to analyze worldviews, one will need to move beyond just the discipline of history.
Although history is important in shaping one’s worldview and can certainly have an impact, it cannot be the sole
arbiter.

The free will defense often employed by theists as an explanation for the existence of evil may also be an
analogy for knowledge of the past. To have free will, it is argued, humans must have the ability to do both good and
evil. Analogously, to know the past, humans bust also have the ability to see the world from their worldview as well
as the worldviews of others.
62

63
While the book is primarily warns of several historical fallacies historians to avoid, there is also some
excellent advice for historians to follow in Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 38-9,62-3, 99–100, 128-130,160-3, 183–
85, 213–15, 240–42, 258–59, 277–81, 305–6. See also Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 52–62. He suggests
several ways to help historians address their own subjectivities: method, publicizing their horizons, peer pressure
aimed at impartiality, submitting ideas to unsympathetic experts, accounting for relevant historical bedrock, and
detachment.
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significance of how subjective factors can affect the quest for objective truth will hopefully be
made clearer as well as provide some insight on factors involved in the application of historical
virtues and vices.
Subjectivity as a Virtue
Three virtues of subjectivity will be examined to help demonstrate how the subjective
elements of the historian can positively affect their ability to obtain objective knowledge of the
past. First, one should make the choice to avoid inappropriate a priori projections. Second, one
should be willing to bracket their worldviews. Lastly, one should make the decision to submit or
follow-after the data itself.
1. Choosing free/open disclosure by rejecting a priori projections
As noted above, the objectivity/subjectivity issue affects a wide range of disciplines so it
is important to remember that these principles extend beyond history and into other realms of
knowledge. Allowing the object of inquiry to disclose itself on its own terms, free from
inappropriately imposed a priori biases, prejudices, or conceptual frameworks of the inquirer is
vital in any inquiry.
Although he was largely concerned with theology and science, the late theologian
Thomas F. Torrance provided an important argument in which he warns against projecting one’s
own “inflexible conceptual structure” upon their object of study. In any discipline, one’s object
of inquiry must not be forced to accord with prefigured conceptual schemes. 64 With respect to
NT studies Torrance writes

Torrance, God and Rationality, 9. John Morrison provides a helpful summary of Torrance’s concern,
“the object is reckoned as relative to the subject, affected by the subject, so that in the subject-object relation it is the
subjective pole that becomes masterful, intruding itself on the object.” John D. Morrison, Knowledge of the Self
64
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But it does mean that I am not prepared to allow the socially conditioned paradigms of
one community to apply as interpretative rules for another, very different in time, place
and culture, or to allow a set of theoretical and methodological ideas thrown up out of our
own cultural trends and philosophies of life to distort what I read in the ancient texts, but
insist that we must be quite ruthless with ourselves in discarding all assumptions of an a
priori or extraneous derivation, in attempting to penetrate into the conceptual forms and
patterns at work in the actual empirical stream of tradition in which the text being
interpreted is to be found. We must do our utmost to allow these texts to bear witness to
themselves as far as possible out of themselves and their own inherent demands, and to let
them impress upon us the appropriate frame of reference for our understanding of them,
so that we may interpret them from within their own natural coherences. 65
How is one to be “ruthless” in preventing the imposition of improper a prioris on the object of
inquiry? 66 Torrance argues that one must think after (nachdenken) and submit to the free
disclosure of the object to the inquirer. 67 Free disclosure can only occur when it is not limited or
controlled by the presuppositions of the inquirer. This enables the object of inquiry to honestly

Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth Torrance (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1997), 4 (emphasis added).
This also helps us to identify when one’s bias has gone too far and abandoned objective inquiry.
65
Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 4 (emphasis added).
Torrance adds,

That this kind of objectivity is not served by assuming from the very start, as for example Rudolf Bultmann
insists in his various essays on hermeneutics, that we cannot but operate with an outlook upon the universe
as ‘a closed continuum of cause and effect’, or by setting aside arbitrarily any idea that God’s self-utterance
in word has left its profound imprint upon the shape and content of the biblical Scriptures, for that is to
bring to the task of biblical interpretation an essentially closed mind which can only result in some sort of
scientific or sociological reductionism.
66
It should be noted that some may want to draw different connotations from what we will refer to as
“objects of inquiry” and the “Other.” For example, some “objects of inquiry” can refer to physical, non-personal
objects while the “other” refers to human beings who are different from ourselves in some relevant way. However,
in this paper we will be using these terms synonymously and are not making such a distinction. For example, if
someone today is studying the Thucydides then Thucydides is simultaneously the object of inquiry (as a goal and as
a source) as well as the other (as an individual with inherent human worth and a different understanding of the world
than that of modern inquirers).
67
Torrance argued that after the Reformation the term “dogmatic science was applied to describe new
physics, [and was a] positive form of science” whereby the emphasis was placed on an a posteriori approach rather
than a priori. Torrance, God and Rationality, 89. Torrance asserts that this phrase was taken from the Greek
distinction, made by Sextus Empiricus, between dogmatikoi (“one who asked questions of the kind that yielded
positive results”) and skeptikoi (“one who asked merely academic questions without any intention of getting positive
answers”). Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 339.
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and openly be understood on its own terms. Torrance, like several others, emphasizes that this
necessitates the inquirer’s active role in acquiring true knowledge. 68 Only an active subject can
be “ruthless” in its questioning and doubting of its own assumptions which, in turn, allows them
to properly discard any inappropriate a priori preconceptions. 69 Thus, one must allow their
thinking to follow after (nachdenken) its object of inquiry while refusing to allow their own
inappropriate a priori prejudices, which are foreign to the inherent nature of the object, to distort
their understanding of the object. 70
The argument here is, of course, not new. It is reflected, for example, in a comment
made in a novel written in the 1860s by Fyodor Dostoyevsky. In his Crime and Punishment,
Raskolnikov receives a letter from his mother warning him of the pitfalls of prejudice because he
will soon meet his sister Dunia’s fiancé, Luzhin. Raskolnikov’s mother warns him that “in order
to understand any man one must be deliberate and careful to avoid forming prejudices and
mistaken ideas, which are very difficult to correct and get over afterwards.” 71 Raskolnikov is
thus encouraged to make the decision to impartially judge the character of Luzhin. He has a
personal choice to make when meeting his sister’s fiancé. It is this choice which inquirers have
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and which allows them to refuse (or, contrarily, to indulge) prejudices and submit to the
intelligibility of its object as it freely discloses itself. 72 It is precisely to such an act that to which
Raskolnikov’s mother appeals. 73
One must, as difficult as it can be at times (including meeting a sister’s fiancé), make the
decision that a subjective being can, namely, to refuse to inappropriately project their views upon
the data. Indeed, Anthony Thiselton stresses that this is essential in hermeneutics. “The
interpreter of texts is not a neutral observer,” he writes, “Understanding in the fullest sense
demands engagement and self-involvement. Virtually every exponent of contemporary
hermeneutics supports this view.” 74 Not only is it a mistake to seek “neutral” or “value-free”
judgments, but knowledge “demands” the active involvement of the subjective individual to
submit to the conceptual frameworks of their object. 75 They must deliberately choose to follow
after (nachdenken) their object of inquiry in an a posteriori manner. Only such an a posteriori
72
See, for example, Meyer, Critical Realism and the New Testament, 139–40; Haskell, “Objectivity Is Not
Neutrality,” 133–34.

Of course, one may see this example as ironic since Raskolnikov’s initial assumptions were indeed
correct. Thus, although he was biased, his biases happened to be correct in this instance. The example is
nevertheless helpful since Dostoyevsky illustrates an awareness, prior to the linguistic turn, of a novelist who
recognized the difference between a balanced judgment and a prejudiced judgment (See also fn. 34 above).
Moreover, Polanyi notes how scientists have been inadvertently correct on some theories in a similar way. Polanyi,
Personal Knowledge, 10–15. As we will see below, we are not advocating that one avoid having a preunderstanding
or working hypothesis or that such is even possible. The issue is whether such preunderstandings are unchangeable,
imposed, restrictive, etc.
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approach will allow the data to freely reveal itself to the inquirer such that the inquirer may then
apprehend objective knowledge that is revealed from the object itself (instead of the subject).
2. Bracketing worldviews and “loving thy neighbor”
Historians have recognized the danger of imposing one’s preconceived ideas upon the
data and another way to minimize this threat is to allow the sources, as best as possible, to speak
for themselves and on their own terms. By respecting or “loving thy neighbor” (cf. Mark 12:31),
one is enabled to bracket their own views and allows their source to freely reveal itself on its
own inherent intelligibility and thus to be truly understood on its own conceptual framework.
The late Ben Meyer noted this when he wrote, “Good will is an antecedent disposition of
openness to the horizon, message, and tone of the text.” 76
However, to do this one must be willing to bracket their own views and allow the other to
reveal itself freely to the inquirer. 77 Indeed, as Haskell has argued, one of the most powerful
arguments a historian can provide is one in which the author has momentarily bracketed their
own perceptions in order to properly assess competing descriptions. 78 Notre Dame professor of
European history Brad Gregory has likewise argued that if one wishes to better know the past,
then it is crucial to understand individuals of the past on their own terms. 79 For Gregory, the
“key distinction to be made is not between …our conviction and assumptions, whatever they are,

Meyer, Critical Realism and the New Testament, 92. Similarly, Licona encourages historians to seek a
“full understanding of and empathy for the opposing view.” Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 60–61.
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and those of the people we want to understand. The first prerequisite is one of the most difficult:
we must be willing to set aside our own beliefs – about the nature of reality, about human
priorities, about morality – in order to try to understand them.” 80 In order to understand someone,
the inquirer must be willing to enter into their mindset and try to understand them on their own
terms. 81 This is a decidedly subjective decision that is virtuous for one to make as it requires
respect for the other or “loving thy neighbor” and assists in attaining greater understanding of the
past. 82 The greater extent that a historian can bracket their own views, the greater they can
understand others and the greater their ability to identify and describe the complexities and
interrelationships of the past.
This decision should occur from the very beginning of one’s historical investigation. For
example, questions framed by the historian should be asked in such a way that is not leading or
constrictive. Both Fischer and Torrance are adamant that within the process of inquiry, questions
should be open-ended, flexible, and open to refinement. 83 A constrictive question, on the other
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hand, is one in which conceptual schemes have been woven into the question such that
inappropriate, constrained, or disfigured answers are yielded. 84
The very purpose of inquiry, Torrance points out, is to obtain new information and
therefore a “genuine question is one in which you interrogate something in order to let it disclose
itself to you and so reveal to you what you do not and cannot know otherwise. It is the kind of
question you ask in order to learn something new, which you cannot know by inferring it from
what you already know.” 85 In other words, an inquirer is one who is seeking an answer, not one
who already has it. The noted NT Princeton professor James Charlesworth warns that it is
“imperative to choose and employ the best methods and then to be self-critical, seeking to ensure
that our search has not been detoured by marred circuitous questioning….we have accomplished
nothing if we allow a wish to be the parent of a result. This warning applies to all research
scholars.” 86 It is therefore important that we do not begin an investigation by improperly
imposing ourselves upon our object of inquiry at the outset by asking “loaded” questions. It is
thus desirable that our questions allow for the free disclosure of the object and are open-ended,
flexible, and able to be revised as the inner logic of the data is disclosed to the inquirer.
The bracketing of one’s paradigm is thus essential from the beginning to the end of
historical research because it allows that which is external to the inquirer to be properly
understood, examined, and evaluated rather than merely being a reflection of the internal (i.e.
“biographical”) beliefs of the inquirer. To do this the questioner should be vigilant (“ruthless”) in
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their refusing to project any inappropriate a priori conceptual constraints upon their object of
inquiry. Importantly, bracketing of own’s own views respects the “voice” of the other by
allowing them to speak without any (tyrannically) imposed restraints. One should, then, “love
thy neighbor” by following and thinking after (nachdenken) its object of inquiry rather than
restricting it by the intrusion of the inquirer’s inappropriate and distorting a priori prejudices and
conceptions which are foreign to the inherent nature of the object.
3. Humility to follow-after the data
“Historical research,” Evans writes, “is a dialogue between historians and their sources,
for historians cannot read into them anything they wish.” 87 In any dialogue there must be at least
two different voices in the conversation. One must not only be willing to allow the other voice to
speak freely but must also be willing to submit to the conceptual frameworks which it reveals. As
noted above, this means bracketing of one’s own worldview and entering into the framework of
another in order to identify, examine, and appraise it. This also includes nachdenken the
conceptual framework of the object of inquiry.
By allowing the object of inquiry to freely disclose itself, one engages the process by
which empirical evidence plays an important role in inquiry. 88 Evidence, which in this context is
that which is freely disclosed by the object of inquiry, is exactly what should contribute to the
shaping our conceptual frameworks rather than our conceptual frameworks inappropriately
imposing themselves. Evidence is presented because of its ability to disclose itself in such ways
that it is believed to be able to impress itself upon others when examined. If the object discloses
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itself, at least to some degree, then the historian cannot simply read anything into it they wish.
The object of inquiry ultimately reveals something about itself to the inquirer.
This does not mean that we approach the data without a perspective, but we should avoid
the extreme that eradicates the object’s evidential qualities. Regarding the dialogical relationship
between the conceptual framework and data, Torrance writes that
the physicist is not free to think what he likes...He is bound to his proper object and
compelled to think of it in accordance with its nature as it becomes revealed under his
active interrogation….[H]e is humbly submitting his mind to the facts and their own
inner logic. So with the science of pure theology, in which we let the nature and pattern
of that into which we inquire impose themselves upon our minds. It is positive, dogmatic
science, but not authoritarian or ‘dogmatical.’ 89
There is an important emphasis on the inquirer being bound to their object of inquiry. The
inquirer must submit themselves to the data and follow-after (nachdenken) the disclosure of the
object. This requires the inquirer to acknowledge ignorance, a humble and personal act, and to
submit to the object’s free disclosure of itself.
So too must the historian be bound to their sources such that they first are accurately
reflected rather than binding the sources to their own conceptual framework. Here Torrance
argues that a rigorous
scientific procedure makes it incumbent upon us first to essay an interpretation of the
Bible within its own distinctive framework, on its own intelligible grounds, and try to
make rational and religious sense of what it has to say about God and the world and his
saving activity in history, without prejudging all that from an alien framework of thought,
and certainly without automatically excluding its supernatural message as academically
unthinkable for ‘modern man.’ 90
This does not mean that one must necessarily and naively accept the testimony of those from the
past, but they must allow their voice to be properly and honestly heard on their own terms and
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within their own proper conceptual schemes. In short, it must be honestly understood prior to any
assessments or evaluations. Historians, then, should first seek to understand their sources
independently on their own terms and then begin to consider the various interrelationships
between them and their descriptions of the past. In the words of Tabor, “conscious humility
before evidence is absolutely essential.” 91
Church historian Carl R. Trueman has similarly argued that evidence is generally able to
provide some, no matter how minimal, coherent interpretive framework for itself. He writes that
the “important thing for a historian is that a balance be maintained between an a priori model
that allows an identification and interrogation of evidence, and an acknowledgment that the
evidence itself may require a modification or even an ultimate rejection of the model.” 92 For him
it is clear that “good historians operate with hypothetical explanatory schemes that are subject to
correction by the evidence gathered.” 93 These “hypothetical explanatory schemes” are held
provisionally and can also be modified in light of new evidence.
Trueman provides a significant and helpful example from church history of the
occurrence of such faithfulness to the evidence. 94 In the 1500s Huldrych Zwingli was accused of
sexual impropriety. The Catholic church used this accusation, for which there was no known
corroborative evidence at that time, to argue that the Reformers were more interested in escaping
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the bonds of priestly celibacy than theology. In the 1800s Johannes Schulthess, who was an
admirer and scholar of Zwingli, found a letter in which Zwingli admitted to his unchastity. Was
Schulthess’ response to then immediately change his understanding of Zwingli? No!
Temptations and emotions pulled at him to such an extent that he began to burn the letter!
Fortunately, Schulthess regained his composure and removed the letter from the fire to preserve
it. Trueman rightly highlights that when Schulthess was
confronted with a text that simply could not be assimilated to the Zwingli-as-godly-hero
paradigm to which Schulthess was committed, Schulthess neither twisted the text (short
of claiming it was a forgery, it is hard to see how he could have done such a thing) nor
destroyed it (which he was very clearly tempted to do). No, he changed his mind. He took
account of the evidence and reworked his understanding of Zwingli as a result. 95
This is an excellent example of how our worldviews can be both a vice or a virtue. Schulthess
initially succumbed to vice in such a charged moment which radically confronted is initial beliefs
regarding Zwingli. The enticement to not only distort the past, but in this case go so far as to
destroy evidence, highlights the reality and strength of this temptation. 96 If a lesser person
discovered the letter, it might have very well ended up in the flames and lost forever. However, it
equally important to note that it was the same subjective components of Schulthess that
ultimately enabled him to make the decision to humbly (and properly) follow after the evidence
rather than seek to retain his previously held position by an inappropriate destruction of evidence
(and thereby distorting our understanding of reality, namely that of Zwingli’s behavior). 97

95

Trueman, 64–65.

Helpful here, but a seemingly overlooked concept, is what Licona refers to as risk assessment. Licona,
The Resurrection of Jesus, 192. One may very well be satisfied with 51% probability of an obscure event occurring,
but would require a significantly higher amount of probability if their job, important relationship, or life are on the
line.
96

Another example of a scholar who was willing to tentatively hold his own view, consider other theories,
and follow-after the evidence, is Richard Burridge who initially “was unimpressed with the arguments put forward
by New Testament scholars, especially in America, to demonstrate the biographical genre of the gospels. Therefore
a negative result was expected [in his own research], exposing the biographical hypothesis untenable. However, as
97

31

While it is impossible to come to the data without some sort of conceptual framework,
our emphasis has been that these frameworks can be bracketed, tested, and refined/revised as
they dialogue with the evidence. The historian is inquiring into the past precisely because they
believe the past is able to disclose something of itself that currently exists beyond the present
knowledge of the inquiring historian. If this were not the case, then it would make little sense to
make inquiries into the past (or in the sciences, etc.). 98
Subjectivity as a Vice
This discussion of vices implicitly acknowledges that the objection to historians as
potentially writing “biographies” is, to a degree, warranted. The virtues listed above will help
provide an important and valuable contrast to the vices we will identify. Some of the vices were
indirectly mentioned above and will be elaborated further here. The significance and severity of
the vices are important for us to be aware of and their severity becomes more noticeable when
contrasted against the virtues. 99
The three vices to be discussed here are in many ways the inverse of the virtues. The first
vice examined is when one imposes their conceptual framework and thereby limits the open and
free disclosure of their object. Second, they are not willing to bracket their worldview and risk

the work developed I have become increasingly convinced that…it is indeed the right one.” Richard A. Burridge,
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presented, will ever be satisfied. Today we might call this the “Heads I win, tails you lose” game. In such scenarios,
the outcome is determined well in advance, there is no consistent application of reason, nor a serious regard for
positive evidence.
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refusing to “love thy neighbor.” Lastly, one who describes past reality according to their own
conceptual frameworks and is unconcerned to follow-after evidence or revise their frameworks
in light of the data.
1. Choosing limited disclosure by imposing one’s conceptual schemes on the data
While the parent of an athlete during a close call has a perspective (and this perspective
does not necessarily invalidate their opinion), they can become less objective if the desire to see
their child be successful in that moment takes the priority over the truth. This is a microcosm of
what can also occur in historical inquiry. All history, Evans writes, “has a present-day purpose
and inspiration, which may be moral or political or ideological. The question is, To what extent is
this purpose paramount?” 100 His answer to this question is instructive:
Ultimately, if political or moral aims become paramount in the writing of history, then
scholarship suffers. Facts are mined to prove a case; evidence is twisted to suit a political
purpose; inconvenient documents are ignored; sources deliberately misconstrued or
misinterpreted. If historians are not engaged in the pursuit of truth, if the idea of
objectivity is merely a concept designed to repress alternative points of view, then
scholarly criteria become irrelevant in assessing the merits of a particular historical
argument.” 101
If the interpretation of the past is constrained to the needs, hopes, or desires of an ideology which
are (consciously or unconsciously) prioritized over truth, then the evidence will merely be used
in order to fit the preconceived notions made in advance by the historian.
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Of course, the enticement of such a temptation comes with the nature of historical
inquiry. Our subjective passions understandably motivate us as we study the past. We generally
study the past in order to make some sort of informed judgments in the present or to help
understand our orientation and identity within the world. 102 Even curiosity and a desire to learn
the past will be guided by the present to the extent that certain topics or questions we select were
chosen, at the very least, due to a curiosity that was shaped by present-day concerns.
Yet, when these concerns are used to illegitimately justify the present, then, as the Oxford
historian Margaret Macmillian notes, the “danger is that what may be an admirable goal can
distort history either by making it into a simple narrative in which there are black-and-white
characters or by depicting it as all tending in one direction…Such history flattens out the
complexity of human experience and leaves no room for different interpretations of the past.” 103
Thus even if one starts with honorable motives when studying the past, these motives can be
corrupted by the imposition of our own a priori judgments.
An example of this can be something as simple as the questions we ask regarding the
past. Fischer considers questions that impose improper restraints on our knowledge of the past as
“confusing an interrogative with a declarative statement.” 104 Clearly, declarative statements are
those which intend to state something about reality and not discover something about it. 105 It is
one thing to hypothesize before making an inquiry and it is another thing entirely to decide the

Rüsen warns that “When one demands that historical thinking and its disciplinary rationality be
separated from all aspects of our cultural orientation, then historical studies, and metahistorical thinking itself,
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conclusion in advance. Fischer writes that “If a historian goes to his sources with a simple
affirmative proposition that ‘X was the case,’ then he is predisposed to prove it. He will probably
be able to find “evidence” sufficient to illustrate his expectations, if not actually sustain them.” 106
This warning demonstrates how easily one’s investigation can be affected from the very outset
by declaring in advance, according to one’s own preconceived notions, what “has” occurred
while giving the appearance of a impartial inquiry. 107
Moreover, as noted above, one’s identity, way of life, pride, politics, moral outlooks, etc.
can be other possible vices that lead one astray from a proper and robust knowledge of the past.
The incident regarding the Zwingli’s infidelity produced within Schulthess a desire to burn the
letter and distort the past since it conflicted so much with his own personal convictions and
admiration for Zwingli. Undoubtedly there are those who have succumbed to the temptation
which can vary from the extreme of destroying (or ignoring) evidence that conflicts with an
ideology to not recognizing the proper weight of counterevidence or counterarguments to asking
leading questions. 108 In Evans’ terms, when aspects of one’s worldview become paramount then

Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 24. We should note that such a question could be appropriate in some
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truth will be sacrificed at the altar of one’s conceptual framework. It will be guided by the
impulse to use evidence rather than be informed by it.
2. Refusing to “love thy neighbor”
We saw above that by loving one’s neighbor they are respecting the other by allowing
them to freely disclose their own inherent rationality. 109 For Torrance, those that impose
inappropriate conceptual frameworks upon the data are “unable to break out of the teenage
mentality in which they are engrossed with their own self-fulfillment, and are unable to reach the
maturity of those who love their neighbours objectively for their own sakes.” 110 In history one
can prevent their neighbor (i.e. source, colleague, etc.) from free expression, by forcing their
neighbor to say only what one’s own conceptual framework will allow. Objective and free
disclosure from their neighbor is thus restricted and distorted because they are not understood on
their own terms. 111 Trueman rightly notes that the “danger comes when the theory becomes less
a means of penetrating history and more a prescriptive, Procrustean bed into which the evidence
must fit or be twisted to fit.” 112 By distorting the voice of one’s neighbor, a false testimony is
created since it does not truthfully nor faithfully represent their neighbor. 113 If one spreads a false

We have used the word “other” here to signify persons as our subject of inquiry. However, as will be
noted below, if we fail to respect the conceptual framework of an impersonal object of inquiry in the natural
sciences, we may risk bearing false testimony.
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message about their neighbor, they are failing to be faithful to them as well as failing to love or
respect them appropriately. Such traits do not assist in providing accurate knowledge of the past
nor are they virtuous characteristics becoming of those trying to portray the past as accurately as
possible.
A surprising example of this is found in a recent article by University of Dallas
psychology professor Amy Fisher-Smith. She describes how this temptation exists in
psychology, specifically in the psychological interpretation of clients. 114 While she
acknowledges the important training and education a psychologist must go through before
working with clients, she also notes that such training has potential to encourage psychologists to
impose the various psychological classifications upon clients that they learned during their
training. Smith writes, “[M]ost therapists have a working knowledge of the diagnostic and
classificatory system of mental illness. If the clinician presumes to ‘know’ the client through the
category ‘depression’, for instance, the danger is (at least theoretically) that the client cannot be
or act otherwise than what this categorization and intellectual conceptualization would
suggest.” 115 Psychological classifications can be imposed to the extent that a client’s words and
actions are interpreted through a specific, yet incorrect, classification which can have significant
impact upon treatment.
Smith is similar to Torrance when she writes, “The ego/self appropriates and
subordinates all elements in an effort to understand them and make them sensible [in light of a
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The importance analogous relevance here is that just as it is important for psychologists to understand
and interpret their clients past and present behavior, so too must the historian properly interpret the actions of agents
in the past.

Amy Fisher-Smith, “Naturalistic and Supernaturalistic Disclosures: The Possibility of Relational
Miracles,” Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 10, no. 2 (October 1, 2010): 7 (emphasis added). See also 10.
Her arguments using primarily the works of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas.
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particular psychological classification].” 116 In other words, the client is subordinated in order to
be made sensible according to the clinician’s diagnosis (and psychological classification) rather
than an ongoing dialogue and constant re-evaluation of the client.
She observes that this is a very subtle temptation for her and her colleagues which can
often go unnoticed. 117 More forcefully, she argues that it “attempts to contain the Other, either
physically or intellectually, constitutes ‘totalization’ by the ego/self, and totalization is
equivalent to committing violence against the other.” 118 Violence, the opposite of loving one’s
neighbor, is thus occurring as a result of forcing the individual fit the interpretive model rather
than allowing the individual’s behavior to dictate the proper interpretive model through constant
dialogue and evaluation. 119
If one thinks that she is being overly harsh or dramatic, she then proceeds to give a case
study where she was the perpetrator and describes how easy it was for her to unintentionally
project a diagnosis on one of her clients. 120 Her suggestion in response to this temptation is to be
vigilant (or, as Torrance would say, “ruthless”) in recognizing clients as having inherent value
while being open and humble enough to follow after the data while constantly willing to revise
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Fisher-Smith, 6 (emphasis added). Adding that “Others are never viewed as resources or as means to
maximize personal ends….Others are treated as ends in themselves given the a priori reason of the ethical
obligation.”

Ibid., 10 (emphasis added). She also notes that “it is seductively easy to intellectually (and tacitly)
attempt to contain clients within the categories themselves….it is easier than we might think to overshadow and
even dominate clients with these frameworks.”
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their evaluations in light of new data. 121 Although it is important not to disregard their
background knowledge and training, it is equally important that the training does not dominate
the client. Her solution is in many ways similar to following virtues noted above by Torrance and
others.
A historical example of this temptation can be found in the work of the Yale historian
Timothy Snyder who has made “an eloquent plea for the historian’s obligation to understand
even those who commit unspeakable crimes.” 122 This plea occurs in the following comment by
Snyder regarding World War II, its victims, and its perpetrators:
It is easy to sanctify policies or identities by the deaths of the victims. It is less appealing,
but morally more urgent, to understand the actions of the perpetrators. The moral danger,
after all, is never that one might become a victim but that one might be a perpetrator or a
bystander. It is tempting to say that a Nazi murderer is beyond the pale of
understanding…. To yield to this temptation, to find other people to be inhuman, is to
take a step toward, not away from, the Nazi position. To find other people
incomprehensible is to abandon the search for understanding, and thus to abandon
history. 123
Snyder’s point is that by refusing to properly understand those who are considered evil, they are
dehumanizing them and risk becoming more like the very ones they disdain. 124 There is a strong
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We may note that some might refuse to love the other in some circumstances because they may believe that such
people are not deserving of it. In addition to the reason Snyder notes above, as well as Solzhenitsyn and Tzu below,
the adage “two wrongs do not make a right” should be kept in mind.

A similar and very important warning is made by Solzhenitsyn who famously wrote, “And just so we
don’t go around flaunting too proudly the white mantle of the just, let everyone ask himself: ‘If my life had turned
out differently, might I myself not have become just such an executioner? It is a dreadful question if one really
answers it honestly.” “If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing
evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing
good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart?”
Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1:160, 168 (emphasis added). Christopher Browning of the University of
North Carolina points out that those involved in the holocaust were human beings and that “I must recognize that in
the same situation, I could have been either a killer or an evader—both were human—if I want to understand and
explain the behavior of both as best I can….What I do not accept, however, are the old clichés that to explain is to
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similarity here with that of Smith above regarding those who commit acts of “violence” on
others such that in both cases the love or respect of other human beings has been sacrificed to a
an interpretive scheme. 125
If one refuses to understand other people as they disclose themselves, they potentially
(knowingly or not) risk dehumanizing them. Such silencing of the other has been considered
violent, tyrannical, or narcissistic as it imperialistically imposes itself on the object of inquiry. 126
Moreover, in the act of inappropriately constricting the beliefs of others, one is bearing false
witness through misrepresentation. 127 In each of these instances there is an absence of learning
something new that is external to the inquirer since the inquirer has already determined in
advance what will and will not be accepted. 128

excuse, to understand it to forgive. Explaining is not excusing; understanding is not forgiving.” Christopher R.
Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, Revised (New York:
HarperCollins, 2017), xx.
The importance of this continues even in the context of military battles where literal bodily violence
might be done to others. Sun Tzu offers the following military advice stressing the importance of truly knowing
one’s opponent: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you
know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the
enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 3.18. These comments provide
another illustration (albeit a pragmatic one) of why it is important to faithfully know people that may even be
considered their enemy.
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When properly interpreting, one must make an honest effort to account for all of the
complexity of the data (i.e. the things liked and the things disliked) rather than merely only
accounting for those that accord with a doctrine, dogma, or desire. 129 This is often easier said
than done. Nevertheless, the words of Lucian are helpful, even if one “personally hates certain
people he will think the public interest far more binding, and regard truth as worth more than
enmity, and if he has a friend he will nevertheless not spare him if he errs.” 130
3. Playing God and defining reality
The last vice of subjectivity refers to the temptation to, in some sense, play the role of
God by defining reality or, more specifically, (re)defining past reality. It will be important to
begin by considering various ways in which this temptation has been described and raised as a
criticism. This will help highlight the reality of this temptation before we briefly consider the
problems it raises with respect to knowing the past.
For Torrance, this is a constant temptation which goes all the way back to Genesis 3. He
writes,
But in and behind it all, one can hear the old demonic whisper, ‘Ye shall be as gods’, that
it, the original sin of the human subject in projecting himself into the place of ultimate
reality, thus rejecting God by eclipsing Him from himself. But in so doing man deprives
himself of the light in which to see his own mistakes, and so becomes incarcerated in the
darkness of his own self-deception. 131
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The doctrine of original sin, for Torrance, is one that remains present for people today. We seek
to be in control and define reality and in so doing, take the prerogative of God. 132 One takes the
role of God when they impose on their objects of inquiry and become masters over them such
that they accord with our desires of their inquirer.
While some may balk at this theological/harmartiological interpretation, the concern is
surprisingly not very far from postmodern concerns (especially the will to power). 133 For
example, atheist postmodern professor of religion Mark Taylor does not appear very far from
Torrance in this regard. Taylor argues that Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous description of the death
of God meant that theology was ultimately transformed into anthropology (i.e. mankind seized
God’s authority to define reality). 134 In Nietzsche’s account, the “Madman” was proclaiming the
death of God and mankind as the replacement. 135 One of the prerogatives of God is that God has
the authority to define reality as the Author of creation. If God has died, so the argument goes,
then mankind must now take the role of God and become the one who defines reality. 136 Taylor
goes even further and suggests that a result of the death of God is the death of history itself. 137
Schweitzer refers Germanic spirit being imposed upon the historical Jesus in such a way that Jesus is
made in the historian’s image. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, 312.
132
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others.
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Ultimately, despite having two vastly different worldviews, both Torrance and Taylor,
among others, recognize that the death of God lead to the elevation of mankind and that this
leads to forms of “terror.” 138 Indeed, as Thiselton observes, recent postmodern concerns have
recognized “the illusory nature of value-neutral perception and value-neutral horizons coheres
precisely with biblical insights into the deceitfulness of the human heart and the realities of
human bondage to sin as self-centered.” 139 It is perhaps worth noting that well before the
postmodern era, Thucydides had already observed such occasions where men redefined reality
and the “ordinary acceptation of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit.
Reckless audacity came to be regarded as courageous loyalty to party, prudent hesitation as
specious cowardice, moderation as a cloak for unmanly weakness.” 140
This issue of taking the place of God may be further highlighted in that various historical
works have appropriated religious language or imagery. For example, Although MacMillan
believes that history is not necessarily replacing the divine, it is seeking to be the transcendent
authority above and beyond humankind. For her, “History with a capital H is being called in to

deconstruction too. For example, Dunn writes that “history (the discipline) and faith have made uncomfortable
bedfellows, each usually trying to push the other out of the bed, it has also demonstrated that history and
hermeneutics are close companions, Siamese twins perhaps. That will no doubt be part of the reason for the failure
of history and faith to bed well together: hermeneutics is the too little acknowledged third partner – a somewhat
uncomfortable ménage à trois.” Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 1:99.
Taylor argues that although mankind became free from the tyranny of God, it became subject to a
different and more dangerous tyranny of mankind which frequently seeks to oppress others. In short, “absolute
freedom” from God became “absolute terror.” Taylor, Erring, 22, 32.
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fill the void.” 141 Yet it is precisely human beings that write history and when one calls their
history the “(H)istory” (with the capital H), it is difficult to avoid making the connection between
the historian seeking to take the role, or power, of God when writing their “(H)istory” 142
Indeed, Macmillan is aware of this temptation (and danger) when she writes “History has
shaped humans’ values, their fears, their aspirations, their love, and their hatreds. When we start
to realize that, we begin to understand the power of the past.” 143 The very purpose of
MacMillan’s book is to identify various instances of the uses and abuses of history. She observes
that history “can be helpful; it can also be very dangerous.” 144 Yet how is one to know when
(H)istory is being helpful or dangerous? Another issue appears to be that in the absence of such a
transcendent, what constitutes abuse by one historian may be considered a legitimate use by
another. 145 MacMillan is also aware of this, she writes, “When people talk, as they frequently do,
about the need for “proper” history, what they really mean is the history they want and like.” 146
Yet it’s not clear how she addresses this complaint given her views on (H)istory. If (H)istory has
MacMillan, Dangerous Games, 20. Two additional examples may be found in MacMillan. The role of
God as a moral law giver appears to be given to historians. For in a secular world, “history takes on the role of
showing us good and evil, virtues and vices….[history] “can vindicate us and judge us, and damn those who oppose
us.” (20). One’s identity and value is provided by historians as well. The reason for this is because “all of us, the
powerful and weak alike, history helps to define and validate us” (53). Additionally, the creation for identity is not
only for the individual, but extends even to nations: “For all the talk about eternal nations, they are created not by
fate or God but by the activities of human beings, and not least by historians” (83).
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replaced God, then, like Torrance and Taylor point out, historians become the definer of past
reality and history cannot help but become more and more relativized according to the number of
people who comment on the past. In short, it is hard to distinguish how a historian writing
(H)istory is different from historian who is taking the role of God by describing reality as though
they were its author.
University of Chicago professor Constantin Fasolt is more emphatic than MacMillan. He
believes that “History conflicts with the historical religions because it is religion, a rival
religion.” 147 Not only is it a rival religion, in the modern world, Fasolt believes it is one of the
most important. 148 Indeed, (H)istory is a religion and historians are the new priests. 149 Such
language is consistent with the reality of the temptation to define past reality (as opposed to
describing past reality) as it confronts the historian. Although Fasolt appears celebrate the
autonomous freedom history provides without religious authority, Taylor’s warnings about
“absolute freedom” turning into “absolute terror” should be kept in mind along with Mark
Cladis’ observation that in arguing for historians to become the new priests in the modern world,
some may rightly find it troubling that Fasolt himself is a historian. 150
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Evans designates an entire chapter to the issue of power in his In Defense of History. 151
Although he does not make the theological point we have highlighted, he nevertheless recognizes
the possibility of historians who seek to define past realities according to their own needs, wants,
and desires. He writes, “If the intentions of the author of a text are irrelevant to the text’s
meaning—if meaning is placed in the text by the reader, the interpreter—and if the past is a text
like any other, then the historian is effectively reinventing the past every time he or she reads or
writes about it.” 152 In such circumstances, the “past no longer has the power to confine the
researcher to the bounds of facts. Historians and critics are now omnipotent.” 153
Historians, then, must consider the question of power with respect to their descriptions
and the possibility to, consciously or un-consciously, seek the power of God in defining reality.
For example, Evans highlighted the famous controversy regarding Paul de Mann in order to
show the immense significance of history, relationship to postmodernism, and why one may
wish to “reinvent” the past. 154 In normal language, one may simply call such redefining “lying”
and it is a temptation that no historian, indeed no person, is above. 155 From a different angle,
Schweitzer pointed out that historical theologians had become “intoxicated with their own
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Alan Spitzer is even more emphatic on the issue of lying in this regard and similarly discusses the de
Mann controversy. Alan B. Spitzer, Historical Truth and Lies About the Past: Reflections on Dewey, Dreyfus, de
Man, and Reagan (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 61–96. It should be noted here
that it is certainly not the case that every time someone inappropriately imposed an a priori they are doing so with
malice. One might, for example, have a blind spot that prevents them from recognizing that they are in fact imposing
a prioris into their work. Thiselton, following Torrance and Karl Rahner, helpfully identifies that a reverence for
truth that demands “openness towards it, and submission to its leading” and that “self-defensiveness and selfassertion give rise to falsehood.” Thiselton, “Truth,” 901.
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ingenuity…[and had]come to believe that the world’s salvation depends in no small measure
upon the spreading of its own ‘assured results’ broad-case among the people.” 156 A final point
should be noted that in contradistinction to the virtuous method listed above, there are those who
believe it their duty to read into such objects their own subjective interests. 157 These provide
three different reasons, among many others, as to how historians could potentially fall into the
this vice.
Summary
The subjective nature of the inquirer can be either a virtue or a vice. We sought to divide
these two categories into three subcategories in such a way as to highlight some key facets that
could affect our investigations for better or worse. The sub-categories are interrelated with one
another and therefore overlap in certain respects. Sometimes we may commit these vices or
virtues consciously while other times unconsciously (e.g. blind spots). Nevertheless, an effort
can, and should, be made to be virtuous and avoid vices.

Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, 311. In a scathing review of Thomas Sheehan, The First
Coming : How the Kingdom of God Became Christianity (NY: Random House, 1986), Alvin Plantinga notes a
similar “quest for novelty.” Alvin Plantinga, “Sheehan’s Shenanigans: How Theology Becomes Tomfoolery,”
Reformed Journal 37, no. 4 (April 1987): 21.
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To be virtuous one should make the decision to be diligent in their efforts to prevent the
imposition of foreign and inappropriate conceptual frameworks upon their object of inquiry. We
recognize the limitations of our own knowledge and humbly respect our object of inquiry by
being able to bracket our own views or hypotheses. When we make this choice, it allows the
genuine understanding of our object, based on its own free and unobstructed disclosure, as it
reveals itself to the questions of the inquirer. We must then be humble and follow the internal
coherence of the object. These virtues help provide us with greater understanding that is derived
from outside the inquirer since they follow-after the free and open disclosure of its object. This
following-after, however, should not be understood to be done uncritically. This is particularly
evident in historical sources or testimonies which involve a number of interrelationships between
different lines of evidence (each understood on their own terms) that need to be properly
weighed. However, it is nevertheless important to understand those sources on their own terms
prior to making any assessments about them.
The vices are an ever-present reality. One can, with surprising ease, approach the data
and impose their own conceptual frameworks. In so doing, the object will only be able to reveal
things that appear to agree with this foreign framework and silenced in areas where it disagrees.
Distortions occur when we force the object to artificially accord with foreign frameworks. We
also risk refusing to love our neighbor when we tyrannically impose our conceptual frameworks
upon them in such that it distorts or disregards their open and free disclosure. By imposing our
preconceived notions in ways that silence the disclosure of our object of inquiry we also risk
taking the prerogative of God by defining (past) reality as we see fit by becoming the author of
past reality instead its discoverer.
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What we have been arguing in favor for regarding the virtues are essentially derived from
critical realism stresses retains the value of both the subjective and objective components
involved in the process of obtaining greater understanding. The subjective element of history has
long been acknowledged and it should not be surprising to recognize that everyone has their own
perspectives. Our worldview contributes to the filter through which they understand the world.
We wear “worldview glasses” which filter how we see the world and sometimes we need to
adjust our lenses. Having the ability to take one’s glasses off and put on a different pair in order
to see how the world looks through a different lens assists in gaining greater understanding.
Sometimes new lenses help us see more clearly and sometimes they do not. Even if the new pair
does not provide a clearer picture, new knowledge and greater understanding may still be
obtained. 158
Historical Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and Resurrection Research
We have emphasized important philosophical elements concerning history in order to
show that although the historian might improperly distort history and the historical Jesus scholar
might contribute to the ongoing “bad joke” mentioned by Crossan, historians may also approach
the past virtuously and attain genuine understanding. We have noted a distinction between the
ontological issue, which is the reality of past events, and the epistemological issue, which
corresponds to our ability to know that past reality. After having examined these various aspects
of human subjectivity with respect to our ability to understand (or interpret) our objects of

Mark Powell writes that although Darrell Bock did not change his mind on an issue, “I did learn some
things from the arguments he posed.” Powell, “Evangelical Christians and Historical-Jesus Studies,” 127. Similarly,
if not more so, in science the hypothesis of an experiment is essentially the equivalent of trying on glasses. Torrance
argues that this is essentially what occurred during the transition to modern physics where a new set of lenses was
used to see the world, by those like Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein, instead of the older Newtonian lenses. He
writes “It was new knowledge that could only be grasped, affirmed and assimilated within a new outlook of which it
constituted the intelligible basis.” Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, 17.
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inquiry, we must now offer some concluding remarks regarding our epistemological access to the
past in general and the resurrection of Jesus in particular while adding some important nuances
along the way.
Hermeneutics, History, and Critical Realism
Thiselton offers important insight on the relationship of our subjective nature and are
ability to gain understanding and knowledge about the world around us. He writes,
‘Everything depends on your presuppositions.’ This is often a cheap way of foreclosing
further discussion…But a greater familiarity with hermeneutics reveals that negotiating
between a given view and provisional pre-understanding is not in any sense a matter of
warfare between nonnegotiable fixed presuppositions. Preliminary understanding and
responsible journeys into fuller understanding leave room for renegotiation, reshaping,
and correction in the light of subsequent wrestling with the parts and the whole. 159
It is a mistake to assumes that one’s presuppositions are like prison which their subjects cannot
escape and thus mechanistically predetermines how one will interpret the world. 160 However, as
Thiselton points out, that
exponents of hermeneutics commend as a more fruitful starting point for ‘understanding’
what has come to be denoted by the technical term pre-understanding [Vorveständnis].
The English might more idiomatically be rendered preliminary understanding. It denotes
an initial and provisional stage in the journey toward understanding something more
fully. 161
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its interconnections to nearby streets. Thiselton refers to the work of Grant Osborne regarding the hermeneutical
spiral, “We cannot arrive at a picture of the whole without scrutinizing the parts or pieces, but we cannot tell what
the individual pieces mean until we have some sense of the wider picture as a hole” (14). Indeed our chapter here
has attempted to move from the parts (Jesus’ resurrection), to the collection of parts (historical Jesus studies), and
then the whole (historical studies) only to move back from the whole, to the collection of parts, to the particular.
Also recall Wright’s similar comments on pg. 15 above.

While it also fails to take into account those who have had “conversions” from one worldview to
another, the objection itself may reflect anchoring bias.
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Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 12 (emphasis in original).
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Such a description is consistent with the virtues described above more generally as well as
Trueman’s comment’s in particular. Recall Trueman urged the use of a provisional model that
can then then be modified as it follows after the evidence. 162
When studying the past, one may have certain ideas or hypotheses, but these must in no
way dictate our investigation. To do so is to risk confirmation bias. Our inquiries, while guided
by a provisional preliminary understanding must not be held dogmatically so as to allow the
evidence to speak and we must be willing to submit to it and follow it where it leads (i.e.
nachdenken). 163 Kevin Vanhoozer offers a particularly helpful analogy by comparing the
dialogue of one’s preliminary understanding with their interpretation to that of being a resident in
a city. 164 He suggests that we should avoid regarding worldviews and presuppositions as a
prison. Instead, our worldviews are more analogous to a city. In our case, the historian is a
resident of that city and, just like any city, there is an overall structure and those within it have
ability to move freely in it but, most importantly, they can also renovate it when necessary.
This analogy highlights two important considerations. First, if the city (i.e. our
worldviews or presuppositions) can be renovated, then we do not have certain nor exhaustive
knowledge. As Vanhoozer has helpfully reminded us, our knowledge is fallible and can be
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See p. 30 above.

163
Thiselton continues by noting that the “very purpose of speaking of preliminary understanding is to
underline that it offers no more than a provisional way of finding a bridge or starting point toward further, more
secure understanding. From the very first it is capable of correction and readjustment. It signifies the initial
application of a tentative working assumption to set understanding going and on its journey toward a fuller
appreciation of all that this might entail.” Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 13 (emphasis in original).
164

Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 202.
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corrected 165 Evidence or arguments can be given that cause us to want to renovate the city (i.e.
re-evaluate and/or revise our worldview).
Second, the fallibility of our knowledge does not mean that, therefore, knowledge is
unattainable. James D. G. Dunn helpfully reminds us that probability “is much more integral to
daily living than was previously understood.” 166 We therefore do not need to embrace the false
dichotomy between absolute knowledge or absolute skepticism. “We do not have absolute
knowledge,” writes Vanhoozer, “only human knowledge…We have, that is to say, adequate
knowledge.” 167 Such limitations are not a flaw, but the result of being human beings who have
by their very nature a limited perspective of reality. Dunn adds that historians have “learned the
danger of thinking of the past in straightforwardly ‘objective’ terms. So they are well aware that
account has to be taken of such bias in their own handling of historical sources – including their
own bias! This is simply integral to the skill and art of all history writing.” 168 We can critically
evaluate the biases of our sources while also being equally critical of our own biases. In short,
cities can be renovated, worldviews can be changed.
Thiselton and Vanhoozer provide valuable insight from hermeneutics. While their focus
is on the interpretation of texts, their advice applies to the art of interpretation more broadly. Yet
for historians, especially those of antiquity, the interpretation of texts is one of their primary
tasks. Thus, the application of these hermeneutical principles for the historian is that historical
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Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 299 (emphasis added).

Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 300 (emphasis in original). See also 139-140. Similarly,
Wright points out the fact that a “human mind has to organize and arrange the material does not ‘falsify’ the history.
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knowledge is not absolute, but adequate. Not perfect, but fallible. Not certain, but probabilistic.
Not exhaustive, but provisional.
Historical Jesus Research and Jesus’ Resurrection
We opened this chapter with a survey of the “bad joke” of historical Jesus research.
Scholars from different eras, geographical locations, and theological views identified a similar
problem. The problem was the surprising number of historians who made Jesus in their own
image. 169 Scot McKnight expresses a common sentiment when he writes that, “Everyone wants
Jesus on his or her side.” 170 If historians are accused of treating Jesus in a manner similar to a
ventriloquist in order to keep Jesus on their side, then there is a serious problem. 171 If this is truly
the case and historical Jesus research is autobiography as Crossan suggested, then this research
ultimately falls into a form of solipsistic self-expression. If historical work in general is merely
the reflection of the individual historian, and if historical Jesus work in particularly also suffers
from this malady, then historical investigations into the question of whether Jesus was dead and
then later alive will all also be a reflection of the desires of the historian. 172

Ross notes that the variety of interpretations of Jesus is “probably greater than in any other field of
academic study.” Ross, “The Use of Evidence in New Testament Studies,” 214. Similarly, Australian NT scholar
Paul Barnett noted that the tendency in recent decades of “agenda-driven” scholars who infuse their subjectivity in
their scholarship is “particularly true in Jesus studies.” Barnett, Finding the Historical Christ, 3:6.
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Scot McKnight and Grant R. Osborne, eds., “Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Face of New Testament Studies:
A Survey of Recent Research (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 149.

As noted above, one of the vices of subjectivity is the temptation for the inquirer to seek to play the role
of God to some degree. In historical Jesus studies, the same problem occurs when scholars have a conceptual
framework they are seeking to justify via Jesus as their intermediary. Vanhoozer provides an example of this which
he experienced during a panel he attended. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 3.
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P. J. W. Schutte comments that when it “comes to a topic such as the resurrection, the argumentation
sometimes goes beyond the exegetical and the scientific. There is always an autobiographical dimension. The
arguments touch the improvable arenas of the spiritual and the belief.” P. J. W. Schutte, “The Resurrection of Jesus:
What’s Left to Say?,” Hervormde Teologiese Studies 62, no. 4 (2006): 1514. Later concluding “Every theologian, in
fact every believer has his or her own opinion. When, at the conclusion of this article, I want to make a few
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autobiographical dimension.” (1524, emphasis in original). Schutte, appears to have overlooked Haskell’s notion
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The death of historical research is the death of the historical inquiry of the resurrection.
The same philosophy of history questions that have significant implications in the quest for the
historical Jesus have obvious and equal implications on whether or not one can investigate the
question of Jesus’ resurrection. If we cannot know anything about Jesus, or the past in general
for that matter, because it is merely a reflection of the historian, then we similarly cannot actually
know about the resurrection. Thus, it has been essential that we engage these philosophical issues
that have direct impact on how we understand the past.
The historian’s subjectivity is a constant hazard but not be a death sentence. Our ability
to know somethings about the past in general, Jesus, or the resurrection in particular is not
impossible simply because we approach the evidence from a limited perspective. As we have
seen, they can be vices and distort our knowledge of the past or they can be virtues which enable
us to adequately, but fallibly, know the past. The late Ben Meyer used the following analogy to
help clarify, “To understand a lecture on colour in an objective way, it is no advantage to be
blind. Therefore, experience (including sense data, images, and affects), intelligence, and
judgment are not only an advantage but a sine qua non condition of coming to understand.” 173
Indeed, our perspectives do not inhibit investigations into the past, which include inquiry into
Jesus’ life more broadly or Jesus’ resurrection specifically.

that objectivity does not mean neutrality, but more importantly he appears to argue for a form of historical relativism
in that the autobiographical dimension appears to serve as a determinative factor that cannot be altered. A further
concern is his comment that the areas of the spiritual and belief are unprovable. The skeptic Quentin Smith observed
the desecularizing of academia occurred in the second half of the twentieth century where it “became apparent to the
philosophical profession that…realist theists were not outmatched by naturalists.” Quentin Smith, “The
Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,” Philo 4, no. 2 (2001): 196.
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CHAPTER THREE: TOOLS FOR KNOWING THE PAST
“The question is how to ferret out the historically accurate information from the later alterations
and inventions.” 174
- Bart Ehrman
In the last chapter we asked whether we can know the past in light of our worldviews and
limited positions as subjective agents. In this chapter we will focus on how historians can begin
to know the past. This will be done by first looking at an approach that seeks to mitigate the
potential vices of bias by (1) only using data that is highly evidenced and (2) agreed upon by a
significant majority of scholars with wide-ranging backgrounds and presuppositions. The second
part of this chapter evaluates criteria that can be used to add probability that an event occurred
which is also an aspect of its being highly evidenced. 175 Our goal is to present two interrelated
ways in which historians can identify that an event has occurred. These two ways are connected
in that the first approach can, and does, utilize the historical criteria when considering facts that
have multiple lines of evidence.
Common Ground Approaches
How, then, is the historian to proceed in knowing the past? One initial way to begin is by
considering data that is widely agreed upon by scholars with differing worldviews. New
Testament scholar Mike Licona makes the following suggestion, “Given the pitfall of horizons
that await a haphazard historian painting a historically responsible portrait of Jesus requires the

Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (New
York: HarperOne, 2014), 94.
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It should be noted at the outset that this chapter will, in effect, present a breakdown and defense of
aspects of the “Minimal Facts Approach” in which facts must be highly evidenced and accepted by a strong majority
of scholars from diverse backgrounds. While there are other ways of approaching questions concerning the past, this
approach seeks to establish the most secure historical facts.
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use of historical facts that are regarded as virtually indisputable.” 176 The reason, he argues,
historians should use these facts, which he calls “historical bedrock,” is that by “requiring
hypotheses to account for the historical bedrock, a check is placed on the explanatory narratives
that are constructed.” 177 The logic is that agreement among a heterogeneous consensus of
scholars is a good indication that they are well evidenced and do not require an idiosyncratic
worldview in order to be accepted. 178 Historical bedrock are thus those facts that are so strongly
evidenced that they have convinced a significant number of those from wide-ranging
backgrounds of their historicity. 179
Licona is by no means alone in this suggestion. 180 Several scholars have included a list or
description of generally accepted facts as historical bedrock. Both Günther Bornkamm and E. P.
Sanders provided lists of “indisputable facts” about Jesus.181 Paula Fredriksen of Boston
University similarly refers to “indisputable facts” and, like Licona, suggests that reconstructions

Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL:
IVP Academic, 2010), 277.
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T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993), 170–74. He
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need to meaningfully take account of these facts if they wish to be persuasive. 182 The noted
Jewish scholar Géza Vermès highlighted “non-controversial facts concerning Jesus’ life and
activity, and [endeavored] to build on these foundations.” 183 Robert Funk of the Jesus Seminar
presented a variety of “assorted facts to which most critical scholars subscribe.” 184 In his
introductory work on the NT, Bart Ehrman also offers a brief list of accepted facts about
Jesus.185 NT scholar Luke Timothy Johnson has likewise provided a list of facts that historians
can assert “with the highest degree of probability.” 186 More recently, in a work discussing the
limitations of historical criteria, the former University of Cambridge professor Morna Hooker
notes that one know “quite a lot about Jesus” and then goes on to provide an overview of facts
about Jesus and early Christianity. 187 Such lists of historical bedrock is a common consideration
made by scholars when seeking to present facts that are known to be the most probable. 188
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These lists were not intended to be exhaustive, nor did these scholars necessarily focus on
events occurring immediately after Jesus’ crucifixion. 189 They understandably emphasized
important facts they deemed relevant to their respective works and purposes. Nevertheless, they
presented data that is so strongly evidenced and agreed upon that they believed their list of facts
must be taken into account when describing the past. To do otherwise risks moving from the
world of history to the world of fiction. This does not mean that these facts cannot be challenged
or overturned, but by starting with the most highly evidenced facts that are agreed upon by
scholars from widely differing worldviews, we can begin to safeguard our inquiry from the
temptation to inappropriately impose our own image or ideology into the historical
reconstruction.
On the Topic of the Resurrection of Jesus
This approach is especially important in areas that may be more divisive, controversial,
or affect deeply held beliefs. The question of whether Jesus died and was then later seen alive is
undoubtedly one of these topics and thus considering any agreed upon data is even more
important. It is unsurprising, then, that the presentation of bedrock facts has become an
increasingly used approach on this topic in the last few decades. For example, in 1975 George
Eldon Ladd provided a list of facts, actually three lists, that focused on historical data relevant

to this consensus in the following pages (15-27). For another list see, Craig A Evans, “Life-of-Jesus Research and
the Eclipse of Mythology,” Theological Studies 54, no. 1 (1993): 34. For the lists of the facts presented by these and
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for inquiries into Jesus’ resurrection. 190 Each list is slightly modified from the others, but when
combined there are a total of thirteen facts. These include the following:
1. Jesus’ death.
2. Jesus’ burial.
3. The empty tomb.
4. The empty tomb alone did not prove the resurrection.
5. The grave clothes were undisturbed.
6. Disciples’ discouragement and disillusionment.
7. The disciples had experiences which they believed to be of Jesus risen from the dead.
8. These experiences initiated the resurrection faith.
9. Contemporary Judaism had no concept of a dying and rising Messiah.
10. Transformation of the disciples to be witnesses to Jesus’ resurrection.
11. The disciples proclaimed the resurrection of Jesus in Jerusalem.
12. The rise of the Christian church.
13. The conversion of Saul.
Ladd believes historians need to be able to take into account these “known historical facts” when
providing a historical explanation for their occurrence. 191 For him, naturalistic theories have
failed to adequately account for these historical facts. 192
More recently, in 2010 Licona similarly presented his own shorter list of facts concerning
this question and identifies events surrounding both Jesus’ life and fate. 193 Licona’s list of
“historical bedrock” includes the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
190

132–33.

Jesus was understood to be a miracle-worker and exorcist.
Jesus understood himself as God’s eschatological agent.
**Jesus’s predictions of death and vindication.
Jesus’ death by crucifixion.
George Eldon Ladd, I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 13, 93,
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5.
6.
7.
8.

Appearances to the disciples.
Conversion of the church persecutor Paul.
*Conversion of James the skeptical brother of Jesus.
*The empty tomb.

We have added an asterisk by some of Licona’s points. One asterisk is by the conversion of
James since Licona is “reluctant” to include it but does so as a “second-order fact.” 194 For
Licona, the conversion of James is well-evidenced and agreed upon by a majority of scholars,
but the number of scholars “who actually comment on the matter is small.” 195 We have similarly
included an asterisk by his use of the empty tomb. 196 Licona does not include the empty tomb in
his main list because it does not have enough of a majority for him to comfortably consider it
part of historical bedrock. 197 Nonetheless, he also considers the empty tomb to be a second-order
fact.
When Licona considers whether Jesus predicted his death and vindication should be part
of this bedrock he ultimately concludes that it should not be included and this is why that fact has
two asterisks. 198 The reason for this is because although there are several good reasons for
accepting it as a historical fact, the “majority of scholars do not regard the predictions as
historical.” 199 Interestingly, Licona does note that there is another scholar who argues to the

Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 461 (emphasis added). Licona has since noted that he may consider
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contrary and that Jesus’ prediction is, in fact, considered historical by a majority of scholars. 200
We have included Jesus’ prediction in our list above, despite the fact Licona does not technically
include it himself, in order to show how he addresses this issue and why; because he includes it
in his own discussion of historical bedrock as a serious contender; and since Licona
acknowledges that there is disagreement regarding his assessment with respect to the consensus
view. While these points may seem overly restrictive or even contrary to Licona’s own definition
of historical bedrock (i.e. accepted by a majority of scholars), his goal is ultimately to use data
that are “virtually indisputable” and thus prefers facts that have a near “unanimous” acceptance
over those that may have a simple majority. 201 His emphasis, then, is that he is giving greater
priority to the historical bedrock fact which have greater agreement among scholars when
compared to “second-order” facts. 202
The Minimal Facts Approach
The most significant work on the historical bedrock as it relates to Jesus’ resurrection,
however, has come from Gary Habermas. Licona states that his own work stands on the
“shoulders of Habermas, who has to my knowledge engaged in the most comprehensive

Here he cites Mark M. W. Waterman, The Empty Tomb Tradition of Mark: Text, History, and
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investigation of the facts pertaining to the resurrection of Jesus.” 203 Indeed, his approach has
made such an impact that it has recently been described as having attained a “near-exclusive use”
by those arguing for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. 204
Prior to Ladd’s I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus (1975), Habermas had already
started to develop what is now called the “Minimal Facts Approach” (MFA). 205 For Habermas,
the “chief thrust of the minimal facts approach is to argue whenever possible on more limited
grounds, both to challenge a larger range of thinkers and to show that our basis is exceptionally
firm.” 206 The method itself is actually quite simple. When discussing the topic of Jesus’
resurrection, a fact is a “Minimal Fact” (MF) when it meets the following two criteria: (1) it has
to be established by multiple lines of data/evidence and (2) it must be agreed upon by a strong
Licona, 302; Licona, “In Reply to Habermas, McGrew, and McCullagh,” 55. Another recent work that
has built on Habermas’ work in David Mishkin, Jewish Scholarship on the Resurrection of Jesus (Eugene, OR:
Pickwick Publications, 2017), 201-211. Cf. 9. For his list of facts see Appendix 1: List of Lists. Others who have
also used Habermas as a foundation are Doug D. Scott, Is Jesus of Nazareth the Predicted Messiah? A HistoricalEvidential Approach to Specific Old Testament Messianic Prophecies and Their New Testament Fulfillments
(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2018); Tristan Casabianca, “The Shroud of Turin: A Historiographical Approach,”
Heythrop Journal 54, no. 3 (May 2013): 414–23. For examples outside of Christianity that have specifically stated
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(Bryn Mawr, PA: Providence Forum Press, 2006), 30; Mark A. Beliles and Jerry Newcombe, Doubting Thomas:
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WA: Lexham Press, 2020).
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majority of competent scholars from wide-ranging of backgrounds. 207 The MFs are then used to
illustrate the strength of the facts surrounding Jesus’ resurrection by demonstrating the robust
evidential ground on which these facts rest; their wide agreement among scholars with differing
theological backgrounds; the continued failure of naturalistic theories to account for these facts;
and that the historical explanation that Jesus was dead and then later seen alive has been able to
adequately account for them.
Philosophically, this method raises a few definitional questions. First, one may consider
what is meant by “multiple lines of data/evidence”? We can start by what this phrase does not
mean. The facts established by the MFA are not considered true because of a presumed
inspiration or inerrancy of the NT. More striking, they are not presupposed to be true because of
a general reliability of the relevant documents. Nor are any of the facts given the benefit of the
doubt. Rather, they are assumed to be unreliable a priori. 208 What this phrase does refer to, then,
is the plurality of arguments that critical scholars have put forward when seeking to demonstrate
the historicity of these facts. We will discuss what some of these arguments look like in more
depth below with respect to historical criteria.
A second definitional question may ask what is meant by “competent scholars”? Here
Habermas is referring to scholars who have an advanced degree in a relevant field that have
published on the subject. However, in a recent publication he has noted that he has even included
more radical skeptical scholars despite the fact that they “did not have specialized scholarly
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Methodology as a Crucial Component in Establishing Historicity,” Southeastern Theological Review 3, no. 1 (2012):
16.

“There is no requirement that the New Testament be accepted as inspired. In fact, this groundwork is not
even based on the New Testament being a reliable text.” Habermas, Risen Jesus, 16.
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credentials or peer-reviewed publications” with the result being that his “study is skewed in the
skeptical direction far more than if [he] had stayed strictly with [his] requirement of citing only
those with scholarly credentials.” 209 In other words, if a Christian and skeptic have both
published on Jesus’ resurrection and both equally have problematic academic qualifications (i.e.
a degree outside the field, just a master’s degree, etc.), Habermas is more likely to include the
skeptic.
Lastly, what is meant by “strong majority”? While technically 51 percent is a majority
view, Habermas’ method seeks a “strong” majority and what this means for him is that the “most
important” facts presented have approximately a “ninety something percentile head-count.” 210
Some facts, despite having a good majority acceptance, are either identified for not having as
strong majority acceptance (i.e. empty tomb) or are simply be excluded altogether. 211 Thus, the
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MFA seeks facts that are the least likely to be questioned and thus uses the “lowest common
denominator” of facts. 212
There are at least three substantial benefits of such an approach that should be mentioned.
First, the use of facts accepted by one’s dialogue partner demonstrates that one’s evidential
ground is firm while also challenging their interlocutor to present what they believe best
accounts for those facts. 213 When one side has limited themselves to the facts that their opponent
will grant, it demonstrates that even on exceptionally limited grounds one’s case can still be
made (let alone if additional facts are granted), especially when their opponent cannot do the
same.
Second, by starting with facts conceded by the overwhelming majority of scholars, one
can bypass the “often protracted preliminary discussions of which data are permissible.” 214
Frequently included in these discussions may be issues surrounding the reliability of the NT,
whether there are contradictions in the Bible, theological questions/concerns, and so on. 215 These
sorts of discussions can be avoided entirely because the MFA does not assume inspiration,
inerrancy, or reliability. Thus one could grant, for example, an alleged contradiction for the sake
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For a dramatic example of this type of approach well before Habermas, see C. A. Row, ed., “The
Historical Evidence of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the Dead,” in Living Papers, Concerning Christian
Evidences, Doctrine and Morals, vol. 1 (Cincinnati, OH: Cranston & Stowe, 1886), 1–48. Row states that he will
“take it for granted, that what such men as Strauss, Renan, Baur, and the whole Tübingen school of critics admit,
those with whom I am reasoning will not deny” (4). Among these concessions is Baur’s belief that only four works
are authentically Pauline (Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Galatians) of which Row grants and focuses only on
two. In using only 1 Corinthians and Galatians, Row is a forerunner to many today who emphasize the importance
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Galatians 1-2
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of the argument since the MF themselves are both well-attested historically and agreed upon by
scholars (which includes those who think the NT is errant and has contradictions).
Third, as noted above, a strong consensus assists in guarding against confirmation bias
due to one’s presuppositions since a heterogenous group, with different and even conflicting
biases, are in agreement regarding the data. 216 By appealing to such scholarly group analysis, it
encourages the type of “community of conscience” we suggested in the previous chapter. These
facts are (and have been) submitted to a diverse group of scholars and “subjected to critical
questioning and correcting.” 217 Thus, facts accepted by diverse groups are a good indication that
there are strong reasons that those facts are historical (which explains why a majority of scholars
have accepted them). 218
These three factors combined with the two criteria for a fact to be considered a MF create
an environment in which one can know the past with high degrees of probability, if not the
highest degrees of probability. It is important to note that Habermas is not simply arguing that
these facts are true merely because a strong majority scholars believe them, but rather he has
“always held that the first [criterion] is by far the most crucial, especially since this initial
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requirement is the one that actually establishes the historicity of the events.” 219 Thus, the MFA
places the highest value on the multiple lines of arguments which are the very reasons scholars
have provided as to how they came to believe an event occurred. While the second criterion is
less important since scholarly opinion could always change or be mistaken, it is nevertheless still
highly significant for the reasons noted above.
Habermas’ list
We may now list some of facts that Habermas presents as agreed upon by scholars with
wide-ranging theological, political, and personal backgrounds. Like the other scholars whose
lists varied depending upon emphasis and purpose, Habermas states that his list of facts have
similarly varied from “publication to publication.” 220 He highlights this principle in Risen Jesus
Future Hope by first presenting a larger list of twelve “known historical facts.” 221 This list
includes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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Jesus died by (Roman) crucifixion.
He was buried, probably in a private tomb.
Afterward Jesus’ death, the disciples were discouraged and lost hope.
Although not as widely agreed upon, the tomb was empty shortly after the burial.
The disciples had experiences that they thought were of the risen Jesus.
The disciples were transformed and willing to die for this belief.
The disciple’s proclamation of the resurrection began at the beginning of the church
(i.e. it was very early).

Habermas, “The Minimal Facts Approach to the Resurrection of Jesus,” 16.

Ibid., 16. For a sample of these publications with varying lists see Gary R Habermas, The Resurrection
of Jesus: An Apologetic (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1980); Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 19–
20, 23–27; Terry L. Miethe and Gary R. Habermas, Why Believe? God Exists! Rethinking the Case for God and
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Oxford University Press, 2013), 471–72.
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8. They proclaimed it in Jerusalem, where Jesus had just recently been crucified and
buried.
9. Jesus’ resurrection is central to the Gospel.
10. Sunday became the day for Christians to gather and worship together.
11. James, the brother of Jesus and a former skeptic, became a Christian due to an
experience that he believed was an appearance of the risen Jesus.
12. Paul, the church persecutor, became a Christian due to an experience that he believed
was the risen Jesus.
Just a few pages later Habermas considers the possibility of a more radical skeptic questioning
these facts and how he would respond. As noted above, he prefers to avoid side discussions and
would rather start with the “lowest common denominator” of accepted facts when possible. Thus
he can reduce his list, for the sake of the argument, to an even shorter list of six facts even
though this list would be “arbitrarily reduced” to a “bare-bones level.” 222 These six “minimal
facts” (as distinct from the “known facts”) would include:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Jesus died by (Roman) crucifixion.
The disciples had experiences that they thought were of the risen Jesus.
The disciples were transformed and willing to die for this belief.
The disciple’s proclamation of the resurrection began at the beginning of the church
(i.e. it was very early).
5. James, the brother of Jesus and a former skeptic, became a Christian due to an
experience that he believed was an appearance of the risen Jesus.
6. Paul, the church persecutor, became a Christian due to an experience that he believed
was the risen Jesus.
For Habermas, the result of the MFA offers the potential for a case to be made for Jesus’
resurrection using MFs that are acceptable by even the most skeptical research procedures. It
seeks to not only use data that critical scholars accept and defend but does so while accepting a
negative and skeptical outlook towards the relevant sources. The conclusion that Habermas, and
others, make from these MFS is that naturalistic theories have continually demonstrated their

Habermas, 26-27 (quote from 27). Cf. 48 fn. 149. This list has been reduced even further in Habermas
and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, 48–77. There they use four facts plus one lesser accepted fact
(empty tomb).
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inability to adequately to account for them, while the explanation that Jesus was dead and then
shortly later seen alive is a superior historical explanation. 223
Limitations, Concerns, and Objections
After having examined the MFA and its benefits, it is proper to consider some of the
limitations as well as some potential concerns and objections. We will be focusing on the
philosophical and historical issues in this section and avoiding possible theological concerns. 224
Additionally, many of the issues below are topics of debate within the much broader area of
philosophy of history. As we will see, some of these concerns have more to do with history itself
rather than the MFA.
Provides limited descriptions and is overly skeptical
The name of the method implies one of its limitations. The Minimal Facts Approach is,
by definition, using a minimal amount of data. That might concern those who believe that other
important and relevant historical information is being ignored. This objection becomes most
notable when Licona demotes of Jesus’ predictions or Habermas reduces his list to a “barebones” level.
It should be remembered, however, that these are self-imposed limitations. The MFA
seeks to argue from a minimalist position. One could very well remove this limitation and argue
for Jesus’ predictions or use the longer lists to further increase one’s confidence in the

Habermas, Risen Jesus, 31–32. Similarly Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 465–610; Davis, Risen
Indeed, 180–85; Craig, Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus, 418–
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223

Such theological considerations might include, for example, certain Christian doctrinal beliefs (i.e.
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resurrection in their historical reconstruction. While there is undoubtedly value in using all of the
available data, there is also value in using a minimal data as well. 225 The value in using minimal
data may be especially important when one is beginning a historical inquiry. This is even more
so on a potentially controversial topic. Thus, the context and purpose of the inquirer can dictate
which route is best.
From a philosophical and pragmatic point of view, there are other benefits from arguing
minimalistically. Making minimal claims means one has less to defend, which can be immensely
important if one is constrained by length or time requirements. 226 It also assists by avoiding
periphery discussions that, although important, may not be directly related to the immediate
historical question (e.g. Jesus’ resurrection). Additionally, since it uses data that is agreed upon
from a heterogenous group of scholars, the data points are less themselves are less likely to be
challenged (although see below). Thus, it is a fair objection that the MFA can be too restrictive,
but the objection is more of a contextual than methodological. Just as in some contexts a
screwdriver is better than a hammer, so too is a minimalist approach better in some contexts than
a more comprehensive approach. 227 The point for our purposes is that the MFA helps answer the
question of how we know the past by providing a way to know the most secure facts about the
past.

For a helpful discussion regarding McGrew’s preference is for a much more robust method that allows
for more data. Timothy J McGrew, “Inference, Method, and History,” Southeastern Theological Review 3, no. 1
(2012): 35–39. For a response see Licona, “In Reply to Habermas, McGrew, and McCullagh,” 60–62.
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The discussion between atomism and holism below is relevant to the discussion here since the MFA
considers these minimal facts in a more atomistic manner, but the explanation of MFs can benefit from a holistic
approach that considers larger narratives.
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Burden of proof. The first criterion of MFA focuses on arguments presented from
critical scholars and therefore does not assume the reliability of the sources. The topic of where
the burden of proof lies and whether a text should be considered true until proven false or false
until proven true can be an important factor with significant consequences in historical
research. 228 Some, like those of the Jesus Seminar, begin with the assumption that the Gospels
are unhistorical until they can be demonstrated to be historical. 229 On the other side of the
spectrum, Stewart C. Goetz and Craig L. Blomberg, among others, have argued for the
presumption of truth unless a text can be demonstrated to be false. 230 It is understandable that
since neither of these positions is particularly neutral with respect to the trustworthiness of the
text, some scholars have adopted the position that the burden of proof rests on the one making
the claim. 231 Thus, the question of whether or not we are to trust our texts a priori can have

For a good overview of this issue in historical Jesus studies see Dagmar Winter, “The Burden of Proof
in Jesus Research,” in Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus, ed. Tom Holmen and Stanley E. Porter, vol.
1, 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 843–51. See also Robert L. Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus
Research,” in Key Events in the Life of the Historical Jesus: A Collaborative Exploration of Context and Coherence,
ed. Darrell L. Bock and Robert L. Webb (Grand Rapids, MI: Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 73–74.
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significant consequences for historians when examining historical claims, not just those studying
Jesus.232
Despite the ongoing debate regarding the burden of proof, the MFA nevertheless takes
the more skeptical approach and does not regard the sources as generally reliable. 233 The reason
for this is two-fold. First, it is seeking to avoid the most agreed upon data. In order to do this it
must accept a greater burden of proof. 234 Those who take the opposite assumption and treat the
sources as true until proven otherwise will likely agree with the MFs, but those who are a priori
more skeptical would not. Thus, in order to have the widest agreement, a more skeptical

Burden of Proof in Jesus Research,” 849. Incidentally, this is the position taken Charlesworth (Charlesworth, The
Historical Jesus, 18).
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approach is to be adopted. Second, it assists in avoiding the peripheral discussions with respect
to where the burden of proof lays. Rather, one is compelled to examine the facts that are agreed
upon even by the more skeptical approaches. 235
Facts can be challenged or changed
A potential concern regarding the MFA is that some of the MFs could change. 236 There
are a few reasons for this concern. First, it is reasonable given the provisional nature of history
and that new evidence may come to light which gives us reason to consider revising the current
list of facts (either by adding or subtracting). 237 Second, the overturning of views that were
considered to be the consensus among scholars has occurred in historical research studies
before. 238 Third, due to human nature, there will undoubtedly be those who wish to challenge the
status quo (even if they happen to agree with it) because sometimes it is simply pleasing to be a

We should add that the MFA is not in any way antithetical to the reliability approach. It may actually be
considered a pre-reliability approach in that it seeks to establish facts that would be part of a cumulative approach of
the reliability method.
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nonconformist or to experiment with a new hypothesis. 239 Similarly, given the impact and
significance of Jesus and the resurrection, one may reasonably expect those who wish to
disprove the resurrection would seek to disprove the facts on which it is argued in an effort to
undercut its effects. Such a skeptic may wish to challenge some of the MFs such that the list
becomes so dwindled that it is then unable to sustain the conclusion that Jesus rose from the
dead. 240 Of course this sword cuts both ways, arguments could be provided that convince a
majority of scholars such that the number of MF may be enlarged.
Ultimately, the concern here is one that highlights a limitation of our epistemic access to
truth, rather than a methodological limitation. The potential for new information, new
perspectives, and so on are possible in many facets of life and it should not be surprising that the
MFs have the same potential for change. Of course, it should be exceptionally difficult for them
to change, as Kuhn similarly noted with strong scientific paradigms, due to the multiple
supporting lines for each established fact. 241 Additionally, this is a limitation that we should want
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since the freedom to ask questions about them essential to open inquiry. Such questioning can
lead to further confidence in the facts, a revising of our understanding of them (i.e. adding or
subtracting facts). While some may be concerned that these facts lack Cartesian certainty and
thus might change, such a concern is unwarranted because the reality is that our knowledge of
the past is partial, probabilistic, and provisional.
Two consensus concerns
In addition to concerns regarding the facts, there are concerns regarding the use of a
consensus. There are two main issues we will discuss below, but before exploring them we want
to stress that consensus agreement does not equal truth. 242 It should be clear that the MFA is not
suggesting that MFs are true primarily because of the agreement, but rather primarily because of
argument.
Determining a consensus. Perhaps the most challenging aspect when discussing a
consensus view is determining what actually is the consensus view. 243 Licona has noted
examples from various experts who have presented contradictory consensus conclusions. 244
Indeed, even in his own work there is are contradictory claims regarding the scholarly consensus
of Jesus’ predictions of his death and vindication. 245

Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 64, 279; Padgett, “Advice for Religious Historians,” 297 (“At best, a
consensus might provide a beginning for our own careful examination of the issues.”).
242

Joel Willits helpfully asks how “many scholars are required for a consensus to form?” Joel Willitts,
“Presuppositions and Procedures in the Study of the ‘Historical Jesus’: Or, Why I Decided Not to Be a ‘Historical
Jesus’ Scholar,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3, no. 1 (January 2005): 68. Willitts is also concerned
about other aspects of this type of method, such as its epistemic foundationalism (69-70, 78, 86) or the limitations of
using the lowest common denominator (101-102).
243

244
Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 278–79. Referring to different consensuses regarding the authorship
of Colossians.

Licona concludes that the majority of scholars do not believe Jesus’ predictions of his death and
resurrection as historical. Licona, 300–301. He then notes a contradictory conclusion with respect to the majority of
scholarship found in Waterman, The Empty Tomb Tradition of Mark, 196.
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Paul Rhodes Eddy warns that “the claim of ‘scholarly consensus’ within New Testament
studies today has at times become little more than an unsubstantiated rhetorical ploy, rather than
simply reporting of a documented state of affairs….given this tendency…scholars should take
extra precautions when making claims of ‘consensus’.” 246 He further, and rightly, criticizes
scholars who do not provide documentation for their claims to consensus. 247 If a scholar is
claiming some fact is accepted by a majority of scholars we should expect (perhaps demand) to
have some sort of substantiation for such a claim. 248
The comments by Licona and Eddy are helpful and offer a good reminder for scholars to
be careful when making claims to consensus. We must avoid the temptation of rhetoric to
strengthen our arguments. Similarly, we must avoid the ease of using our perception of what we
may “feel” the scholarly landscape to be when making such claims. Moreover, these are also
reminders to readers to be on alert for such claims and to look for these claims to be backed up
by documentation.

Paul Rhodes Eddy, “Response,” in The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the
Resurrection of Jesus, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 273.
246

In the context of his chapter, he raises this criticism specifically against William Lane Craig who very
well could have provided the documentation but for some unknown reason did not. Eddy, 273–74. Cf. Licona, The
Resurrection of Jesus, 280.
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How such documentation could manifest itself would vary depending upon the style of the author, the
development of the argument, editorial restraints, and so on. Nevertheless, something, however minimal, should be
presented. Interestingly, in the lists we noted above, there rarely seems to be documentation that substantiates the
claims of each of those facts. There are, however, scholars who provide exceptional documentation. For historical
Jesus research, Charlesworth notes over two dozen scholars from wide-ranging theological backgrounds and from
several different countries before he writes that they and “far too many international authorities to mention—are all,
and independently, recognizing that in its broad outline the Gospels’ account of Jesus is substantially reliable and
true.” Charlesworth, “Jesus Research Expands with Chaotic Creativity,” 6–7. With respect to resurrection research,
Habermas see Habermas, Risen Jesus, 3–51. In the largest reference, Habermas cites a staggering list of fifty
scholars who accept the list of six facts presented by Habermas (50 fn. 165. Cf. 26-27, 31). Similar documentation
can be found in peer-reviewed academic journals such as Habermas, “Resurrection Research From 1975 to the
Present.”
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We may add to Licona and Eddy another concern. There is an increasing difficulty in
determining a consensus due to the vast number of publications being produced today. It is
understandable to expect the number of publications today. The introduction of the computer and
internet has contributed to the plethora of publications today as well as an increased accessibility
to publications. The challenge is so great that no less a scholar than Dale Allison has commented
that “even the experts cannot keep up any more. The number of publications has become as the
sand of the sea.” 249 If there are a number of publications that we are unable to read due to the
vast quantity of writings, it will make claims to scholarly consensus less accurate.
This issue has been recognized for some time in historical Jesus studies. 250 Nevertheless,
one need not read every single work in order to determine the scholarly lay of the land. While
scholars cannot read every publication, they still read many of them and in so doing become
familiar with the positions of various scholars. 251 This includes those whom they are unable to
Dale C. Allison, The Historical Christ and the Theological Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009),
13 (emphasis added). He adds “Attending the displays of new books at the annual Society of Biblical Literature
meetings produces in me mostly despair, because I know that amid the myriads of throw-away books, are thousands
of valuable pages that I will never turn.”
249

In 1993, the noted Princeton professor James Charlesworth made a comment similar to Allison’s above.
He wrote that the “task before us is now formidable, and in some ways impossible.” Charlesworth, “Jesus Research
Expands with Chaotic Creativity,” 2. Charlesworth was echoing the concerns of Hugh Anderson who, in 1967,
asked “Who of sufficient range of intellect and breadth of vision is to survey and measure an enterprise so massive,
to bring some order into the chaos of the lives of Jesus?” Hugh Anderson, Jesus (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1967), 16. However, writing in 1906, Schweitzer wrote “There is room for an attempt to bring order into the
chaos of the Lives of Jesus.” Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress
from Reimarus to Wrede, trans. W. Montgomery (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 12.
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Habermas, for example, states that throughout his years of research he had to modify how he was able to
maintain his finger on the pulse of scholarship. He writes, “Initially I read and catalogued the majority of these
publications, charting the representative authors, positions, topics, and so on, concentrating on both well-known and
obscure writers alike, across the entire skeptical to liberal to conservative spectrum. As the number of sources grew,
I moved more broadly into this research, trying to keep up with the current stated of resurrection research.”
Habermas, “The Minimal Facts Approach to the Resurrection of Jesus,” 18. It should be added that although he
stated that his bibliography at that time was around 3,400 sources, he is am making no claim to having done an
exhaustive study of all these resurrection sources. He adds, “Not to be misunderstood here, as I have tried to explain
elsewhere, I am making no claim to have done an exhaustive study of all these resurrection sources. My figures
reflect a difference between representative sources that have been catalogued in all their significant, exhausting
details, to those that were surveyed more briefly, to those that are simply listed in my ongoing bibliography” (18
fn.8).
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read directly since interaction, references, and reviews of works provide additional avenues for
scholars to become familiar with the positions held by scholars. 252 Moreover, at the very least,
one could quite reasonably read works that provide samples or overviews from the main groups
in scholarship, in ways similar to how polls are taken today, in order to obtain a sampling of
scholarly views. Thus, while it is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to keep up with every
scholarly publication on a topic today, this does not prevent scholars from determining what the
majority of scholars believe on a topic.
Does not eliminate subjective element. As indicated above, consensus views are, in
limited ways, helpful. While they can potentially help to mitigate the issues of bias, they do not
provide a guarantee that objective knowledge has been obtained. 253 For example, it could be
possible that a heterogenous group shares an unrecognized and false assumption on which they
evaluate the data (and thus the group is not actually heterogenous with respect to a specific
unidentified assumption). 254 Thus, despite a plurality of worldviews coming together in
agreement, there always remains the possibility of a (seemingly idiosyncratic) minority being
correct. 255

Albert Schweitzer’s notable Quest for the Historical Jesus provides a substantial overview of a
significant number of scholars. Reading this work could help provide one with information regarding a number of
scholars despite the fact they may not be able to read them.
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We are in agreement with Vanhoozer’s notion of fallible knowledge. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a
Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, Anniversary Edition (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), 302–3, 335, 458, 464.
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Polanyi highlights some of these issues with respect to the discovery of the theory of relativity. Michael
Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974),
11–14.

Wolfhart Pannenberg notes that the sound judgment of a historian can outweigh a majority view.
Wolfhart Pannenberg, “The Historical Jesus as a Challenge to Christology,” Dialog 37, no. 1 (1998): 22–23.
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Another consideration is that the MFs are the result of interpretations themselves. To help
illustrate what we mean by this is by pointing out that interpretation occurs when “facts are
converted into evidence.” 256 While the MFs are frequently “converted” into evidence when they
are used to argue for a historical explanation, the MFs themselves are also the result of various
other facts that have been “converted” into evidence in order to establish them as the best
historical explanation. MFs have multiple lines of evidence that are used in order to demonstrate
that a MF is indeed a fact. The best explanation of these multiple lines of evidence is the MF
itself. Thus, this process found in criterion one of the MFA is not without its own levels of
subjective interpretation and may also explains why some of the facts, like the empty tomb, have
lesser agreement.
It is important, given the aforementioned limitations as well as the argument in chapter
two, to remind ourselves that subjective nature of historical research is not in itself an obstacle to
knowing the past. Moreover, these concerns are not strong enough to warrant a rejection of the
approach. As Licona points out, consensus approaches may “not always be a reliable filter of
conclusions that have been overly influenced by the horizons of historians, no filters are.” 257 A
method need not be perfect in order to be effective.
Final comments
We have seen that while some of the concerns are legitimate, most are the concerns of
history in general and thus not necessarily concerns of the MFA in particular. Aside from the
concern that this method is overly limiting, many of the issues are ones that are topics that are

Evans, In Defense of History, 66. Dunn distinguishes event, data, and fact (i.e. interpretation of data)
Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 1:102–5.
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Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 279 (emphasis added).
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related to philosophy of history or historiography. In other words, they are questions that
everyone interested in the past must face. While it is true that this method is restrictive, as we
noted, however, this is an acknowledged limitation of the method and in certain contexts this
restriction can be positive and in others a negative. The MFA is especially beneficial, then, by
seeking to start the discussion on common ground and provide a groundwork from which one
may begin their inquiry. Importantly, one can examine the common ground and explore the ways
in which different historians have come to their conclusions about the past. The variety of
arguments and lines of evidence (criterion one of the MFA) provide a description of how these
thinkers have come to know the past.
A further point may be added here for those who still may hold a reservation regarding
the method. Should we prefer a method that seeks the opposite of what the MFA seeks to
establish? It would be thoroughly surprising to find a scholar would proudly proclaim that their
historical method (1) does not have multiple lines of evidence nor (2) enjoys an overwhelmingly
minimal acceptance by critical scholars! 258 Ultimately, scholars may wish to amend or
supplement the method, but the minimalist nature of the method is one designed to establish the
strongest historical foundations possible. It thus provides us with one avenue of knowing the
past.

258
Note we are not saying that one needs acceptance of a majority of scholars for their argument to be true.
To be clear, we have not argued anywhere that something is true simply because the majority believe it. It can
certainly be preferred since such agreement amongst a diverse group mitigates against confirmation bias, but
minorities can certainly be correct and it may be their bias that gives them the greatest insight into the truth of the
matter. For these reasons, the bigger emphasis is on the multiple lines of evidence that substantiate each fact.
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Historical Criteria: Moving from Historical Claims to Historical Events
It is at this point one may ask, “It is all well and good that these historians agree to X, Y,
and Z, but how do they know that these things happened? What is it that convinces them?”259
Underlying such questions is a concern regarding how and why historians move from the claim
of the occurrence of a past event (found in a source) to the actual occurrence of such an event. 260
In other words, how do historians adjudicate between claims to historicity and actual historicity?
These questions are by no means trivial and have serious implications to other fields. For
example, if we cannot provide good reasons to discern historical truth from historical fictions,
then most claims to alleged criminal activity will be discarded (unless they have been
videotaped, but even this can be questioned). 261 Fortunately, it is virtually unanimously agreed
that we can have good reasons for doing so despite the fact that fictions, fabrications, and
distortions can, and do, occur. 262 While our ability to discern the truth of the past may be taken
for granted by many, the question of how we know the past in light of these challenges still

In a recent debate, Carl Stecher, a retired literature professor of Salem State University, repeatedly asked
a similar question, “How do we determine where history ends and legends begin?” Carl Stecher and Craig
Blomberg, Resurrection: Faith or Fact? A Scholars’ Debate Between a Skeptic and a Christian (Durham, NC:
Pitchstone Publishing, 2019), 58, 61, 63. Tom Holmén notes that the criteria should help ground our ability to affirm
a historical tradition (although he is specifically referring to the NT traditions). Tom Holmén, “Authenticity
Criteria,” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of the Historical Jesus, ed. Craig Evans (New York: London: Routledge,
2008), 45.
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Although it cannot be pursued here, there is a critical distinction between the fact of an event having
occurred and its significance (both past and present). This distinction has been tacitly acknowledged by those
studying the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, but is rarely drawn out. This issue is highlighted, for example,
throughout Daniel P. Fuller, Easter Faith and History (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1965). Some of the most
explicit examples are found on 168-170 regarding the work of Gerhard Koch. The classic work on the distinction
between a text’s meaning and its significance is found in E. D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1967).
261
Video evidence is susceptible to many of the similar limitations that photographs have (limited
perspective or angle, etc.), although to a lesser extent.

Alan Spitzer makes the point that it is assumed by virtually everyone, even those engaged in
controversial debates, that there is some way in which we all can distinguish historical truth from historical fiction.
Alan B. Spitzer, Historical Truth and Lies About the Past: Reflections on Dewey, Dreyfus, de Man, and Reagan
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 1–12, 117–21.
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remains. The answer to this question can, on one level, be answered by the so-called criteria of
authenticity. 263 While some of criteria may be instinctively recognized, various scholars have
explored them in greater detail. 264
The Role of Criteria
Although historians may vary regarding as to where the burden of proof should be placed
when confronted with a historical claim, various criteria have been proposed which, if met, add
to the probability of a historical claim being a historical reality. Criteria that historians use
include multiple independent attestation, embarrassing testimony, and contextual credibility
among others (see list below). 265 It will thus be essential to discuss what are they intended to
demonstrate and what their limitations are since there appears to be some confusion in this

263
These historical criteria are only one way among others that historians can know the past (others include
source criticism, archaeology, evaluation of inferences to the best explanation [explanatory power and scope], etc.).
Tom Holmén has also pointed towards the general reliability of these texts such that it has taken some of the burden
off of the criteria of authenticity. Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” 44, 46. James Charlesworth notes that, “in fact far
too many international authorities to mention—are all, and independently, recognizing that in its broad outline the
Gospels’ account of Jesus is substantially reliable and true.” Charlesworth, “Jesus Research Expands with Chaotic
Creativity,” 7.

Tom Holmén notes that the “The criteria of authenticity are therefore best characterized as tools in
support of logic.” Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” 45. John Meier writes that “Given the difficulty involved in
articulating and applying these criteria, it is not surprising that some scholars brush aside the whole question of
method and criteria….Yet every scholar engaged in the quest for the historical Jesus is de facto operating with some
method and criteria, however inchoate and unexamined.” John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical
Jesus, vol. 1: The Roots and the Problem of the Person, Anchor Bible Reference Library (New York: Doubleday,
1991), 12. While for Dunn, Gotthold Lessing and Ernst Troeltsch are “usually given credit for stating and defining
most clearly the principles on which critical historical study is postulated and the sobering consequences which
follow.” Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 1:68.
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Some historians do not like the word criteria due to the degree of certainty that is conveyed with it and
prefer other terms (e.g. indices, proverbs, principles, or tools). See for example, Ben F. Meyer, Critical Realism and
the New Testament (Allison Park, PA: Wipf and Stock, 1989), 134, 141; Benjamin C. F. Shaw, “What’s Good for
the Goose Is Good for the Gander: Historiography and the Historical Jesus,” Journal for the Study of the Historical
Jesus 15, no. 2–3 (December 11, 2017): 303. We will use a number of terms below (tool, proverb, etc.), including
criteria, since we will be noting the relevant qualifications to the term.
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regard. 266 This will also put us into a position to more fully understand the criteria and why they
can be utilized as historical tools in uncovering the past.
It may be helpful to list some of the criteria proposed by NT scholars. This is important
since there is currently no official list of criteria that historians can appeal to or have agreed
upon. While some have analyzed these proposed lists, we will only briefly mention some of them
here as a preface to the following section. 267 Some of the proposed criteria consist of the
following:
1. Early: Generally earlier sources are preferred to later sources.
2. Eyewitnesses: Eyewitnesses are typically better than non-eyewitness accounts.
3. Multiple Independent Attestation: The more independent sources the greater the
likelihood of the event’s occurrence.
4. Multiple Literary Forms: Different literary forms (i.e. parables, narratives, etc.),
indicate an earlier and more likely historical event.
5. Embarrassing Testimony: Attestation that can argue against the interests of the
source are normally a positive indicator of an event’s historicity.
6. Enemy Attestation: Generally, when one attests to an event that is favorable to
their rival, then it is considered more likely to have occurred.
7. Contextual Credibility: If the event in question fits the overall context in which it
occurred, this can add to the events probability (if even only slightly).
8. Double Dissimilarity: If an event is not similar to either Judaism or early
Christianity than it can add to the probability of an event.
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Shaw, “What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander,” 301–2.

One of the most extensive lists comes from Dennis Polkow, “Method and Criteria for Historical Jesus
Research,” in Society of Biblical Literature 1987 Seminar Papers, ed. Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta, GA: Scholars
Press, 1987), 336–56. See also Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter, The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question
of Criteria, trans. M. Eugene Boring (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002). Allison considers
Theissen and Winter’s work as “the most extended and most judicious exploration of our criteria to date.” Dale C.
Allison, “How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria of Authenticity,” in Handbook for the Historical Jesus, ed.
Tom Holmén and Stanley E. Porter, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 7.
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Typically Add Historical Probability to an Event’s Occurrence
It is valuable to first note that these criteria are typically only able to add probability to
the historicity of an event. 268 Ehrman argues, for example, that reported events that have either
multiple attestation and meet the criterion of dissimilarity are positive indicators of the
historicity. 269 Each of these criteria add to the probability of an events occurrence and the more
criteria that are met, the more likely the event in question occurred.
A critical distinction should be made with respect to the inverse of this formulation. It is
true that if some criteria that are met then we are less confident in the historicity of the event;
however, it does not follow that their absence makes it is more likely the event in question is
unhistorical. Confidence that an event occurred needs to be distinguished from events that are
considered unhistorical. 270 For example, the absence of the criterion of multiple attestation with
regard to event X will not be able to make X become improbable (i.e. go below 50%
probability). It can, however, make an event become less probable in the sense of moving one’s
confidence from, say, 90% to 80% probability or from 80% to 70% probability, but it will not
(by itself) make the event move to historical improbability (i.e. move from 50% [agnostic] to
40% [improbable]).

Holmén points out that this was primarily due to a presumed skepticism towards the NT. Unless one
could present arguments (i.e. criteria), the tradition “would be assumed to be inauthentic.” Holmén, “Authenticity
Criteria,” 43, 51. The criteria, then, were primarily developed in a climate that placed the burden of proof on the NT
to show that it is historical. Given that scholars, even skeptical ones, wanted to demonstrate that their depiction of
Jesus was accurate, they would need to devise or utilize criteria to support their claims if they wanted to even begin
to attempt to argue on the basis of evidence. We use the term “typically” for reasons noted below regarding the
criterion of contextual credibility.
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Ehrman, The New Testament, 220-221. Ehrman makes a similar comment regarding works that are
closer to the events in question (217).

Confidence in an events occurrence can also relate to the risk assessment of a belief. Although this topic
cannot be pursued here, for one of the few (and brief) discussions on risk assessment see Licona, The Resurrection
of Jesus, 192.
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To say it differently, if a reported event does not meet a certain criterion, then it does not
necessarily follow that the alleged event is unlikely to have occurred. As Meyer noted, the
“presence [of criteria] positively tells in favor of historicity, but their absence does not positively
tell against historicity.” 271 The logic here is that if an alleged historical event is not supported by
multiple attestation, then it does not follow that the event is therefore non-historical or did not
happen simply because the event lacks the criterion of multiple attestation. 272 In such an instance
we would be limited in our ability to know whether an event occurred if it lacks the additional
corroboration and this limitation can subsequently affect our confidence in the historicity of the
event, but it is not a positive argument that an event did not occur. 273 Ultimately, the point is that
the criteria are criteria of authenticity, not inauthenticity. 274 This means that their presence will
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Meyer, Critical Realism and the New Testament, 131. He adds, “By denying that the absence of these
indices positively tells against historicity, or justifies the methodological ranging of data in the non-historicity
column, one breaks cleanly with the grounding of historicity judgments on mere assumptions.”

Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” 60–62.See also Darrell L. Bock,
“Faith and the Historical Jesus: Does A Confessional Position and Respect for the Jesus Tradition Preclude Serious
Historical Engagement?,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 8 fn. 9. Bock notes
that the reason historian’s may be cautious, as opposed to skeptical, in such a situation is that the event may, ceteris
paribus, merely lack additional confirmation. Such lack of confirmation may understandably be due to a number of
causes such as the destruction or deterioration of documents (especially in ancient history). However, as pointed out
in fn. 59 above, sometimes later corroboration for singularly attested events is discovered.
272

Such arguments are arguments from silence. Relevant exceptions could be construed on the basis of
missing evidence where one would have expected to find it. If we are limited in our ability to know whether the
event occurred, then historians generally take one of three options. (1) They can simply withhold judgment and
remain agnostic. (2) They can view the claim skeptically by placing the burden of proof on the text (until its
historicity can be adequately demonstrated). (3) They can trust the claim by placing the burden of proof upon the
skeptic of the text (until it has adequately been demonstrated to be unhistorical). The latter two options are clearly
influenced upon how one views the burden of proof question.
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While the language of authenticity and inauthenticity is typically related to historical Jesus studies,
broader language of historical or unhistorical could also be employed. For a discussion on the use of authenticity and
inauthenticity see Anthony Le Donne, “The Rise of the Quest for an Authentic Jesus: An Introduction to the
Crumbling Foundations of Jesus Research,” in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, ed. Chris Keith and
Anthony Le Donne (London: T & T Clark, 2012), 6–17.

85

generally add to the historical probability of an event and their absence does not constitute
positive evidence that the event did not occur. 275
There is, however, an exception to the claim that the criteria can only be used to raise the
probability of an event’s occurrence or that their absence of a criterion does not count against an
event’s historicity. For Ehrman, alleged events that do not satisfy the criterion of contextual
credibility give us reason to doubt the their historicity. 276 He argues that “unlike other criteria,
contextual credibility serves a strictly negative function.” 277 The reasoning for this is that the
events need to fit reasonably into the context in which they occurred. For example, if we found
an account in which the disciples were driving motorcycles, we would know immediately that
this event fails to meet the contextual credibility criterion and would be a clear mark against its
historicity. This is an admittedly extreme example and is used to highlight how a failure of this
criterion could count against the historicity of the event. There are, however, other examples in
which something may seem out of place contextually but are nonetheless historical. The criterion

Some have argued that the reason criteria do not identify historical fiction is because the criteria are
somehow being prevented from doing so by the one’s using them. For example, Robert Miller writes, “I assume—
although I would be happy to be corrected—that evangelical scholars do not allow those same criteria to lead to
negative historical conclusions.” Robert J. Miller, “When It’s Futile to Argue about the Historical Jesus: A Response
to Bock, Keener, and Webb,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 89. Amy-Jill
Levine makes a similar argument writing, “If the application of the criteria in every case yields a positive
assessment, we have not proof of historicity but doubt about the viability of the criteria.” Levine, “Christian Faith
and the Study of the Historical Jesus,” 98. Thus, the problem for Miller is that it is the person wielding the tool
(evangelicals), while for Levine the problem is the tools themselves. Both appear mistaken for as we will see, the
tools, if being used properly, are generally only able to yield positive results regardless who uses them. Moreover,
the fact that they essentially only yield positive results is not a fault of the criteria, but a legitimate limitation. To say
that a screwdriver is not a hammer does not make a screwdriver a less viable tool. Ultimately, if one wishes to
establish a historical falsehood they must, according to Fischer, find “affirmative evidence of not X – which is often
difficult, but never in my experience impossible.” Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 47. See also 48, 62. Similarly
Meyer, Critical Realism and the New Testament, 135–36.
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Ehrman, The New Testament, 222–23. See also Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” 51–52. Holmén
helpfully notes that this criteria can be stated positively (e.g. the criterion of plausibility or the criterion of
Palestinian context).

Ehrman, The New Testament, 223. Robert Webb also makes a similar point in Webb, “The Historical
Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” 63–67, 69–71.
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of dissimilarity, for example, suggests that those things that Jesus said or did that is significantly
dissimilar from the context of Judaism or Christianity is, in fact, more likely to be historical. 278
Thus, as with the other criteria, one cannot be simply apply the criteria in a dogmatic way.
Probability (and Subjectivity), Not Certainty
None of the criteria are able to verify events with absolute certainty nor should they be
expected to do so. This must be noted due to the existential angst of those who may “want the
criteria to work like a calculator” or may be struggling with “physics envy.” 279 The criteria, no
matter how strictly or universally applied, can only yield probabilistic (and provisional)
assistance and never mathematical certainty. 280 There are several factors to consider in this
regard.
First, speculations and possibilities will always persist. 281 Various undercutting defeaters
can be imagined ad infinitum that would be a potential defeater to a given criteria. For example,
what if all the documents we have for a given event are counterfeits? This is always a possibility
that, if true, would remove claims to multiple independent attestation. Yet, possibilities are not
probabilities and such speculating is reminiscent of Descartes’ evil demon. One cannot refute its
logical possibility, but it clearly does not follow that because something is possible it therefore

Webb uses Matt. 8:22//Lk. 9:60 as an example of the criterion of dissimilarity being met since Jesus’
words regarding the treatment of the dead (“let the dead bury their dead”) appear to be out of context with those of
the early church who, so far as we know, had concern for burying the dead. Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and
Historical Jesus Research,” 65.
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The first comment comes from Licona, “Is the Sky Falling in the World of Historical Jesus Research?”
358–59. The second is from Allison, The Historical Christ and the Theological Jesus, 55.
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Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” 43, 45, 51, 53.

281

Ibid., 46, 53.
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becomes probable. Our knowledge of the past, like knowledge in so many other areas, remains in
the world of probability and not certainty and this is perfectly fine. 282
Second, the application of the criteria, like a proverb, is dependent upon the one applying
them. This means that an important subjective element remains. Meyer helpfully pointed this out
when he observed that the criteria
function in criticism not entirely unlike the way proverbs function in common sense.
Faced with an issue that must quickly be settled one way or another, one might wonder
which of two proverbs fits the situation: “He who hesitates is lost”? Or “Look before you
leap”? If added insight is needed to know which piece of wisdom is relevant here and
now, so in the criticism of historical data, when the indices offer mixed signals, added
insight I required to know which factors tip the balance. The added insight is not a
misbegotten intrusion of subjectivity it is that without which a true judgment is simply
impossible. 283
The criteria require wise discernment in their application and are not wooden calculations. Of
course, along with the possibility of wise discernment also comes the possibility of unwise
discernment. 284 It is for this reason that there remains an important subjective element in the use
and application of the criteria. As noted in chapter two, subjective elements need not be a
deterrent from good inquiry. Just as a proverb is not invalidated simply because someone applies

Some may nevertheless find the probable nature of much of our knowledge existentially problematic.
Ben Simpson notes some historians “emphasized this high level of objectivity because of the demand for certainty in
the modern Western culture.” Benjamin I. Simpson, Recent Research on the Historical Jesus, Recent Research in
Biblical Studies 6 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2014), 28. Cf. Dunn’s comments on the fact that most of our
knowledge is probabilistic. James D. G. Dunn, “Response to Darrell L. Bock,” in The Historical Jesus: Five Views,
ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 299.
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Meyer, Critical Realism and the New Testament, 141. Similarly, Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 279.
Jonathan Bernier writes that the criteria “simply do not achieve the desired objectivity because objectivity is to be
located not in our techniques but, rather, in ourselves.” Jonathan Bernier, The Quest for the Historical Jesus after the
Demise of Authenticity: Toward a Critical Realist Philosophy of History in Jesus Studies, Library of New Testament
Studies 540 (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 10. See also 159.
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We can agree with Bernier here when he notes that we need to “make peace with our own subjectivity
and realize that it is an asset rather than an obstacle.” Bernier, The Quest for the Historical Jesus after the Demise of
Authenticity, 11. However, we would want to add, that we should also recognize that in addition to it being an asset,
it can also be an obstacle. This is not just the case for “other” historians, but also ourselves.
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the incorrect proverb to a given situation, neither are the criteria to be discarded because they
have been misused. 285
Another way one may understand the subjectivity of the inquirer with respect to the
criteria is in the evidential weight one places on the differing criteria. Webb remarks that the
“relative importance or weight for each of these primary criteria is somewhat subjective among
scholars.” 286 For example, some may favor multiple attestation (e.g. John Meier) as the
weightiest criterion while others may prefer discontinuity (e.g. Norman Perrin). However, Webb
warns that with a “heavy and rough hand, the historian can push the criteria in one direction or
another, and they may be used to justify a preconceived viewpoint.” 287

Allison is concerned that we cannot discern the difference between a misuse and proper use since each
historian makes the criteria say what they want. He uses tools as an analogy and writes, “Tools do not dictate how
they are used; the hands that hold them do that. You can use screwdrivers to remove screws or screws, and you can
use screwdrivers to install screws.” Dale C. Allison, “It Don’t Come Easy: A History of Disillusionment,” in Jesus,
Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, ed. Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne (London: T & T Clark, 2012), 197.
Allison’s distinction is that historians are using these tools to build or tear down anything they like. However, this
seems to be an overly negative attitude towards the criteria and would also seem to apply to proverbs. Though
people can wrongly apply a proverb by forcing it into a situation in which it ought not be used, we do not respond by
suggesting that we do away with proverbs. So too with criteria. Thus, the point we are making is that a hammer is
still a good tool even if someone (mistakenly) uses it on a screw (one could also question whether the hammer
constitutes an actual “tool” in such a scenario since it is being used in a way outside of its original design). Such
mistaken or incorrect uses of a tool or proverb should cause us to consider the one utilizing them, not question the
tool/proverb itself.
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Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” 60. However, Holmén rightly notes
“the criteria are not all of the same value in what comes to argumentative strength and cogency….the effectiveness
and cogency of the different criteria vary from case to case.” Holmén, “Authenticity Criteria,” 52. See also Shaw,
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Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” 72. Hooker’s comments are similar,
but too pessimistic (and possibly relativistic). She writes that the “answers which the New Testament scholar gives
are not the result of applying objective tests and using precision tools; they are very largely the result of his own
presuppositions and prejudices.” Hooker, “On Using the Wrong Tool,” 581. Rather, as Allison more accurately
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For these reasons, it is not be surprising that some see the application of the criteria as
“more art than science.” 288 Viewing the criteria as something other than a scientific formula
reminds us that the results are not assured with certainty and that the role of the inquirer retains
an element of responsibility. 289 Thus, the subjective inquirer applies the criteria in order to yield
objective knowledge about the past that is (unsurprisingly) probable and provisional, but not
certain.
Criteria Should be Used as Part of a Cumulative Argument
The criteria are not to be used in isolation, but rather should be used in conjunction with
one another when possible. As Webb writes, the criteria “must be used together….viewed as
functioning collectively to provide the historian with the best judgment concerning a piece of
tradition….it cannot be stressed enough: weighing the evidence involves using all the criteria
together, seeing the issue from various angles.” 290 The past is far too dynamic to be restricted to
one test for truth. Just as a geologist would not restrict their inquiry to only that which shovels
can discover, neither should the historian examine the past using only one criterion. Thus, while
one may have a preference for a given criterion, they should not use that criterion to the
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Ben Meyer helpfully reminds us that criticisms of the criteria that identify the subjective nature of the
criteria are implicitly advocating for the impossibility of a positivistic form of history. He writes, “Morna D. Hooker
made a particularly incisive contribution….But the critique failed to come to a fully satisfactory
conclusion….[because] it was undermined by a mistaken (implicitly positivist) recoil from ‘subjectivity.’” Ben F.
Meyer, “Some Consequences of Birger Gerhardsson’s Account of the Origins of the Gospel Tradition,” in Jesus and
the Oral Gospel Tradition, ed. Henry Wansbrough, Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series
64 (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 427. Bernier places Meyer’s point in the critical realist context.
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exclusion of other considerations. 291 Indeed, the more tools at their disposal, their more fruitful
their findings are likely to be (so long as those tools are used properly). Tom Holmén argues that
“The best way to observe these considerations is an ensemble use of the criteria: that is, allowing
flexibly for the whole repertoire of applicable criteria.” 292 Thus, there is an interplay between the
differing criteria as well as the context in which they are employed and by taking these into
account, one attain a greater understanding of the past.
The importance of this can be seen in the purpose of some of the criteria themselves. For
example, as Rafael Rodríguez and Mark Goodacre note, the criterion multiple attestation and the
criterion of embarrassment create a tension with one another. Goodacre writes, “It is a strange
state of affairs that scholars will simultaneously claim both that a given tradition was
‘embarrassing’ to the early church and that they repeated it on ‘multiple’ occasions. It is a
counterintuitive combination.” 293 While we will have more to say on the combination of these
two criteria below, it is sufficient for our purposes here to point out the use of multiple criteria is
important for developing a better understanding of the past, which includes identifying potential
tensions in our evidence such as those noted by Rodríguez and Goodacre.
We thus want to argue that an important aspect of the criteria is that, in general, they
should not be used in isolation. As Holmén points out, “the more criteria one can appeal to for
the authenticity of a tradition or a motif, the better. However, decisions must not be based on

For example, Webb complains that John Dominic Crossan has overemphasized the criterion of multiple
attestation in his work. Webb, 62 fn. 117. We may also note that the historian should not just bind themselves to the
use of criteria alone, but should incorporate other historical arguments.
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simple counting of the criteria but the variables [also involved].” 294 Furthermore, and as we will
see below, it is not just that the criteria should be used in conjunction and in conjunction with
other criteria, but also on differing levels of analysis with other historical arguments.
Multiple Levels of Analysis
Historical analysis occurs at many different levels. Two levels of analysis relevant to our
present considerations are what can be termed holism and atomism. Holism seeks to take into
account a general overview of all available sources and factors. 295 On the other end of the
spectrum, atomism seeks to examine specific events (saying or action) within the broader
historical narrative. Contrary to what some have suggested, the criteria should take both into
account when analyzing the past. 296
Ferdinand Hahn helpfully had pointed out years ago the interrelated nature of the whole
and the parts of historical inquiry. He wrote that a “reconstruction of the pre-Easter activity of
Jesus can be obtained only if a first draft for a comprehensive interpretation is sketched
simultaneously with the discovery of detailed pieces of information. Individual observations and
an overall view are interrelated at every stage.” 297 The larger narrative is thus kept in mind when
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Chris Keith argues that such a “big-picture approach” is growing in historical Jesus studies and is one of
the ways historians should seek to proceed. Chris Keith, “The Fall of the Quest for an Authentic Jesus: Concluding
Remarks,” in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, ed. Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne (London: T &
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examining an individual unit, but the individual units are precisely those what contribute to our
understanding of the larger narrative.
One may think of Google Earth as a helpful analogy here. Just as one can zoom in on
Google Earth in order to look at individual streets, one can also zoom out in order to examine the
broader city, state, country, or continent. These different levels aide to our geographic
understanding by allowing analysis on a variety of different levels (street, city, etc.). Similarly,
our understanding of the past is examined on multiple levels of analysis. One can “zoom in” to
an action, but in order to better understand the action one may also need to “zoom out” and
consider the bigger picture. For example, when utilizing the criterion of embarrassment, one
must consider the atomistic level of the event (e.g. Jesus’ death on a cross). However, one must
also “zoom out” in order to consider the wider narrative that situates such an event in a specific
context that would constitute the event as embarrassing. In other words, the “fact becomes
embarrassing when we place them into larger historical narratives.” 298
We should add here that on the different levels different historical arguments can be
provided that go beyond just the criteria. For example, Allison helpfully refers to recurrent
attestation when considering a more holistic approach. While multiple independent attestation
refers to a particular event, recurrent attestation is “a theme or motif that is repeatedly attested
throughout the tradition.” 299 This is important for Allison because if the “tradents of the Jesus

methodological circle for the reconstruction of the historical Jesus.” Schröter, “The Criteria of Authenticity in Jesus
Research and Historiographical Method,” 55 (emphasis added).”
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Rodríguez, “The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus: The Criterion of Embarrassment and the Failure of
Historical Authenticity,” 146 (emphasis in original). It is worth noting that, on the atomistic level, the criteria will
generally identify that an event happened and not its significance. For example, whether or not an event is
embarrassing cannot be known simply by the occurrence of an event alone. In some contexts one event can be
embarrassing, while in other events the same event may be encouraging.
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tradition got the big picture or the larger patterns wrong then they also got the details—that is,
the sentences—wrong.” 300 Conversely, if they get the particulars wrong, the big picture
arguments provide a reasonably accurate general depiction or gist of the past. It is for this reason
that Allison is able to argue that “Joseph was surely the name of Jesus’ father, even if none of the
stories in which he appears is historical.” 301 Whether or not one agrees with Allison’s arguments,
the point we are making is that the criteria can, and should, be used alongside other historical
arguments.
Here we have argued along lines similar to that of Hahn. He pointed out that
“observations taken singly fall far short of permitting judgment about a piece of tradition….Only
when several criteria are used simultaneously, and when observations are used to supplement and
correct one another, can reliable conclusions be obtained about the assessment of the Jesus
tradition for use in the historical investigation of Jesus.” 302 More recently, Licona has advocated
for a similar approach writing, “Whether one begins with holism or atomism, using them
together has the potential to yield a greater degree of certainty pertaining to a greater number of
specific logia and acts than using one approach to the exclusions of the other.” 303 Thus, we want
to avoid using the criteria in isolation from one another, in isolation from the larger picture, and
in isolation from other arguments. Rather, we should seek as cumulative and integrated approach
as possible if we are seeking to have a better understanding of the past.
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Summary
For decades various concerns have been raised with respect to the effectiveness and
usefulness of the criteria in providing authentic or historical material about Jesus.304 These
concerns have recently culminated into a book length treatment on the subject criticizing the
criteria titled Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity. 305 We have sought in the above
discussion to take some of their criticisms into account in our presentation of how historical
criteria can assist one in knowing the past. In summary, the criteria are tools that are used to help
establish the greater probability of a purported historical event. The more criteria that are met,
generally the greater the likelihood the event occurred. If a historical claim does not meet the
criteria, then it does not typically make the event unlikely by itself. The criteria all add varying
degrees of certainty with some criteria carrying greater weight than others and some criteria
being more valuable in certain situations and less so in others. Wise judgment and discernment
will be important when determining which criteria are more valuable than others in a given
circumstance. Thus, the subjective role of the inquirer is important in the application of the
criteria. Furthermore, we should avoid the mistake that we only need one criterion or that only
one should be used. Instead we should seek to use multiple criteria. In addition to multiple
criteria, we should utilize the criteria within the context that takes both the whole (holism) and
the parts (atomism) into consideration. In doing so, one should not exclude other relevant
historical considerations. In short, the criteria function as proverbs that are applied by the
inquirer of the past in order to provide positive, probabilistic, and provisional conclusions that
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are most effective when one takes into account other relevant criteria, historical arguments, and
differing levels of analysis (e.g. holism).
Jesus, Criteria, and the Surprise of Historicity: Jesus’ Crucifixion as Test Case
In response Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, Licona asks an important
question to those who are more skeptical of the criteria. He writes,
If a contributor objects to my use of criteria with respect to Jesus’ death by crucifixion, I
would want to ask that contributor whether he or she thinks Jesus was crucified and died
as a result. If the contributor answers affirmatively, I would want to ask how that
contributor arrived at that conclusion apart from the criteria. 306
In this section we want to provide a test case for how the criteria contribute to our knowledge of
the past, specifically with respect to Jesus’ death.
Criteria and the Crucifixion
In addition to the criteria, there are many critical arguments for Jesus’ crucifixion (e.g.
medical considerations, qualifications of the Roman soldiers, Strauss’ famous critique, etc.). In
an effort to highlight how the criteria operate when investigating the past, we are going to focus
upon those directly related this event. In this case there are at least seven different criteria that
provide the inquirer with positive reasons to believe Jesus died by crucifixion. 307
First, Jesus death by crucifixion is multiply attested in a wide variety of sources. Jesus
death is referenced in nineteen of the twenty-seven writings of the NT. 308 It is also attested, both
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Although we think that there is limited value for the criterion of dissimilarity, we have excluded it from
our consideration (Jews were not expecting a Messiah who would die) due to the recent debates surrounding the
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with and without mentioning the cross, in early Christian noncanonical writings such as Clement,
Ignatius, Polycarp, and others. 309 Josephus and Tacitus are examples from non-Christian sources
that also refer to Jesus death. 310 These sources combine to make Jesus’ death by crucifixion one
of the best attested historical facts we have about Jesus.311
Second, as might be expected in a wide variety of sources, Jesus’ death is found in
multiple literary forms. It is found, for example, in biographies (Gospels), creeds (1 Cor 15:3),
and historical annals (Tacitus). While this criterion is sometimes considered under the category
of multiple attestation, we find it helpful to distinguish it separately here. 312
Third, it is in sources that are early. Although Paul mentions Jesus’ death and his writings
predate the Gospels, there is an important creedal formula in 1 Corinthians 15:3ff. Jesus’ death is
mentioned in v. 3. It is widely believed that the creed predates Paul’s initial trip to Corinth. In
fact, James Ware has recently summarized the scholarly assessment regarding the date of this
creed. He writes, “There is almost universal scholarly consensus that 1 Cor 15.3–5 contains a
carefully preserved tradition pre-dating Paul’s apostolic activity and received by him within two
to five years of the founding events.” 313 Thus, we have reports of Jesus’ death that date

undisputed Pauline works are Romans, 1 Corinthian, 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and
Philemon. If the other works attributed to Paul are actually Pauline, then we still have one source. If they are nonPauline, then these would constitute additional sources and add to the weight to the criteria of multiple attestation.
309
For just four references from the early church: Clement, Cor., 24; Ignatius, Trall. 9; Polycarp, Phil. 7;
and Justin, 1 Apol., 32. Apocryphal writings, such as the Gospel of Peter, similarly include Jesus death.

Jos. Ant., 18.3. Although there is debate about the authenticity of Josephus’ text as a whole, it is likely
that the portion referencing Jesus’ death was in the original. Tacitus’ reference in Ann. 15.44 mentions the “extreme
penalty” as occurring under Pilate. Other references could include the Talmud which makes reference to Jesus being
“hanged” in b. Sanh. 43a (cf. Acts 10:39).
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James Ware, “The Resurrection of Jesus in the Pre-Pauline Formula of 1 Cor 15.3–5,” New Testament
Studies 60, no. 04 (2014): 475. Among those he cites are Conzelmann, Schlier, Kloppenborg, Lüdemann, and
Gerhardsson. Ehrman similarly writes that “it is believed far and wide among New Testament specialists that Paul is
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incredibly early in the ancient which subsequently adds considerable probability to this event
being historical. 314
Fourth, there are several elements that indicate the embarrassing/offensive nature of
Jesus’ death by crucifixion from the wider culture. 315 Jewish sensibilities considered those hung
on a cross as cursed by God (Deut 21:23). The Roman world would have understood such a
death to belong to a slave or insurrectionist. 316 Cicero notably stated, the very word “should be
far removed not only from the person of a Roman citizen but from his thoughts, his eyes and his
ears.” 317 Cicero’s comments appear to explain why there are not more descriptions in the ancient
world of such an event. In fact, the Gospels represent “the single most comprehensively
documented extant record of an execution by this method.” 318 Indeed, as Paul Barnett writes,
“the dominant place of the death of Jesus, a death by the unmentionably vile mode of crucifixion,
makes the bios or ‘life’ of Jesus distinct from any other bios of that era.” 319 Thus, while

indicating that this is a tradition already widespread in the Christian church, handed over to him by Christian
teachers, possibly even the earlier apostles themselves.” Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 2014, 138.
It might be objected that the creed does not refer to the cross and thus we cannot know if the mode of
execution goes back this early. However, there is good reason to connect the mode with the creed. For example, Paul
argues that Jesus was crucified and it is unlikely that he would quote this creed if it implied another sort of death (cf.
1 Cor 1:23).
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Christians believing in Jesus’ resurrected may not have felt embarrassed or offended by Jesus’
crucifixion, those to whom they were evangelizing certainly would (1 Cor 1:23). 320
Fifth, Jesus’ crucifixion meets the criterion of contextual credibility. As indicated above,
crucifixions did occur in the time and area that Jesus lived. Thus, Ehrman offers the simple
conclusion that the “crucifixion of Jesus under Pontius Pilate is, of course, contextually
credible.” 321
Sixth, although this criterion is met with less confidence then those above, we appear to
have reports that originated with eyewitnesses. The reason it is met with less confidence than
those above is because of the arguments used to establish the eyewitnesses are not as clear-cut as
one may desire. Only two points will be briefly made here with respect to this criterion. (A) The
statement regarding Jesus’ death from the early creed in 1 Cor 15:3 could have been created or
affirmed by eyewitnesses. 322 Paul argues that the apostles were preaching the same message as
him (v. 11; Cf. Gal 1:18; 2:1-10) and given that the cross was so central in Paul’s thought it is
unlikely that he would have gotten that wrong, especially after two trips to Jerusalem and
meeting with the pillars of the church (Galatians. 1-2). (B) Richard Bauckham has placed a great
deal of emphasis on the names of the women in the Gospels, especially towards the end of Jesus’
life. His argument is that their names were recorded because they were well known witnesses
Allison also points out that, “The joy brought by belief in the resurrection did not obliterate the memory
that Jesus had been publicly humiliated and tortured to death.” Dale C. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest
Christian Tradition and Its Interpreters (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 364. This explains, contra Goodacre, why
we could have multiple attestation and embarrassing testimony. Although, Ehrman places the crucifixion as meeting
the criterion of dissimilarity, embarrassment and dissimilarity frequently overlap in that they both identify aspects
that are contrary to the biases of the author. Ehrman’s own comment highlights this overlap because he argues that
the crucifixion of Jesus created “enormous headaches for the Christian mission.” Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist?, 292.
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and each Gospel listed the women that were known to their respective authors. 323 Although more
work needs to be done to more fully establish these points, these arguments present why one
would be reasonable in considering this criterion as relevant here.
Seventh, a few of the sources indicate that the opponents of early Christianity were aware
of Jesus’ death and thus meets the criterion of enemy attestation. Like the criterion above, it also
has some challenges that cause us to be less confident in its fully satisfying this criterion.
Although there are some problems with it (i.e. dating, sources, etc.), we noted above that the
Babylonian Talmud refers to Jesus as being hung. Additionally, it is reasonable for scholars like
Ehrman to suggest that that Paul knew of Jesus’ crucifixion prior to his own conversion both of
which occurred in the early 30s. 324 One would expect that the very enemies of Jesus would be
proclaiming their perceived victory (Cf. Matt 27:11-15). In any event, this criterion is another
one that is worth considering even if it cannot be held with as much confidence as other criterion.
We have seen how the claim that Jesus was crucified can be examined in light of various
historical criteria and that by meeting these seven criteria, the reality of the event increases in
probability. 325 Other arguments should be used to supplement these criteria, but the criteria
should also contribute to our ability to obtain knowledge about the past. This test case very
briefly presents how the criteria are used in assessing claims of the past.
In completing our test case, we want to add a final comment. One might expect that these
and other arguments for Jesus’ death by crucifixion have convinced scholars from wide-ranging
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theological backgrounds and indeed they have. In The Risen Jesus and Future Hope, Gary
Habermas lists over fifty scholars who accept this fact (among others). 326 We need not list them
here, but it is important to nevertheless point out the fact that scholars have been convinced by
the reasons mentioned above (among others) and the acceptance of this fact by a diverse group of
scholars can likewise provide us with greater confidence regarding the event. Thus, the MFA
itself utilizers the role of the criteria and other historical arguments as well as substantial
agreement among scholars.
Concluding Remarks
Throughout this chapter we have sought to establish how we can know events in the past
occurred. We presented two interrelated concepts that both deal with our epistemological access
to the past. The first was to consider the MFA as a way to begin with the bedrock historical
details. Such a method is admittedly minimal, but the events established by such an approach
should be the most secure. We also examined one way that historians can move from mere
claims of the past, to warranted knowledge that the event actually occurred. Historical criteria
can be used to provide the inquirer with various intuitive tools that help them better discern past
facts from past fictions.
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Habermas, Risen Jesus, 50–51 fn. 165.
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CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND DIVINE ACTION
“In history as well as in science, God is dead.” 327
-

Tor Egil Förland

“The academy—which now includes ourselves—has the right to reframe approaches in
the light of new perspectives.” 328
-

Craig Keener

We will be discussing a question that has been undergoing a re-evaluation among
scholars in recent years, namely whether a historian qua historian can conclude that a miracle has
occurred. 329 Interestingly, where one falls on this question does not appear to be guided directly
by the question of whether God exists. 330 There are skeptics who believe historians should, in
principle, be able to investigate miracle claims, such as Jesus’ resurrection, as well as skeptics
who do not. 331 Similarly, there are theists who think these claims can be investigated historically,
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Tor Egil Førland, “3. Historiography Without God: A Reply to Gregory,” History and Theory 47, no. 4
(2008): 532.

Contributors, “Dialogue: A Way Forward,” in The Nature Miracles of Jesus: Problems, Perspectives,
and Prospects, ed. Graham H. Twelftree (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017), 196 (Craig Keener).
328

For example, Graham Twelftree’s recent book presents several different scholars who examine the
historian’s responsibility to miracle claims, specifically Jesus’ nature miracles. The book, Twelftree argues, “seeks
to discuss the problem with the view to seeing whether there is the possibility of greater consensus.” Graham H.
Twelftree, “Preface,” in The Nature Miracles of Jesus: Problems, Perspectives, and Prospects, ed. Graham H.
Twelftree (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017), xi. For a recent article concluding in the negative, see Robert L.
Webb, “The Rules of the Game: History and Historical Method in the Context of Faith: The Via Media of
Methodological Naturalism,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 59–84. For an
affirmative response, and critique of Webb, see Michael R. Licona, “Historians and Miracle Claims,” Journal for the
Study of the Historical Jesus 12 (2014): 106–29.
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Philosopher Raymond Martin was surprised to find that it is not a partisan issue between “conservative
and liberal historical Jesus scholars.” Raymond Martin, The Elusive Messiah: A Philosophical Overview of the
Quest for the Historical Jesus (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 50. Similarly Robert A. Larmer, The
Legitimacy of Miracle (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), 88.
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For example, Gerd Lüdemann is a skeptic who maintains the question of Jesus’ resurrection must be
asked historically. Gerd Lüdemann, The Resurrection of Christ: A Historical Inquiry (Amherst, NY: Prometheus
Books, 2004), 11–21. While, perhaps most famously, David Hume did not believe one could conclude a miracle
occurred historically, David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg, 2nd ed.
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993). For a more recent treatment that answers negatively see James G.
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as well as theists who do not. 332 This does not mean that there are not theological or atheological
factors that may contribute to how one answers this question. It is simply to point out that this
issue does not seem to place theists and atheists at odds with one another with respect to the
historian’s ability to assess miracle claims.
We will present an argument that outlines why historical epistemology allows for a
historian to, in principle, conclude whether a miracle has occurred or not. To do this we will
briefly address the concept of a miracle in general. Then we will examine how our epistemic
access to the past allows for the possibility of identifying divine acts. Lastly, we will briefly
address some common objections to our conclusion. The goal, then, is not to argue for any
specific miracle, but rather to demonstrate that historians have the epistemological tools to
investigate alleged divine acts and comment upon their historicity. 333

Crossley, “The Nature Miracles as Pure Myth,” in The Nature Miracles of Jesus: Problems, Perspectives, and
Prospects, ed. Graham H. Twelftree (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017), 86–106.
Two Anglican bishops provide helpful examples here. N. T. Wright seeks a historical case for Jesus’
resurrection in N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3, Christian Origins and the Question of God
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003). Conversely, Peter Carnley wrote that those who speak about the
resurrection (and even the “certainty” of the disciples belief) are not doing so qua historians. Peter Carnley, The
Structure of Resurrection Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 89. More recently, Peter Carnley, Resurrection in
Retrospect: A Critical Examination of the Theology of N. T. Wright (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2019); Peter
Carnley, The Reconstruction of Resurrection Belief (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2019). Although Carnley’s
discussion focuses upon the resurrection in particular, his comments seem indicate that miracles in general are also a
problem for the historian. For a theist who makes a more direct comment on the historian’s ability to comment upon
miracles in general John Meier writes, “A historian may examine claims about miracles, reject those for which there
are obvious natural explanations, and record instances where the historian can find no natural explanation. Beyond
that, a purely historical Judgment cannot go.” John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, vol.
2: Mentor, Message, and Miracles (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 11.
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It should be noted that we are not attempting to provide an exhaustive account of all the ways a historian
might be able to account for divine action, but rather addressing the issue from the general context of historical
inquiry while also addressing common objections. Some scholars have, for example, sought to demonstrate God’s
existence as part of their overall argument for a miracle. See Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate
(Oxford University Press, 2003); Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument From Miracles: A
Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed.
William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 593–662.
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Defining a Miracle
Scholars have had a surprising difficulty in defining a miracle. 334 It is important for us to
examine and define the concept because we need clarity regarding the sort of events we are
referring to in this chapter. Additionally, one’s definition could affect whether they believe a
historian can investigate miracle claims if one’s definition is too restrictive. 335 It will thus be
helpful to briefly consider the concept of a miracle so that we can better understand why a
historian would be within their epistemological rights to evaluate them.
David Hume’s well-known definition of miracles as “violation[s] of the laws of nature” is
a helpful place to begin. 336 The late Antony Flew, a supporter of Hume, noted that this definition
highlights some challenges to believing in miracles a posteriori. He writes that
The natural scientist, confronted with some occurrence inconsistent with a proposition
previously believed to express a law of nature, can find in this disturbing inconsistency
no ground whatever for proclaiming that a particular law of nature has been
supernaturally overridden....On the contrary, the new discovery is simply a reason for his
conceding that he had previously been wrong in thinking that the proposition, thus

Licona, for example, lists around two dozen different definitions that have been offered in an attempt to
define a miraculous event. Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010), 134–35 fn. 3. See also Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle, 27–52.
334
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Bart Ehrman provides a definition for miracle that a priori eliminates them from historical investigation.
For him, miracles are events that “defy all probability, miracles create an inescapable dilemma for historians. Since
historians can only establish what probably happened in the past, and the chances of a miracle happening, by
definition, are infinitesimally remote, historians can never demonstrate that a miracle probably happened.” Bart D.
Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 228-229 (emphasis in original). Licona rightly objects to those who define history in such a
way that it a priori excludes inquiries into miracle claims. Licona, “Historians and Miracle Claims,” 108–14, 129.
As noted earlier, inquiries should be made by questions that are open-ended and flexible and without imposing
foreign or artificial conceptual schemes upon the object of inquiry/

Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 76. For a recent discussion on the reception,
resurrection, and recent assessment of Hume’s influence see Timothy J. McGrew, “Of Miracles,” in The Nature
Miracles of Jesus: Problems, Perspectives, and Prospects, ed. Graham H. Twelftree (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books,
2017), 161–70.
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confuted, did indeed express a true law; it is also a reason for his resolving to search
again for the law which really does obtain. 337
In short, any observed violation of a law of nature will simply cause a revision of the laws of
nature rather than the acceptance of a miracle. Additionally, appeals to supernatural intervention
due to a violation of the natural law alone would also seem to require (faulty) God-of-the-Gaps
reasoning since God is used to explain a gap in our knowledge. 338
Flew makes a fair point. One should not believe that a miracle has occurred merely
because of an apparent violation of a natural law, or the normal course of nature, alone. 339
Perhaps a new discovery was rightly observed and our understanding of the world needs to be
modified (i.e. a Kuhnian paradigm shift). While an anomalous event could possibly be evidence
of a divine agent, it could also be evidence of new discovery. 340 Without positive reasons to

337

1967), 349.

Antony Flew, “Miracles,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan,

Philosopher Larry Shapiro appears to require the believer in miracles to accept God-of-the-Gaps
reasoning by his definition of miracle. For him, miracles are events that are so incredibly improbable that we simply
infer God must have been the cause. Lawrence Shapiro, The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the
Supernatural Is Unjustified (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 19–20, 21, 58–61, 78–81. Bart Ehrman
gets close to this position as well. Ehrman, The New Testament, 226–27. As we will see below, he also incorporates
notions of “faith” into his assessment of miracle claims.
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339
Bart Ehrman notes “scientists today are less confident” of the phrase “natural law” and prefer to think in
terms of the “normal workings of nature.” Ehrman, The New Testament, 226. The issue of propriety of the term
“natural laws” and subsequent “violations” with respect to miracle claims is beyond the scope of our present
discussion and has been discussed elsewhere. See David Basinger, “Miracles as Violations: Some Clarifications,”
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 22, no. 1 (March 1, 1984): 1–7; Richard L. Purtill, “Defining Miracles,” in In
Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R.
Habermas (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1997), 61–85; Steve Clarke, “Hume’s Definition of Miracles
Revised,” American Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 1 (1999): 49–57; Gary R. Habermas, The Risen Jesus and
Future Hope (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 67–78; Morgan Luck, “Defining Miracles:
Violations of the Laws of Nature,” Philosophy Compass 6, no. 2 (February 1, 2011): 133–41; Larmer, The
Legitimacy of Miracle, 37–45.

Joshua Butler notes the relevant analogies between scientific anomalies and miracles such that the
observer of the scientific anomaly is comparable to the observer of a miracle. Joshua Kulmac Butler, “A Kuhnian
Critique of Hume on Miracles,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 86, no. 1 (August 1, 2019): 39–59.
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believe a divine agent was involved, one would be perfectly reasonable to believe a new
discovery has been observed.
However, rather than identifying a problem for the believer, Flew’s observation actually
identifies inappropriate limitations to Hume’s concept of a miracle. His definition, as it stands, is
too narrow since it seems to limit miracles to anomalous events, something many would reject as
accurately reflecting their understanding of a miracle. 341 It appears to conflate scientific
discoveries and divine action since it offers no way to distinguish between the two. If a miracle is
simply a violation of a natural law, then there is no room for science to make new discoveries
since any new discovery would be considered a miracle. 342 This also places the believer of a
miracle in a rationally disadvantaged position because they are required a priori to accept Godof-the-Gaps reasoning to explain apparent violations. Thus, we see some internal problems with
this definition that should lead us to think it needs to be expanded in order to properly capture
what is meant by the term miracle.
A second reason to expand this definition is that Hume neglects to consider purported
miracles that do not violate natural laws. Oxford philosopher Steve Clarke has pointed out that
Hume’s definition it is “too narrow to capture all instances of miracles; too narrow because it

341
Even those in the ancient world recognized that a miracle was more than just an experience contrary to
the normal workings of nature. Colin Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984),
5, 7–8. Gerhard Lohfink points out that in the OT and NT “the concept of miracle was still wide open. It was not
“natural laws” in the modern sense and most certainly not about breaking them. For the Bible a miracle is something
unusual…by which God plucks people out of their indifference and causes them to look at him.” Gerhard Lohfink,
Jesus of Nazareth: What He Wanted, Who He Was (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 140. See discussion
below regarding context.

Interestingly, Flew critiques Hume’s dogmatic refusal to accept events simply because they are reported
as miraculous as detrimental to the sciences. Flew, “Miracles,” 351. Flew was referring to what he believes were
psychosomatic healings which Hume had dismissed a priori. Butler also identifies how testimony related to the
observation of anomalies to current paradigms can lead to further discoveries and that without such anomalies (i.e.
violations of natural law) “further paradigms and discoveries likely would not, and in some cases could not, be
made.” Butler, “A Kuhnian Critique of Hume on Miracles,” 49. See also Craig S. Keener, Miracles: The Credibility
of the New Testament Accounts (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 149–51, 168, 173–74.
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fails to include acts of supernatural intervention in the world which are non-law-violating.
Intuitively it seems possible that a supernatural being could intervene in the natural world
without violating any laws of nature.” 343 New Testament scholar Craig Keener similarly argues
that “many biblical accounts of miracles portray God working through nature, merely in
extraordinary ways. For example, the formulation of ‘miracle’ against which Hume directs his
case fails to cover many of Jesus's works treated as ‘signs’ or ‘miracles’ in the Gospels.” 344 Thus,
for Clarke and Keener, God could perform incredible acts through, for example, a “powerful
wind” as described in Exodus 14:21 or Numbers 11:31. 345 Similarly, “providence” or answers to
certain prayers (i.e. healing via natural means) could be described as miraculous without
necessarily violating the laws of nature. The point here is that miracles might not be limited to
only violations of natural law but need to include the possibility of God acting through nature
itself in ways analogous to human agents. 346
One must therefore be careful to avoid definitions that inappropriately limit the possibility
of divine action by an inadequate definition. The late German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg
stated that the “judgment about whether an event, however unfamiliar, has happened or not is in
the final analysis a matter for the historian and cannot be prejudged by the knowledge of natural
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Clarke, “Hume’s Definition of Miracles Revised,” 51.

Keener, Miracles, 2011, 1:133. Adding, “Likewise, most Muslims claim that the Qur'an is a miracle but
not that it violates a law of nature.” Larmer similarly discusses the fact that miracles need not necessarily be
violations of the laws of nature. Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle, 11–13, 36–45.
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Clarke, “Hume’s Definition of Miracles Revised,” 53; Keener, Miracles, 2011, 181. See also 180-185.
Similarly Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993),
28.

As will be discussed below, God working through nature could be understood as analogous to other
agents (i.e. humans) who act through nature.
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science.” 347 Others have similarly observed that we cannot allow fallible, if not fallacious,
conceptions of natural law to dictate what can or cannot happen. 348 This creates problems not
just for new scientific discoveries, but also for recognizing divine actions.
The Super/Natural Distinction
Not only might one’s definition affect their conceptualization of a miracle, but so could
one’s understanding of the relationship between the natural world and the supernatural world.
For example, one’s beliefs about God’s relationship to the world can significantly impact how
one views God’s ability to then interact with the world. Clarke points out the following, “To
attach a meaning to the ‘supernatural’, we also need to attach a meaning to the term ‘natural’.
This is because the supernatural stands in a particular relation to the natural.” 349 For him, “the
demarcation between the natural and the supernatural on the basis of the notion of a violation of
a law of nature is somewhat problematic.” 350 We will thus briefly contrast two different
paradigms that attempt to describe the relationship between supernatural and natural. Although
the paradigms below are admittedly broad generalizations, they nevertheless provide a helpful
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“The casual dismissal of the claim that Jesus may indeed have risen from the dead is not a helpful
prejudice, for it is founded upon a fallacious conception of natural science [as prescriptive and not descriptive].”
Alan G. Padgett, “Advice for Religious Historians: On the Myth of a Purely Historical Jesus,” in The Resurrection:
An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of Jesus, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald
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heuristic for highlighting how each framework can potentially impact our understanding and
knowledge of miracles.
Paradigm One places a hardline between the supernatural and natural worlds. It views the
supernatural and natural realms as wholly distinct and separate. Paradigm One has become more
prevalent since the Enlightenment and can often be associated with a Newtonian mechanistic
understanding of the natural world around. 351

SUPERNATURAL
———————————————
NATURAL

Paradigm One

Paradigm Two is one where the dividing line is erased. In this paradigm there is no strict
distinction between the super/natural. This does not necessarily imply a form of monism or
pantheism, but rather is to express the point that both the supernatural and natural are part of
reality. 352

Wright, for example, notes this paradigm is primarily due to Enlightenment assumptions. Wright, The
New Testament and the People of God, 1:97. Ehrman similarly recognizes the influence of the Enlightenment with
respect to our understanding of natural laws. Ehrman, The New Testament, 226. One may think of Immanuel Kant’s
noumenal/phenomenal split.
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Michael Cantrell observes that the “believer perceives the sacred as quite a natural reality.” Michael A.
Cantrell, “Must a Scholar of Religion Be Methodologically Atheistic or Agnostic?,” Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 84, no. 2 (June 2016): 378.
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REALITY

Paradigm Two
Undoubtedly other paradigms could be presented, but these two provide a helpful
contrast with respect to the ontology and epistemology of miracles. 353 Paradigm One, for
example, is foreign to many who have claimed miracles in the distant past. Bart Ehrman reminds
us that for those in the ancient world, a miracle “did not involve an intrusion from outside of the
natural world into the established nexus of cause and effect….For ancient people there was
no…natural world set apart from a supernatural realm.” 354 Not only would they reject Paradigm
One, but according to Ehrman they would seem to be at quite comfortable with Paradigm Two.

It is worth noting that Robert Webb provides three paradigms in which historians operate. Interestingly,
the one closest to representing Paradigm Two is what Webb calls “Ontological Naturalistic History.” The main,
perhaps essential, difference is that instead of the word “Reality” (as in our Paradigm Two), he has “Natural World.”
His other two paradigms include similar distinctions between the supernatural and the natural worlds, but differ with
respect to where history is concerned. In the “Critical Theistic History” model history consists in both the
supernatural and natural worlds. In the “Methodological Naturalistic History” model history is only concerned with
the natural world. Robert L. Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” in Key Events in the
Life of the Historical Jesus: A Collaborative Exploration of Context and Coherence, ed. Darrell L. Bock and Robert
L. Webb (Grand Rapids, MI: Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), 43. Another example would be to add the nuance that
the line dividing the supernatural world and natural world may be conceived of in a more porous manner (thus
enabling more interaction). Paul Rhodes Eddy and Gregory A. Boyd, The Jesus Legend: A Case for the Historical
Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus Tradition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), 39 fn. 1. While still another
avenue is presented by Clarke who believes the category of the supernatural is a subcategory of the non-natural.
Clarke, “The Supernatural and the Miraculous,” 278.
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Ehrman, The New Testament, 226 (emphasis in original).
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Of course this is not just an ancient viewpoint. N. T. Wright is forthright in his dismissal
of Paradigm One when he writes, “I reject the nature/supernature distinction….It seems to
me…that ontologies based on a nature/supernature distinction simply will not do...[It is an]
untenable ontological dualism.” 355 For Wright, part of the problem seems to be, at least in part, is
how do we distinguish between the two worlds. 356 Paradigm One makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the supernatural to interact with the natural because if it does then it, by
definition, becomes part of the natural (similar to Flew’s point above) or because it cannot cross
the dividing line at all.
Contrarily, Paradigm Two eliminates one from asking whether something is natural or
supernatural due to the challenges one faces when distinguishing between the two. Indeed as
Clarke points out, “In the absence of agreement regarding the definition of the natural, the charge
that the boundary between the natural and the supernatural is ill-defined is hard to argue
against.” 357 Paradigm One is difficult to establish if we do not know where the lines of
demarcation are actually located (and why). Furthermore, one could also argue that Ockham’s
razor should be employed here to simplify our understanding and remove any potential
inappropriate a prioris conceptual frameworks from being imposed. Thus, the difficulty, or

Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:97. See also 10. For Wright, other false
dichotomies that should be abandoned are theology/history and subjectivity/objectivity (24-25, 34, 93, 95). Thomas
F. Torrance also argues strongly against dualisms of ontology (Newton), epistemology (Kant), etc. For a summary
see John D. Morrison, Knowledge of the Self Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth Torrance (Eugene,
OR: Wipf & Stock, 1997), 48–60.
355

Wright notes a concern that such dualisms may be used in such a way that collapses one side into the
other. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:25. Clarke has noted the challenges of actually defining
the dividing line between these two. Steve Clarke, “Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural,” Sophia 48, no. 2
(May 2009): 130, 138–39. For a scientific discussion on this issue see Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke, and Johan
Braeckman, “How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism: Philosophical Misconceptions About
Methodological Naturalism,” Foundations of Science 15, no. 3 (June 9, 2010): 231–33.
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possibly the impropriety, of distinguishing between these two realms might be dismissed due to
the unnecessary problems, distortions, and complications it creates.
For example, let us think about the implications of Wright’s argument regarding
“heaven” (i.e. “life after life after death”). 358 Consider for the moment that Wright is right and
that followers of Jesus are resurrected bodily into an incorruptible new world. While it would
seem appropriate for one who holds to Paradigm Two to consider “heaven” simply a part of
reality, how is one to understand this reality on Paradigm One? It seems that an implication of
Flew’s point would be that “heaven” is part of the natural world since life in “heaven” would
simply require us to revise our understanding of natural laws. While it may be true that a rose by
any other name would still smell as sweet, it would certainly seem odd for someone who holds to
Paradigm One to suggest that “Heaven” is part of the natural world.
Perhaps, on the other hand, those who hold to Paradigm One might say that “heaven” is a
part of the supernatural world and not the natural world. In this case, one would be left
questioning what it means for resurrected humans to be a part of the supernatural world and no
longer part of the natural world. It would seem odd to consider humans, even resurrected humans
in “heaven,” to not be part of the natural world. One would be left wondering what is it that
makes these humans part of the supernatural world? Is it just that they have eternal life? Are
there some set of traits or laws that making something supernatural? What is it that actually
makes something supernatural? How do we know what these traits are? And so on. However one
answers these questions, the answers illustrate the concern of Wright and others regarding how
one precisely distinguishes the supernatural and the natural worlds.

N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church
(New York: HarperOne, 2008), 148–52.
358
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Another example may be found in Gary Habermas’ research on evidential Near-Death
Experiences (NDEs). 359 Evidential NDEs refer to a specific type of NDE whereby a person has
been “dead” (or almost dead), later revives, and then are able to report empirically verifiable data
from experiences they had while “dead” which are subsequently corroborated. 360 Are these
evidential cases demonstrative of the natural or supernatural? How is one to classify the reality
they experience if these reports are accurate? Again, it seems odd to suggest that such
experiences are what we typically mean when we speak of the natural world. 361 Moreover, the
distinction between the supernatural and natural worlds becomes more and more blurred.
Although we cannot pursue these issues further here, our goal was simply to explore the
different implications of these two different paradigms. We have highlighted how these
paradigms can possibly affect one’s understanding of miracles and their relationship to the

Recently, Habermas has provided five different categories of corroborated NDEs. Gary R. Habermas,
“Evidential Near-Death Experiences,” in The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, ed. Jonathan J. Loose,
Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 227–46.
359

In Habermas’ earlier work he provided a categorized list of evidential NDEs according to one’s
consciousness as it continued beyond various definitions of death. Gary R. Habermas and J. P. Moreland,
Immortality: The Other Side of Death (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Inc, 1992), 74–78. For an entire book
dedicated to these types of verified and corroborated cases see Titus Rivas, Anny Dirven, and Rudolf H. Smit, The
Self Does Not Die: Verified Paranormal Phenomena from Near-Death Experiences, ed. Robert G. Mays and Janice
Miner Holden, trans. Wanda J. Boeke (Durham, NC: International Association for Near-Death Studies [IANDS],
2016). One example of an evidential NDE from the book describes a patient who was undergoing surgery (and
properly connected to the medical monitoring equipment). The patient’s heart activity ceased about twenty minutes.
The patient was being prepped for an autopsy when suddenly the monitoring equipment began to detect heart
activity and other vitals. The patient recovered and later reported various details from this world that should have
been unknown to him. His reports were later confirmed (71-78, case 3.11).
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Another contribution of Habermas might also be used as an example, namely the Shroud of Turin. If this
is the burial cloth of Jesus and represents a piece of remaining empirical evidence of the resurrection and the
differing paradigms are going to understand the shroud differently. Kenneth E. Stevenson and Gary R. Habermas,
Verdict on the Shroud: Evidence for the Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ (Ann Arbor, MI: Servant Books,
1981). See also Tristan Casabianca, “The Shroud of Turin: A Historiographical Approach,” Heythrop Journal 54,
no. 3 (May 2013): 414–23.
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world. 362 We have suggested that Paradigm Two appears to be the more open of the two
paradigms since it does not restrict the inquirer in an a priori manner as Paradigm One does.
One may object and say that one is imposing a foreign framework by suggesting that we
start with Paradigm Two, but this objection misses the point on several fronts. First, one cannot
add such distinctions into reality (i.e. supernatural and natural) a priori. By adding the
distinction, one assumes the burden of proof and thus requires arguments to be made in support
of such distinctions. Second, if one begins with Paradigm Two, nothing prevents Paradigm One
from being argued for a posteriori, but if one begins with Paradigm one, then artificial
limitations are imposed and our knowledge becomes necessarily limited to those constraints.
Third, there are no clear definitions that describe this distinction or how we know where these
distinctions are located and why. Fourth, as we have noted, Paradigm One appears unfalsifiable.
As noted in the example above, anything that acts in the natural world is by definition natural
and not supernatural. The natural appears to engulf the supernatural. Fifth, Paradigm Two is
falsifiable in the sense that if there is no “supernatural” then all reality would simply be the
natural world and thus look like Paradigm Two anyway. For these reasons, we concur with
Clarke that, “What is crucial to enable sense to be made of the concept ‘supernatural’ is that we
have a coherent way of talking about the natural that leaves conceptual space open for the
possibility of the supernatural.” 363

Another reason we have not sought to engage these issues more fully here is that to do so would border
the type of metaphysical discussions David Hackett Fischer warns about (see below). The reason we have pointed
out these Paradigms is that they frequently, particularly Paradigm One, do get imposed into historical investigation.
It was thus important to evaluate these two interpretive models to see how they might affect one’s interpretation. We
will be suggesting below that, as part of the normal workings of history, historians should not allow the differing
paradigms to wholly interpret data, such as a miracle claim, but that the data should be able to inform the observer
how to formulate their paradigm via a dialogical relationship between the two. Wright, The New Testament and the
People of God, 1:35.
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Clarke, “The Supernatural and the Miraculous,” 280-281 (emphasis added).
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We will end this section with our own tentative definition. The definition will seek to
limit inappropriate a priori considerations while trying to remain open to the possibilities of the
different paradigms above. A miracle, then, may be defined as a dynamic event in space/time
whereby a divine agent has acted in such a way as to communicate or reveal something
intelligible. 364
Historical Epistemology and the Miraculous
We now turn to historical epistemology with respect to miracle claims. There are
generally two ways scholars have suggested we could proceed. The first is that a historian could
say that event X has occurred, without arguing for its cause(s). 365 The second is that one can
conclude that X has occurred and argue for a specific cause(s). Although the first approach is
more modest, Flew rightly points out the “essential aim of the historian is to get as near as he can
to a full knowledge of what actually happened.” 366 Among other things, historians seek to
describe past events and, when possible, their cause(s). 367 Thus, we will be arguing that a
historian qua historian can investigate the event and the cause of purported miracles in ways

Although this definition is does not address whether the divine agent is benevolent or malicious.
Generally benevolent beings are considered to have performed miracles, but our definition makes no such
distinction since such a discussion would require further philosophical and theological refining which is beyond the
scope of this present work. Additionally, if someone is arguing for a miracle that occur outside of time and space
(i.e. spiritual resurrection), then this would be different. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 162 fn. 100.
364

Licona notes that this is a more modest approach and one that is compatible with methodological
naturalism. Licona, “Historians and Miracle Claims,” 122–25. Dale Allison appears to make comments sympathetic
to such an approach. Dale C. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and Its Interpreters
(New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 298.
365

Flew, “Miracles,” 352. Similarly Evan Fales, Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological
Puzzles (NY: Routledge, 2010), 2.
366

367
Fischer writes, “A historian is someone (anyone) who asks an open-ended question about past events
and answers it with selected facts which are arranged in the form of an explanatory paradigm.” David Hackett
Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), xv. See
also James D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 101; Davis, Risen Indeed,
24.
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analogous to other historical claims. We must recall how historians approach and investigate the
past before considering whether the historian can comment upon miracle claims. This will be
done by incorporating relevant elements from our earlier chapter on the philosophy of history
and then applying them to our current question.
Investigating the Past
The first section of David Hackett Fischer’s Historians Fallacies is dedicated to
highlighting fallacies of question framing. 368 One of the fallacies historians ought to avoid is
asking metaphysical questions that seek to answer a “nonempirical problem by empirical
means.” 369 Fischer argues that historians should abandon metaphysical questions raised by
determinism and voluntarism, materialism and idealism, and “all manner of other monism and
dualisms. The progress of an empirical science of history squarely depends upon a sense of the
possible.” 370 This does not mean historians operate from a neutral position on these topics. 371
The point is, however, that although one may have their own metaphysical preferences, these
should not be inappropriately imposed into the historical data because to do so would mistakenly
limit what is possible based upon a metaphysical commitments. Fischer suggests that to avoid
this and other fallacies, historians should ask questions that are open, flexible, and that can be
revised throughout the process of research. 372
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Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 3–39. See chapter two.

Ibid., 13. Examples of the types of metaphysical questions Fischer has in mind are those such as “What
is the nature of things?” or “What is the inner secret of reality?”
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Ibid., 13, emphasis added.

Fischer calls this the “Baconian Fallacy.” Fischer, 5–6. For a list of typical metaphysical beliefs held by
historians see Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 156.
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As well as operational (empirical), analytical, explicit and precise, and testable. Fischer, Historians’
Fallacies, 38–39, 160–61.
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History must not only be open regarding the questions it asks, but also its conclusions.
Historians cannot restrict, a priori, the answers to open historical questions. 373 The nature of
history is such that many things are possible, but evidence directs us to what is most probable.
Since so many things are possible, the historian must remain open to them when beginning their
inquiry and allow the data to guide their inquiry toward what is probable. 374 Historical
conclusions need to be made on the basis of the available evidence and held provisionally such
that if new evidence should arise, one can revise their initial conclusions.
It also vital to recall that all historians approach evidence from some perspective or
worldview. The historian must keep a constant dialogue between the evidence and their
interpretive model. Significantly, evidence is not wholly interpreted and can potentially change
one’s perspective. Thus, if evidence is obscured from one vantage point, another one can be
adopted. Indeed, a plurality of worldviews, or a community of conscience, can enable historians
to see events from a variety of angles and better determine which ones are better and why.
In order to examine these different angles, historians must be willing to bracket their own
worldviews and consider different vantage points. Wright helpfully notes that in some situations
one should, based upon publicly available evidence, re-examine their worldview and consider
other alternatives. He writes,
If events are public, they can be discussed; evidence can be amassed; and some
worldviews become progressively harder and harder to retain, needing more and more
conspiracy theories in order to stay in place, until they (sometimes) collapse under their
own weight….worldviews, though normally hidden from sight like the foundations of a
As will be seen below, closed-minds of this sort are damaging to scholarship. Wright, The New
Testament and the People of God, 1:92–93.
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For one who argues strongly for following-after the data see Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and
Resurrection (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 5. See also chapter two. For a helpful discussion on the often
misunderstood concept of historical possibility see Robert J. Miller, “Back to the Basics: A Primer on Historical
Method,” in Finding the Historical Jesus, ed. Bernard Brandon Scott, vol. 3, Jesus Seminar Guides (Santa Rosa,
CA: Polebridge Press, 2008), 10–12.
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house, can themselves in principle be dug out and inspected….Dialogue is possible.
People can change their beliefs; they can even change their worldviews. 375
Differing worldviews, horizons, or explanations can be challenged or supported by the
evidence. 376 Unless one maintains a rigid dogmatism, they are not impenetrable fortresses to
which all data must conform in order to be accepted. 377 This is particularly important to keep in
mind when considering alleged divine acts since they can potentially have significant worldview
ramifications. 378
The basic principles for historians, when investigating the past begin with open questions
that can be answered based on evidence. Although we all approach the evidence from a certain
perspective, this does not inhibit our ability to know the past. We can bracket our worldviews,
consider alternatives, and judge whether any revisions or changes are needed. As we approach
the data, we allow it to inform us of its own structure. We then begin to reconstruct this model
and test it against the data whereby we our conceptual frameworks are in dialogue with the
evidence.

Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:117. See also 92, 95, 97–99; Davis, Risen Indeed,
24–25; Padgett, “Advice for Religious Historians,” 291, 301.
375

This is precisely Flew’s point above with respect to the scientist who comes across evidence that
violates the natural law of a current scientific interpretation. The evidence forces the scientist to search for a new
interpretive model.
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Larmer is correct when writing, “Historians can scarcely escape the influence of interpretive horizons
based on assumptions they bring to their work, but to the degree that such assumptions cannot be challenged or
overthrown by actual evidence, they cease to function as genuine historians and become merely dogmatists.”
Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle, 181.
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The centrality of the resurrection is a good example here of a miracle that can have significant impact in
several areas (1 Cor. 15:12-19). See also Habermas, Risen Jesus, 89–121; Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle, 187–
88.
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Methodological Naturalism
While there are several types of inappropriate a prioris (e.g. worldviews, conceptual
frameworks, etc.) that could negatively affect one’s investigation of the past, methodological
naturalism (MN) is frequently used to negate the historian’s ability to discuss miracles. 379 MN,
as opposed to ontological naturalism, requires that historians examine the world etsi Deus non
daretur (as if there were no God). 380 While different reasons have been advanced for adopting
MN (e.g. as a definitional limitation), such a methodology imposed a priori restricts historical
conclusions by not allowing one to examine the past with a full range of explanations. 381 It
should be noted that we are not presently concerned here with those who hold to MN is an a
posteriori and provisional manner (PMN) which is distinct from the MN we will be discussing
here. 382 As we saw in the first chapter, by refusing to allow the evidence of the past to be

For examples of other inappropriate impositions outside of the issue of methodological naturalism, see
Richard J. Evans, In Defense of History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 168, 188. See also Carl R.
Trueman, Histories and Fallacies: Problems Faced in the Writing of History (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010), 87–
107; Margaret MacMillan, Dangerous Games: The Uses and Abuses of History (New York: Modern Library, 2010),
114.
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Roland Deines provides a helpful discussion on the origins of this phrase (which is attributed to Hugo
Grotius). Roland Deines, Acts of God in History: Studies Towards Recovering a Theological Historiography,
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 317 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 2–3. See also
Gregory Dawes, “In Defense of Naturalism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70, no. 1 (2011): 6.
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Webb, for example, sees MN as nothing more than merely a definitional limitation. Webb, “The
Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” 41–43, 47–48. Mark Allen Powell is exceedingly
complimentary of Webb’s approach. He writes that Webb’s “proposal for a methodological-naturalism that places a
definitional limitation on what historian can appropriately say about causation strikes me as absolutely correct and,
in fact, so obvious as to be virtually beyond dispute. It strikes me as something that should be able to go without
saying…I don’t know that it has ever been said as well as it is here. I deem Webb’s essay a masterpiece of elocution
and common sense.” Mark Allan Powell, “Evangelical Christians and Historical-Jesus Studies: Final Reflections,”
Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 135. As this chapter indicates, however, we
believe there is reason to doubt and that significant revisions are needed.
382
Those who hold to PMN are open to revising their view in light of new evidence. An example of this
would be Dawes, “In Defense of Naturalism.” Similarly, but with more questionable justification. Maarten Boudry,
Stefaan Blancke, and Johan Braeckman, “Grist to the Mill of Anti-Evolutionism: The Failed Strategy of Ruling the
Supernatural Out of Science by Philosophical Fiat,” Science & Education 21, no. 8 (February 22, 2012): 1152. As I
have understood these scholars, they are open (or at least the claim to be open) to examine claims of alleged
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examined freely, history is undermined because an open and free questioning of the past, which
is crucial to historical study, is impossible since the answers are constrained before the inquiry
even begins. 383 In such situations, the conclusions are built into the method and no amount of
evidence can possibly have an effect on such a method that is dogmatically closed. 384
Given these issues, it is understandable that discontent with MN has been growing in
recent years. In a recent series of articles featured in History Compass, scholars engaged in these
very issues and questioned the current paradigm of MN. 385 Roland Deines has argued that
dogmatic MN “coerces those who desire to talk intelligibly and rationally about God acting in
history, and in their own lives, to convert first to a worldview where the very thing they seek to
communicate is already assigned to the non-real.” 386 Michael Cantrell has also contested against
such dogmatism. For him it not only “prejudices the integrity of a scholar’s work,” but can
actually lead scholars to do worse in their research. 387 Church historian Brad Gregory highlights
supernatural intervention. The fact that they have not found any sufficiently strong enough to be granted is a
separate topic and beyond the scope of this work.
Francis Beckwith, David Hume’s Argument Against Miracles: A Critical Analysis (University Press of
America, 1989), 101.
383

G. E. Ladd points out that “Far from being open-minded and ‘objective’, it is closed-minded to one of
the most viable explanations….the very presuppositions of the scientific method make it blind to one very live
option….The man of faith is therefore more open-minded than the so-called scientific historian.” George Eldon
Ladd, I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 13. See also 25-27.
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385

Deines, Acts of God in History, 26 (emphasis in original). He adds, “[To stay silent about truth] is
against the ethos of the university and the practice of good scholarship.” Similarly Evan Fales refers to an “antiintellectual” attitude.” Fales, Divine Intervention, 3.
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Adding, “It is not going too far to say that, by using methodological atheism, a scholar may actually
fabricate the data of experience—an action that, in any other circumstance would raise serious concerns about the
shirking of proper scholarly conduct.” Cantrell, “Must a Scholar of Religion Be Methodologically Atheistic or
Agnostic?,” 384. See also 379-386. Similarly Licona, “Historians and Miracle Claims,” 112–13.
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the circularity of methodological naturalism in that it unsurprisingly yields only naturalistic
conclusions. 388 Although Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke, and Johan Braeckman do not appear
to have found any supernatural explanations satisfying, they nevertheless conclude that “the most
widespread view, which conceives of MN as an intrinsic or self-imposed limitation of science, is
philosophically indefensible.” 389
Even more striking is when Robert Webb, a proponent of MN, acknowledge its
limitations. He concludes that MN is “less satisfying, for its conclusions may be more tentative
and explanations are incomplete in certain cases.” 390 Rather than settle for an admittedly limited

Gregory adds that this “goes on unrecognized to the extent that such metaphysical beliefs [e.g.
naturalism] are widely but wrongly considered to be undeniable truths.” Brad S. Gregory, “The Other Confessional
History: On Secular Bias in the Study of Religion,” History and Theory 45, no. 4 (2006): 146; Eddy and Boyd, The
Jesus Legend, 48. More skeptical thinkers have also recognized this point. Boudry, Blancke, and Braeckman, “Grist
to the Mill of Anti-Evolutionism,” 1155.
388

Boudry, Blancke, and Braeckman, “How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism,” 228 (emphasis
added). In their article they also evaluate five common arguments in favor of MN (definitional, lawful regularity,
science stopping, procedural necessity, and testability) and despite being sympathetic to them they ultimately find
each of them problematic. Tiddy Smith similarly argues against two forms of MN (intrinsic and pragmatic) in Tiddy
Smith, “Methodological Naturalism and Its Misconceptions,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,
February 2, 2017, 323–30. Fales responds to four arguments in favor of MN (locality, supernatural/natural
distinction, reliability of the laws of nature, and miracles as a science stopper). Fales, Divine Intervention, 4–6.
Gregory Dawes makes a similar point and contends ultimately against dogmatic positions and advocates for a
provisional approach which is open to change in light of new evidence. Dawes, “In Defense of Naturalism,” 23.
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Webb, “The Rules of the Game,” 83. See also Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus
Research,” 48. See also 42. Powell similarly acknowledges this shortcoming despite favoring MN. Powell,
“Evangelical Christians and Historical-Jesus Studies,” 135. Robert Miller discusses the costs involved in such a
method as Webb’s in Robert J. Miller, “When It’s Futile to Argue about the Historical Jesus: A Response to Bock,
Keener, and Webb,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 93–95; Robert J. Miller,
“The Domain and Function of Epistemological Humility in Historical Jesus Studies,” Journal for the Study of the
Historical Jesus 12, no. 1/2 (January 2014): 130–42. In addition to the issues noted throughout this chapter, another
concern is also present regarding Webb’s discussion of methodological naturalism. Webb’s criticisms of critical
theistic history are unsuccessful and contrary to normal historical practice. For example, he cites that one of the
problems of such a method is that it “requires that a reader entertain some form of a theistic worldview before the
explanation can [sic] evaluated” (46). We saw that historians should bracket their worldview in order to consider
other perspectives is essential to the practice of history in the first chapter. Additionally, multiple perspectives can
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(i.e. Marxist vs non-Marxist interpretations). Thus, although Webb favors MN because it “allows historians who
have differing worldviews to participate together in the historical enterprise in spite of their differing worldviews”
390

121

epistemological method, we should strive to examine the past openly, critically, and with a more
fruitful methodology that seeks a fuller and more robust understanding of the past. It has,
moreover, been pointed out by proponents of PMN that excluding the supernatural by
definitional fiat is an unjustifiable position philosophically and is counterproductive since it
allows the opponents of MN to rightly accuse MN of inappropriate bias and dogmatism. 391
An inflexible acceptance of MN, thus, makes one unnecessarily vulnerable to significant
and avoidable objections. 392 In order to avoid these problems, one simply need not be dogmatic
and impose methodological naturalism a priori which artificially limits our knowledge of the
past. 393 Inquirers of the past must remain open and allow the evidence to direct them while
refusing to allow arbitrary (or tyrannical) assumptions to be forced upon them. Philosopher of
history, Aviezer Tucker, provides a good reminder that there “are no a priori shortcuts. To reach
any reasoned conclusion about miracles or any other past event, it is necessary to examine
hypothesis about the past in competition with one another over the best explanation that

(47), it is difficult to see that MN actually delivers on this promise for the reasons just mentioned. Moreover, when
we pair the shortcoming of Webb’s objections to critical theistic history and the fact that the open method that we
have been advocating here and in chapter two, then we see that it is our method that creates a better environment for
historians of different worldview would still be able to fruitfully dialogue and participate in historical research
despite their differing worldviews.
391
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Benjamin C. F. Shaw, “What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: Historiography and the
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increases most the likelihood of the broadest scope of evidence.” 394 There are no shortcuts to
good scholarship, let alone excellent scholarship. 395 Indeed, these very types of “a priori
shortcuts” are reflective of the vices discussed in the first chapter since they impose artificial
conceptual frameworks that necessarily constrain one’s inquiry.
Ethnocentrism
It is curious that MN is now used to dogmatically to deny inquiry into certain questions
considering that MN largely stemmed from the Enlightenment which itself sought to undue the
dogmatisms of its own day. 396 Wright helpfully calls attention to this irony writing that the
underlying rationale of the Enlightenment was, after all, that the grandiose dogmatic
claims of the church (…) needed to be challenged by the fearless, unfettered examination
of historical evidence. It will not do, after two hundred years of this, for historians in that
tradition to turn round and rule out, a priori, certain types of answer to questions that
remain naggingly insistent. 397
One may infer that for Wright those that seek to dogmatically insist on MN are no different than
earlier ecclesiastical authorities who sought to dogmatically impose their views on others. 398

Aviezer Tucker, “Miracles, Historical Testimonies, and Probabilities,” History and Theory 44, no. 3
(October 1, 2005), 73-390 (390). See also 381, 385.
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Eddy and Boyd note that such a method is exemplified when it is open to investigate supernatural
activity. Eddy and Boyd, The Jesus Legend, 16–17, 51–53, 58, 82–90. Adding that dogmatic methodological
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Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, 3:713 (emphasis added). See also Wright, The New
Testament and the People of God, 1:93 fn. 26; Keener, Miracles, 2011, 193–94.
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Michael Bird echoes Wright’s complaint, “My point is that those who think that religion has a
monopoly on dogmatism better think again, and unless the whole debate is going to be reduced
to a slanging match between competing presuppositions we had all better be prepared to take the
evidence seriously.” 399 Indeed, the prescription of MN on scholarship has led many in recent
years to refer to such an imposition as intellectual imperialism or ethnocentrism derived from
Western Enlightenment rationality. 400
James Crossley, who argues in favor of a form of MN, recently raised concerns against
the charge of ethnocentrism. 401 His (somewhat understandable) concern is that the term
ethnocentrism could simply be used as a label to dismiss opponents while also failing to realize
that the accusation alone does not establish whether or not a specific miracle has occurred. 402 He

Michael F. Bird and James G. Crossley, How Did Christianity Begin? A Believer and Non-Believer
Examine the Evidence (London: Peabody, MA: SPCK: Hendrickson, 2008), 49. We may add that given the
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Smith, “The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,” Philo 4, no. 2 (2001): 195–205. Regarding the dozens of arguments for
theism see Jerry Walls and Trent Dougherty, Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). The latter is based off a lecture given by Alvin Plantinga in 1986.
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is also concerned that this may be more of a rhetorical move since those that raise the charge find
themselves in the same bind since those in non-Western countries “presumably do not believe
plenty of things Bird, for instance, believes in and many of them will no doubt practice things
Bird dislikes.” 403 In other words, there is an “acceptance of the Other without (too much)
Otherness, accepting those bits that are useful and can conform to positions within contemporary
liberal discourses.” 404
A few comments should be made here in an effort to address Crossley’s apprehensions.
First, it is not clear where Crossley gets the impression that that these scholars are, in fact, using
the charge of ethnocentrism as a label that functions as an automatic disqualifier of their
opponents or if it is just a possibility. Such “pigeonholing” is something these scholars are
typically just as concerned about themselves. 405 Similarly, these scholars do not believe the
charge of ethnocentrism somehow validates the occurrence of a specific miracle, but that
ethnocentrism can a priori close the door to the evidence for any miracle claim. If, for example,
Keener thought that the charge of ethnocentrism was sufficient enough to establish a specific
miracle, then presumably his two-volume work on Miracles could have been considerably
shorter. Nevertheless, we certainly can agree with Crossley’s main point here that merely
assigning a label to one’s opponent does not automatically grant one a victory nor does this

Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 117; Powell, “Evangelical Christians and
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403
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when we ask questions of whether or not a given miracle actually occurred (102). This last comment is particularly
strange as people have reflected on the historicity of miracles long before the Enlightenment, but also because
Crossley does not think historians should entertain such questions.
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charge establish that any miracle has, in fact, occurred even if we disagree with Crossley’s
justification.
However, the charge itself is important if it is accurate and Crossley acknowledges that it
is for certain thinkers (e.g. Hume). 406 It is important because, as Crossley also agrees, scholars
can fall into ethnocentric thinking unintentionally. 407 It is therefore helpful when the academic
community brings such “blind spots” to our attention. We certainly do not want our
understanding of reality or the past to be dogmatically limited to what we know (or have
experienced). 408
Second, the fact that Bird or any of these other scholars do not agree with everything
their non-Western counterparts is not a strong argument that they are somehow retaining degrees
of ethnocentrism. On the one hand, it is not clear how much one must accept of the other in order
to avoid this charge from Crossley or how he determined where the line of “too little” acceptance
is located. On the other hand, if it is to be an all or nothing approach, then he would seem to be
presenting a false dichotomy between ethnocentrism (rejecting the other entirely) on one hand
and xenocentrism (accepting the other entirely) on the other. 409 So long as one is open to the
views of others, which requires a bracketing of their own views in the process, then dialogue
between the different views and evidence is occurring. The problems of ethnocentrism occur
when the self is elevated above all others in such ways that promote monologues and inhibit
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Crossley, “The Nature Miracles as Pure Myth,” 102, 104.
Ibid., 104.

Walter Wink, “Write What You See,” FourthR 7 (May 1994): 6; Contributors, “Dialogue: A Way
Forward,” 199 (Keener), 220 (McGrew).
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Such holistic agreement rarely, if ever, occurs within the same cultures let alone cross cultures.
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dialogues (as Crossley would undoubtedly agree). 410 The very problem that can be found in
Hume’s dismissal of miracles. 411
Agency
Richard Taylor has helpfully identified two kinds of explanation. For example, one could
explain the campfire by referring to a match starting the fire or a man starting the fire. 412 These
two kinds of explanations refer to different aspects of the same past event (scientific and
agency). The important explanation for our present purposes is agent explanation. 413 Agent
explanations can generally be identified by a telos or intentionality. Taylor writes that “any true
assertion that something does occur in order that some result may be achieved does seem to
entail that the event in question is not merely an event, but the act of some agent.” 414 While
history is concerned with a multitude of topics (individual people, governments, etc.), one form
of explanation that historians will frequently appeal to is that of agency. As Wright notes, history

For an interesting discussion on this issue see Jörn Rüsen, Evidence and Meaning: A Theory of
Historical Studies, trans. Diane Kerns and Katie Digan, Making Sense of History 28 (New York: Berghahn Books,
2017), 200–213. For more detailed discussion see Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible,
the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge, Anniversary Edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009).
410

While many references could be given on this point, we will simply refer to Larmer, The Legitimacy of
Miracle, 136–37.
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Richard Taylor, “Two Kinds of Explanation,” in Miracles, ed. Richard Swinburne (New York:
Macmillan, 1989), 103. See also Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1970),
53–57.
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agency.

Hume’s definition above appeared to be more concerned with the scientific component rather than

Taylor, “Two Kinds of Explanation,” 107 (emphasis in original). Taylor rightly adds that even if an
agent’s “actions were quite unprecedented, they would nevertheless be understood, intelligible, and in that sense
explained, if they did satisfy these conditions—that is, if they could be truly represented as an appropriate means to
some end.” Ibid., 112
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is “the study of aims, intentions and motivations.” 415 Historians frequently seek to know what
caused certain people (or groups) to act in certain ways in order to achieve certain goals (i.e.
knowing the motive is essential to legal cases).
Agency can be a broad category and it need not apply exclusively to human agency. 416
Historian Christopher Pearson has argued that although many historians believe agency to be a
uniquely human characteristic, animals should be recognized as agents who are also capable of
acting intentionally. 417 For Pearson, militarized dogs, although not having the same caliber of
agency as humans, nevertheless exhibit the ability to act with forms of intentionality that can,
and have been, discussed historically. 418 Thus, historians already examine the past actions of
non-human agents with lesser degrees of agency than humans.
Divine agents with potentially greater degrees of agency should similarly be open to
historical investigation. 419 Since historians already discuss agency in both humans and non415
Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:111. See also 91, 95. Cf. Trueman, Histories and
Fallacies, 119.

Human agency may be the most interesting and popular (thus a reason for studying it and writing it), but
that would in no way diminish the fact that there are other forms of agency whereby intentional acts are performed.
416

417
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Chris Pearson, “Dogs, History, and Agency,” History and Theory 52, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 128–

Licona has made a similar suggestion (using the term “persons” instead of agents), but more unique in
that he refers the possibility of alien interaction with humans in order to demonstrate that agency could exist beyond
humanity. Licona, “Historians and Miracle Claims,” 112–13. The overall point here would still apply even to those
who suggest that history is a study of the human past since the types of events described here would involve human
interaction with non-humans (be it dogs, aliens, or the divine).
418

We must add the nuance of the potential immateriality of some divine agents. Eddy and Boyd, The Jesus
Legend, 59. Regarding the ability of a divine immaterial agent to act causally within the physical world see Larmer,
The Legitimacy of Miracle, 105–8. J. P. Moreland also notes the similarity between human and divine agency. J. P.
Moreland, “Science, Miracles, Agency Theory and God-of-the-Gaps,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive
Case for God’s Action in History, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas (Downers Grove, IL: IVP
Academic, 1997), 143. That divine action could nevertheless be detected is also affirmed by skeptics such as
Boudry, Blancke, and Braeckman, “How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism,” 240. Who also make
reference to the noted atheist Victor Stenger’s work where he cites eleven examples that would support divine
action, although some of these seem surprisingly weak. Victor J. Stenger, God: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science
Shows That God Does Not Exist (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 231–34.
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humans, it would seem odd to refuse to address divine agency (a category of non-human
agency). 420 If we can recognize the intentional actions in other agents, we should also be able to
recognize, at least to some extent, intentionality in divine agents should they so choose to act. 421
Disembodied Agency
While we have noted the analogy to human and non-human agency, it may be objected
that divine agency is relevantly different from the above examples since there is no physicality to
divine beings. Humans have physical bodies in which they are able to cause various events in the
physical world. Their agency does not manifest itself by thoughts, but by physical bodies. Dogs,
as non-human agents, similarly have physical bodies that enable them to act in the physical
world. Divine beings may not have such physical attributes and thus cannot be investigated by
the historian since there is no observable person to link an alleged miraculous event.
Given this absence of physicality one may think that a historian would be equivalent to
the two explorers searching for the gardener in the late Oxford philosopher Antony Flew’s
famous parable. 422 According to the parable, two explorers were walking in the jungle when they
came across a clearing where flowers and weeds were growing. One explorer believes this area
had been intentionally tended by a gardener and the other explorer disagreed. They decided to

For Clarke, “A miracle is an intended outcome of an intervention in the natural world by a nonnatural
agent.” Clarke, “The Supernatural and the Miraculous,” 278.
420

“One can definitely speak of a ‘plan’ here, if this is understood as a purposeful undertaking directed
towards a goal.” Deines, Acts of God in History, 334 fn. 60. Ehrman notes that when apparent miraculous events
occurred, “the only questions for most ancient persons were (a) who was able to perform these deeds and (b) what
was the source of their power? Was a person like Jesus, for example empowered by a god or by black magic?”
Ehrman, The New Testament, 226.
421

422
Although Flew published the parable (and presented it in 1950), he reports that it was developed by
philosopher John Wisdom. Antony Flew, “Theology and Falsification,” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology,
ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1963), 96–99. It appear that this objection, or one
close to it, if part of the reason why Webb defines the supernatural as “beyond” the natural world of time and space.
Webb, “The Historical Enterprise and Historical Jesus Research,” 46.
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setup a watch to see if a gardener came, but they saw nobody. They then decide to add an electric
fence and bloodhounds to their search, but still no gardener was detected. The “believer”
suggests that the gardener must be “invisible, intangible, insensible to electric shocks, a gardener
who has no scent and makes no sound.” 423 The “skeptic” responds by asking “Just how does
what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary
gardener or even from no gardener at all?” 424 One of the points of this parable for Flew, who
raised this argument in the era of logical positivism, was that empirical verification of the
gardener was needed. 425
While it would be easy for the historian to avoid the discussion of miracles altogether
when confronted with complex questions such as these, it is important that we engage them to
see if the constitute a solid objection to our ability to identify the occurrence of a miracle and it
seems they do not. 426 First, we should note a rather simple qualification that the divine could
create a physical manifestation of itself before any action occurs. Possible examples of this could
be found in burning bushes, an angelic appearance, Jesus, etc. 427 It seems logically possible that
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Flew, “Theology and Falsification,” 96.
Ibid., 96.

Another aspect of this parable was to identify the possible unfalsifiability of some views (Flew, 99).
While logical positivism was shown to be self-refuting, one may find the responses to Flew helpful. See R. M. Hare,
“Theology and Falsification,” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre
(London: SCM Press, 1963), 99–103; Basil Mitchell, “Theology and Falsification,” in New Essays in Philosophical
Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1963), 103–5.
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426
This objection is important to consider since it would not only affect the historian but also non-specialist
believers in miracles. The objection seeks to nullify our epistemic access, as humans (not just as historians), to the
divine.

Given the ambiguity on the distinction between the supernatural and the natural noted above one could
potentially include ghosts or NDEs into the conversation, but this would be beyond the purview of our discussion.
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immaterial divine beings could become physically manifested if they so desired and thus nullify
this objection. 428
Second, the immateriality of agent not enough to preclude our belief in their agency a
priori since there are, as Fales points out, many “things that scientists study [that] are not—not
straightforwardly, at any rate—locatable in space: space itself, properties, human minds.” 429
Human minds are a particularly helpful analogy in our discussion since we are arguing that
historians can possibly identify the actions of a divine mind. The ideas and wills of different
human minds cause their bodies to act within the world. In other words, one’s immaterial mind
and will is able to produce events within the physical world. 430 In a similar way, the divine mind
could cause events to occur in the material world. 431
In seeking to address the concerns of the invisible gardener, we argued that although a
divine being could be manifested physically, it need not do so. Historians are able to identify the
actions of a divine mind in ways analogous to the human mind. Thus, much like Flew eventually
found the Gardener, so too can the historian. 432

Boudry et al. note an interesting story of Non Serviam by Stanislaw Lem in which a computer
programmer exists apart from his created computer universe in which the programmer could chose to reveal his
existence or not to his computer universe. Boudry, Blancke, and Braeckman, “How Not to Attack Intelligent Design
Creationism,” 240.
428
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Fales, Divine Intervention, 4 (emphasis added). Cf. 1.

Some may object that this analogy is dependent upon a view of the mind as being immaterial. While
there is renewed discussion on the mind-body problem, even if it turns out that physicalist notions turn out to be
correct, we cannot know these things a priori. Such relationship on the mind-body relation is best left open and
discussion on multiple models be considered. Thus, rather than being dependent upon a specific view of the mindbody relationship, we are grounding it in a model that allows for the possibility of historical investigation that is
open to a number of different positions on this issue. For a recent discussion mind-body dualism see Jonathan J.
Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2018).
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For more details on this analogy see Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle, 30, 105–8, 110, 155–57, 169.

Antony Flew and Roy Abraham Varghese, There Is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist
Changed His Mind (NY: HarperOne, 2007). Flew found teleological arguments convincing for theism (155).
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Context
Agent explanation is important because it provides the type of explanation proper to
understanding miraculous events as something different from natural laws (and avoids “God of
the Gaps” accusations that merely consider the “oddness” of an event) and more about
intentionality, will, and purpose. 433 In order for agents to act with intentionality, a context is
necessary. Cutting someone with a knife could be a good thing or a bad thing, it depends on the
context. If the context is a surgery, then its good, but it would be bad if the context were a
robbery. 434 Without knowing the context, one is unable to move towards a desirable goal because
they do not know what specific actions will help them achieve their goals. The context of the
agent’s situation will help reveal which actions will assist in achieving their goals and which
ones will not. Context is absolutely crucial to understanding the actions of agents, including
divine agents. 435

Interestingly, as we have argued, miracles are often considered a form of the teleological argument. For a specific
discussion on this topic see Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle, 148–62. One may also see the special issue of
Philosophia Christi 13, no. 2 (2013) on “Ramified Natural Theology.” To this we may also add Alvin Plantinga’s
highly influential work Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God
(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1967). Further discussion on this topic, although interesting, is beyond the
scope of our discussion.
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Habermas, Risen Jesus, 64–66, 89.

Such differences in context would be essential in court cases where the motive of the agents plays such a
pivotal role. For example, in the surgical example, if the patient dies during the surgery, then the surgeon will not
get a first-degree murder charge unless some additional information is provided to suggest that he planned to murder
their patient. Without such positive evidence, however, one would be reasonable to believe that the patient died to
any number of other unintended causes since the event occurred during a surgery which is the sort of context in
which the goal is to save or preserve life and not take it.
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435
This includes unique (possibly divine) actions. Even if such actions, as Taylor notes, “were quite
unprecedented, they would nevertheless be understood, intelligible, and in that sense explained if they satisfied these
conditions—that is, if they could be truly represented as an appropriate means to some end.” He also points out that
this is what is done routinely in law courts when trying to determine motive. Taylor, “Two Kinds of Explanation,”
112.
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How would this apply to divine agents? Philosopher and skeptic Larry Shapiro has
questioned our epistemic ability to know that God was the causal Agent in Exodus when Moses
confronts Pharaoh (even if one grants the events occurred as described). He sees no reason to
think that God would express Himself through might and to do so is just speculation. 436 Perhaps
God’s nature is one that prefers to turn the other cheek instead? For Shapiro, we do not have
access to God’s intentions or desires so any comment about God’s actions (i.e. using might) is
conjecture. If one considers this event without a context, then it certainly is difficult to know how
God might act. 437
However, the Exodus account, which Shapiro grants for the sake of the argument, does
provide a context for which understanding of the actions of the agents involved makes sense,
including God’s actions. 438 Among other factors, there is a clear challenging of power occurring
whereby God informs Moses that Pharaoh will not let Israel go unless a “strong hand” is used
(Exod 3:19-20; 6:1). Thus, the context enables us to understand why God would use might in this
situation (in order that Israel may be released), while in other situations He may act differently
just as human agents act differently in different situations. 439
While it is true that Shapiro grants the evidence for the sake of the discussion, the point
we are highlighting is that when the evidence is considered within the context it occurred, a

436

Shapiro, The Miracle Myth, 44.

Gregory offers a humorous anecdote that reminds us of the ambiguity of trying to identify the intentions
of an agent when they act in such ways that are consistent with mutually exclusive paradigms. Gregory, “The Other
Confessional History,” 132–33.
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For more details see Benjamin C. F. Shaw and Gary R. Habermas, “Miracles, Evidence, and Agent
Causation: A Review Article,” Philosophia Christi 20, no. 1 (January 2018): 189–91.

On the importance of context see Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle, 148–62, 187–88; Habermas, Risen
Jesus, 63, 66; Davis, Risen Indeed, 8, 28. For Licona, context is a criterion for identifying a miracle. Licona,
“Historians and Miracle Claims,” 119ff.; Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 163–66.
439

133

historian could recognize the intentions of the divine agent. Clarke made a similar point two
decades ago when he wrote,
If we accept what we are told in the Old Testament, it is reasonable to believe that God
supernaturally intervened in the world because he intended that the Israelites were
enabled to cross the Red Sea….Without the context of such a plan God’s intervention
would be difficult to understand, and we would hesitate to attribute the parting of the Red
Sea to the activity of a supernatural being at all, either preferring a natural explanation, if
we can find a viable one, or admitting that we do not know how to explain the
occurrence, and letting the matter rest. 440
The point that we are making, then, is that the context enables us to see that if this event
occurred, then supernatural intentions are made evident by the actions carried out in the
empirical world. 441 If the information suggests that a divine agent has acted by parting the Red
Sea or resurrection Jesus, then the historian would be conducting their historical method in ways
analogous to human agents or other non-human agents. 442
Conclusion
In summary, we suggested that history is a discipline that requires the freedom to be able
to openly inquire into the past and miracles are the intentional actions of divine agents within
Clarke, “Hume’s Definition of Miracles Revised,” 53. The late Ben Meyer noted that in the Gospels the
“supposition of the concrete possibility of miracles is fundamentally grounded in the positive openness to a divine
act of salvation as the intelligible context of the miraculous. If the salvific context is overlooked, the concrete
possibility of miracles evaporates.” Ben F. Meyer, The Aims of Jesus (London: SCM Press, 1979), 101 (emphasis
added). He then adds, “If, furthermore, the critic cannot seriously imagine anything which might give religious
significance to a resurrection of Jesus…nothing of the sort can commend itself to him as a viable hypothesis in
accounting for the transforming paschal experience of the disciples.”
440

Habermas writes “Historical facts are not self-interpreting. The require a context in order to achieve
special significance. However, when events are coupled with other factors, meaning may ensue.” Habermas, Risen
Jesus, 65. He helpfully uses Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon as an example writing, “that a Roman military
commander crossed a small river in northern Italy in 49 B.C. might seem rather insignificant, at least when taken in
isolation. But new insight develops when it is understood in its context. Julius Caesar lead an army across the
Rubicon River, which, against the background of Roman law, constituted an act of civil war” (65).
441

442
Although we are not doing so here, in the case of Jesus’s resurrection, one could argue for the divine
action pattern surrounding Jesus’ life which provides context for interpreting the resurrection as a miracle.
Habermas, 89–121. For a discussion on divine action pattern see David Basinger, “Christian Theism and the
Concept of Miracle: Some Epistemological Perplexities,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (June 1,
1980): 137–50.
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time and space. We highlighted that historical methods must be abandoned if they artificially
restrict what can be studied a priori because such methods improperly imposed epistemic
restraints that distort our knowledge of the past. Additionally, history is frequently concerned
with the explaining the actions of agents. The intentions of agents are best understood by
considering the context in which their actions occurred and should not be neglected. Thus,
historians can quite properly investigate the important and significant questions regarding
alleged actions of divine agents, including the resurrection, and draw conclusions on the basis of
positive and publicly available evidence as they would with human agents.
Historical Concerns: “What About…”
As should be clear, we have advocated for a historical methodology that is able to freely
investigate the action of agents in the past. While there are apprehensions in such a method that
allows for divine agents, our approach has already sought to take these concerns into account.
However, it will be helpful to briefly address two of the strongest and most common concerns
directly and show how they have been incorporated into our method. 443
Faith and its Relationship to History
A common objection to the historian’s ability to access miracles has to do with faith and
evidence. Many presume belief in miracles to be known through (subjective) faith and apart from

443
We have decided not to discuss a number of other objections because they appear to be far weaker than
the two we will be discussing. Some of these weaker objections include the following the claim that extraordinary
claims require extraordinary evidence (how does extraordinary evidence differ from ordinary evidence?) or if we
accept a miracle in one religion we must then accept all miracle claims (why not evaluate miracle claims on a caseby-cases basis?). A number of other common objections have been addressed above either directly or indirectly
(God of the gaps reasoning, etc.).
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publicly available (or objective) evidence. 444 Ehrman provides a helpful illustration of this
response,
[F]aith in a miracle is a matter of faith, not of objectively established knowledge. That is
why some historians believe that Jesus was raised and other equally good historians do
not believe he was. Both sets of historians have the same historical data available to
them, but it is not the historical data that make a person a believer. Faith is not historical
knowledge, and historical knowledge is not faith. 445
This objection, although common, has a few significant problems to overcome if it is to be
sustained. 446

Deines notes that the assumption of religious truths being equated with subjective truths is pervasive in
academia. Deines, Acts of God in History, 7–9.
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Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (New
York: HarperOne, 2014), 173. This comment appears to explain why Ehrman’s understanding of “canons of
historical evidence” cannot demonstrate a miracle. Ehrman, The New Testament, 226. Similarly, but from a different
angle, Willi Marxsen, “The Resurrection of Jesus as a Historical and Theological Problem,” in The Significance of
the Message of the Resurrection for Faith in Jesus Christ, ed. C. F. D Moule, vol. 8, Studies in Biblical Theology 2
(Naperville, IL: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1968), 17, 19–22, 25.
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The late Jewish scholar Alan Segal writes “For me, this is the mark of faith; it does not depend on
rational argument. If it did, it would be reason, not faith. The same is true with the resurrection.” Alan F. Segal,
“The Resurrection: Faith or History?,” in Resurrection of Jesus: John Dominic Crossan and N. T. Wright in
Dialogue, ed. Robert B. Stewart (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 137. For a different view from another
Jewish scholar, Pinchas Lapide writes, “I cannot rid myself of the impression that some modern Christian
theologians are ashamed of the material facticity of the resurrection. Their varying attempts at dehistoricizing the
Easter experience which give the lie to all four evangelists are simply not understandable to me in any other way.”
Pinchas Lapide, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Jewish Perspective (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002), 130. After
citing comments from Bultmann, Rahner, Braun, Marxsen, Zahrnt, and Limbeck, Lapide provides a humorous
response to their unhistorical paraphrasing of resurrection (129). E. P. Sanders similarly noted that the “need for
rational explanations is a modern one. The numerous efforts have a conservative aim: if Jesus’ miracles can be
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“conservative” this aim actually is, but Sander’s point illustrates how some are willing to redefine the NT
conceptions in order to fit in with modern sensibilities. For example, Thomas Sheehan, “The Resurrection, An
Obstacle to Faith?,” in The Resurrection of Jesus: A Sourcebook, ed. Bernard Brandon Scott, vol. 4, Jesus Seminar
Guides (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge Press, 2008), 93–104. Lüdemann helpfully offers this response, “Is it not also
important to measure one’s own faith by the faith of the first witnesses or if need be to have it corrected from there?
Otherwise it threatens to be arbitrary.” Gerd Lüdemann, The Resurrection of Jesus: History, Experience, Theology,
trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994), 1. Nevertheless, other scholars today would agree
with Ehrman, Segal, et al. scholars on this point. For example see Roy W. Hoover, “Was Jesus’ Resurrection an
Historical Event?,” in The Resurrection of Jesus: A Sourcebook, ed. Bernard Brandon Scott, vol. 4, Jesus Seminar
Guides (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge Press, 2008), 75–92; Miller, “Back to the Basics: A Primer on Historical
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First, historians come to different historical conclusions on all sorts topics despite also
having the “same historical data” available to them. 447 In these situations, scholars (including
Ehrman) do not typically accuse their opponents of having some generalized notion of faith. 448
One is left wondering how those who conclude a miracle claim occurred are being treated
differently.
It appears one reason for this is because of the assumption that miracles can only be
known by “faith.” While it is unclear how Ehrman understands faith as an epistemology that can
informs someone that a miracle has occurred, it would still need to be demonstrated that those
who argue for the historical occurrence of a miracle are actually doing history differently rather
than just being assumed. 449 Contrarily, if they are doing history and providing the relevant data
and arguments, then these must be engaged. 450

Ehrman writes, for example, that historical Jesus research is a “hotly debated area of research” and that
he is therefore only able to present what he believes to be the “most compelling” position. Ehrman, The New
Testament, 231. For an example outside Jesus research, different interpretations (i.e. Marxist and non-Marxist) of
the French Revolution are mentioned in introductory works on the subject. William Doyle, The French Revolution:
A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 98–108. Licona makes a similar observations.
Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 156.
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Ehrman does not think, for example, Jesus was a cynic philosopher, but he (rightly) does not accuse
those who do as acting on some undefined notion of faith (or as a believer). Ehrman, The New Testament, 259. Cf.
229. As we noted, historians do not approach the data from a neutral position and there are certainly cases where
scholars have imposed certain worldviews or assumptions into their historical work which affects interpretations.
For an insightful discussion on differing interpretations of data see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards
a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 150–60, 286–94.
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For example, Licona points out that it is hard to read Wright’s The Resurrection and the Son of God as
the product of mere blind faith. Licona, “Historians and Miracle Claims,” 111.

Smith makes the distinction between those who use faith as appeals to “supernatural methods of
justification” which are private as opposed to his understanding of methodological naturalism which relies on
publicly available evidence. His view of methodological naturalism is one that refers to justification, not
metaphysics. Thus, one could, in theory investigate miracle claims so long as the evidence is available for analysis.
Smith, “Methodological Naturalism and Its Misconceptions.” An important nuance is that this understanding of faith
should be distinguished between an existential private encounter with God. Such events, however, would only be
evidential to the individual who had the experience. If a transformation occurs in the individual, that transformation
could be considered indirect evidence to others. Although he may, at times, appear fideistic in his approach, Scot
McKnight provides an example an example of experiential components. Scot McKnight, “The Misguided Quest for
the Nature Miracles,” in The Nature Miracles of Jesus: Problems, Perspectives, and Prospects, ed. Graham H.
Twelftree (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017), 187. Cf. Contributors, “Dialogue: A Way Forward,” 196 fn. 1
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Second, it seems that the notion of faith being used here appears to assume a form of
blind or entirely subjective faith. This understanding of faith is problematic both for the historian
and the believer. The problem for the historian is that it is only one understanding of faith among
others and thus should not be used as the only interpretive grid for evaluating miracles. 451 As
noted above, historians can, and should, conceptualize other models of faith (as they do with
different worldview) rather than ones that make miracles impervious to investigation a priori.
The problem for the believer is, as Deines points out, in a world where there is no critical
discourse on divine action, then “authority of the sentence, ‘God wills it’ is a dangerous weapon
in the hands of religious leaders, and even more so, from a theological perspective, within the
reality of a fallen humanity, for which ‘will to power’ is one of the most disastrous sins.” 452
Believers should be concerned that their faith does not become a type of Gnosticism whereby
those who have “faith” are those who have the knowledge of the truth. One may rightly wonder
where or what are the constraints for those who have faith or is it ultimately a great deal of
subjectivity? 453 Such understandings of faith would seem to render the Bible itself as secondary,
if not irrelevant, while one’s experienced “faith” is paramount. Indeed, Wright warns that
“without historical enquiry there is no check on Christianity’s propensity to remake Jesus, never

(Keener). One may also find helpful Gary R. Habermas, “The Personal Testimony of the Holy Spirit to the Believer
and Christian Apologetics,” Journal of Christian Apologetics 1, no. 1 (1997): 49–64.
For example, on the other end of the spectrum is Gregory A. Boyd, Benefit of the Doubt: Breaking the
Idol of Certainty (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2013).
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Deines, Acts of God in History, 2 (emphasis added).
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“But how should faith determine what one believes—does “anything go” so long as one believes it on
faith, or ate there constraints.” Martin, The Elusive Messiah, 152 (emphasis in original). Three scholars, for example,
have provided “criteria” when it comes to miracle claims. See Steve Clarke, “When to Believe in Miracles,”
American Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 1 (1997): 99–100; Deines, Acts of God in History, 24–26; Larmer, The
Legitimacy of Miracle, 79–87.
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mind the Christian god, in its own image.” 454 Historical evidence, then, is not only important for
divine action and doctrine, but also for serving as a check on the temptation to make Jesus look
like believer instead of the believer looking like Jesus. 455 Thus, while the historical component is
not sole thread in the cord of Christian (or religious) knowledge, it cannot and should not be
dismissed en toto. Faith is certainly more than history, but that does not make it less historical.
A related issue is that some may see the need to “safeguard” their faith from being either
less than certain or from the possibility of being falsified by deferring to faith and avoiding
historical inquiries. 456 Pannenberg makes a comment that would likely raise anxiety for some
such as these when he writes “Whether or not a particular event happened two thousand years

Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:10. One need not understand this comment as
being making history mutually exclusive from the help of the Holy Spirit.
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“Theology does not rule out history; in several theologies, not only some Christian varieties, it actually
requires it.” Wright, 1:95. See also Pannenberg, Jesus, 99; Padgett, “Advice for Religious Historians,” 302. Cf. A. J.
M. Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 7. One could argue, for
example, that if the accounts of Jesus were mythological in nature and Jesus never existed, then the faith that certain
believers claim to experience would be an incorrectly interpreted experience. They may claim to have some
experience, but it was not manifested as a result of Jesus since in this scenario Jesus is nonexistent. Thus, it is
important that we know that Jesus actually existed if we want to affirm these experiences as involving something
external. The same may be said with other events in Jesus’ life (i.e. death, resurrection, etc.). In short, the historical
question to Jesus’ existence, which is beyond doubt, is still a historical issue that has impact on doctrines such as
soteriology. Importantly, Paul in 1 Cor. 15:15 says that Christians would be lying about God if they say that God
raised Jesus if God did not actually do this. Thus, no matter how much faith one may have, if God did not perform
this act and one proclaims God as having done it, then that person is misrepresenting God according to Paul. A final
distinction on faith, history, and doctrine may be found in Mk. 2:1-12 where there are existential (forgiveness of
sins), empirical (healing of a paralytic [which confirms the forgiveness of the paralytic’s sins]), and theological
(Jesus has the ability as the Son of Man to forgive sins [which was demonstrated in the healing of the paralytic as a
confirmatory act that supported Jesus’ claim that the paralytic’s sins were forgiven]) components.
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“Much Christianity is afraid of history, frightened that if we really find out what happened in the first
century our faith will collapse.” Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 1:10. See also 93-94. Similarly
Deines, Acts of God in History, 4 (“Committed Christians within Biblical Studies sometimes try to bracket out a
supra-historical core from historical examination to leave their central beliefs unthreatened”). See also 344. It should
be noted that the skeptic is not immune from this concern. Wedderburn seems to think this issue only goes in one
direction when he makes comments that history should not “become lackeys of another discipline [i.e. theology]”
but neither should it be a tool for atheology; history cannot be forced to provide “fodder for theological systems” nor
should it for atheological systems either; and he says that when the theologian or believer is confronted with
historical problems they “have to re-examine their premises” and indeed so should the skeptic! He also believes that
the history is a bed of nails for the believer. Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection, 7. See also 8, 16, 18.
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ago is not made certain by faith but only by historical research, to the extent that certainty can be
attained at all about questions of this kind.” 457 Yet, for those who have this anxiety James D. G.
Dunn offers the following observation
The Liberal flight from history was also a search for an ‘invulnerable area’ for
faith….But a crucial question was too little asked: whether we should expect certainty in
matters of faith, whether an invulnerable ‘certainty’ is the appropriate language for faith,
whether faith is an ‘absolute’….The language of faith uses words like ‘confidence’ and
‘assurance’ rather than ‘certainty’. Faith deals in trust….Faith is commitment, not just
conviction. 458
While the desire for certainty is understandable, “existential certainty does not translate into
epistemic certainty.” 459 Additionally, if Dunn is correct and faith is more like trust or
commitment, then one need not speak of epistemology, let alone certainty. Rather the issues
should focus on faithfulness.
Moreover, knowledge of a miracle alone does not appear to equal faith in the Biblical
sense. In both the OT and NT miracles are expected to occur in other traditions and Jews and
Christians are expected to be able to recognize the events without any subsequent faith or
following-after the divine agent who performed them (e.g. Deut 13; Mark 13:22 [cf. Matt 7:2123]; Matt 24:24). 460 The knowledge of a miracle from a divine agent, for example, seeking to
lead Israel astray, should be recognized and avoided by the Israelites in Deuteronomy 13. Thus,

Pannenberg, Jesus, 99. Similarly Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1991), 361; Davis, Risen Indeed, 31.
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Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 1:104 (emphasis in original). See also Lüdemann, Resurrection of Jesus, 1.
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Padgett, “Advice for Religious Historians,” 306.
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Deines adds that even in the teachings of various religious traditions warn against false claims. Deines,
Acts of God in History, 23. Adding, “But the critical task for a theistically motivated historiography remains to
discern whether God’s involvement should indeed be seen or heard in an event…or whether revelatory claims
function as an attempt to embellish someone or something for some particular reason” (24). See also Clossey et al.,
“The Unbelieved and Historians, Part II.”
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knowledge of these miracles does not require faith (in any sense) on the parts of Jews or
Christians.
From an inverted perspective, in the New Testament we find examples of people who
believe that a miracle occurred but do not commit themselves to following Jesus (Mark 3:22;
Matt 11:16-19). Similar examples come from recent times. For example, there have been some
scholars who have accepted Jesus’ resurrection while refraining from commitment (i.e. faith) to
Jesus as Messiah or Lord. 461 In short, knowledge alone does not yield commitment. 462
Third, those who argue that historians are unable identify a miracle because it is an act of
“faith” can be the very ones who provide hypothetical examples where a miracle is expected to
be identified by their readers as a miracle but apart from faith. In other words, they presume their
readers will recognize a miracle given the right constellation of evidence and not by faith. 463 By
presenting a hypothetical example of a miracle occurring in the world, they have simultaneously
provided an example of how one could identify a miracle historically.

One well known scholar who takes this view is the late Pinchas Lapide. Lapide, The Resurrection of
Jesus. In a recent work on Jewish research on Jesus’ resurrection, David Mishkin notes other Jewish scholars who
accepted Jesus’ resurrection but remained Jewish, he then adds that “belief in the historicity of the resurrection does
not necessarily lead to a personal faith.” David Mishkin, Jewish Scholarship on the Resurrection of Jesus (Eugene,
OR: Pickwick Publications, 2017), 212 cf. 110–13, 115–16. Of those who take up the issue in Hinduism, more
appear to be more willing to accept a spiritual resurrection or objective vision of some sort which is more consistent
with their theological outlook. Bradley Malkovsky, “Some Recent Developments in Hindu Understandings of
Jesus,” Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies 23 (January 1, 2010): 5–6; Sandy Bharat, “Hindu Perspectives on Jesus,”
in The Blackwell Companion to Jesus (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 258; Balwant A. M. Paradkar, “Hindu
Interpretation of Christ from Vivekananda to Radhakrishnan,” The Indian Journal of Theology 18, no. 1 (1969): 75.
For some helpful overviews and themes on Hindu views (e.g. swoon, spiritual body, travels to India) see, Sandy
Bharat, Christ Across the Ganges: Hindu Responses to Jesus (Winchester, U. K.: O Books, 2007), 6 fn. 4, 57, 58,
61, 66–67, 83-84. Cf. 116.
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One may know, for example, simple mathematics but fail to be faithful to it if they wish to commit
financial fraud of some sort.
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When we refer to the “right constellation of evidence” we are referring to various elements such as
agency, context, and other relevant empirical data needed to demonstrate the event’s occurrence.
463
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For example, in addition to Ehrman’s comments above, he also argues against the
historian’s ability to discuss miracles when he writes, “Many historians, for example, committed
Christians, observant Jews, and practicing Muslims, believe that they [miracles] have in fact
happened. When they think or say this, however, they do so not in the capacity of the historian
but in the capacity of the believer.” 464 Yet without acting in the capacity of a believer or
appealing to faith, Ehrman then goes on to suggest that it would be a miracle “if a preacher
prayed over a bar of iron and thereby made it float.” 465 The reader is expected to be able to
envision such an event occurring and recognize it as miraculous because of the agent who caused
the bar to float and the context in which it occurred despite the fact the reader does not (or may
not) not faith or is acting in the capacity of a believer.
The reason readers can recognize the event as a miracle is because the right constellation
of events has occurred which provide positive evidence that a divine agent has acted in that
context. Ehrman appears to be aware of this which explains why he is able to use it as an
example of what a miracle would look like. 466 Yet, if, according to the objection, we can only
conclude that a miracle occurred by faith or as a believer, it is not clear how this is so. In his
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Ehrman, The New Testament, 229.
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Ibid., 227. See also 229. More fully, Ehrman presents this example in the context of the natural sciences
whereby one could perform a number of tests and seeing that the iron bars will sink in every instance. Interestingly,
it is not just that the iron bar floats contrary to the normal working of nature that makes the event a miracle, but
when the preacher prays over an iron bar and it floats is when it becomes a miracle. Thus, we see Ehrman
incorporating, at least to some degree, an element of context and agency whereby God is answering the preacher’s
prayer in his hypothetical example.

Ehrman contends that his example is how the natural sciences could possibly identify a miracle, but
history could not do so since it “cannot operate through repeated experimentation.” Ehrman, 227. Yet this overlooks
the fact that in Ehrman’s example he is performing the role of a historian by describing the past experiments in
which the iron bars sank every time with the exception being when a preacher prayed over a bar and it floated.
Moreover, as noted above, what helps historians (or anyone) identify a miracle is the evidence, context, and agency
involved, not whether we can conduct repeated experiments since a divine agent could possibly work through
nature.
466
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hypothetical situation, if there was in fact evidence of a priest who prayed over a bar of iron and
evidence that the bar of iron floated, then historical evidence could be used to demonstrate that a
miracle has occurred. It seems the reason the reader would understand the example given by
Ehrman is precisely because they have the epistemic ability to identify miracles. This includes
the layman and the specialist as well as the believer and unbeliever. The use of hypothetical
examples is evidence of our ability to recognize a miraculous event in the past given the right
constellation of evidence. Ultimately, then, it is not merely a matter of faith (or perhaps
faithfulness), but simply the right evidence in the right context.
The Domain of Philosophy and/or Theology
Another objection is that historians should pass the question of miracles to other
disciplines. The objection suggests that historians do not have the right tools to adjudicate
miracle claims. We might wonder what exactly are these tools, who has them, and, most
importantly, why is the historian unable to use them? The general sentiment is that philosophers
and theologians have these tools.
Princeton University professor Dale Allison provides an interesting example of this point.
Although he used to think these sorts of questions could be answered historically, he has changed
his mind. He now thinks the
discussion has to be handed over to the philosophers and theologians, among whose lofty
company I am not privileged to dwell. They, not me, are the ones who can address the
heart of the matter, the problem of justifying – if such a thing is possible – a worldview,
the thing that makes the resurrection of Jesus welcome or unwelcome, plausible or
implausible, important or unimportant. 467

Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 351; Carnley, The Structure of Resurrection Belief, 89; Ehrman, The New
Testament, 226. Despite their arguing for “supernatural occurrences,” Eddy and Boyd raise a similar concern in
Eddy and Boyd, The Jesus Legend, 40, 87–89. A slightly different shift appears in Dale C. Allison, The Historical
Christ and the Theological Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 66–78.
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This is an understandable objection. Nevertheless, this comment raises several considerations
worth noting.
First, and perhaps most important, several philosophers from differing backgrounds do
believe historians can conclude a miracle has occurred. Decades ago, Leon Pearl pointed out in
the American Philosophical Quarterly that “This matter is best left to historians and
archaeologists; all that philosophical inquiry can do is clear the path for them.” 468 Skeptical
philosopher Evan Fales contends that he “cannot find any principled reason why, if supernatural
causation is metaphysically possible, its presence could not be detected.” 469 While the Christian
philosopher Stephen Davis writes “Could a historian as a historian affirm that Jesus was raised
from the dead?...Could a historian as a historian affirm that God raised Jesus from the dead?....I
believe the answer to both questions ought to be Yes.” 470 As we have highlighted both here and
in chapter two, there do not appear to be any reasons philosophically or theologically that
prevent the historian from investigating miracle claims. 471 Indeed, as Pearl noted, the path has
already been cleared!
Second, suppose we grant the point that historians, by the nature of their discipline, do
not have the tools to examine miracles, why should we think that they could not obtain these

Leon Pearl, “Miracles: The Case for Theism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 25, no. 4 (1988): 336
(emphasis added). See also Martin, The Elusive Messiah, 116–17, 188–89.
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Evan Fales, “Reformed Epistemology and Biblical Hermeneutics,” Philo 4, no. 2 (2001): 176 (emphasis
in original). See also the skeptical Smith, “Methodological Naturalism and Its Misconceptions.” The noted
theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg makes a similar argument. Pannenberg, Jesus, 109.
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Davis, Risen Indeed, 27. See also 26-34. Similarly C. Stephen Evans, The Historical Christ and the
Jesus of Faith: The Incarnational Narrative as History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 203.

Larmer writes that the “job of the historian is not to decree in advance what can or cannot happen, based
on his or her metaphysical predilections, but rather to seek to ascertain what did in fact happen. The question of
whether events best understood as miracles actually occur is an empirical one, not to be decided by an arbitrary fiat
that refuses to countenance the possibility of supernatural causes.” Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle, 180.
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tools and apply them historically? Historians frequently cross-discipline in order to better
understand the past. 472 For example, without being a psychologist, a NT scholar such as Allison
could (and in fact has!) legitimately appropriated knowledge from the field of psychology in
order to try to better understand the past. 473 One could similarly, as a historian, likewise become
familiar with various philosophical and theological issues related to miracles in order to better
understand the past. 474
Third, we might question whether any “special training” is needed. As noted in the
previous consideration, hypothetical examples of miraculous events are provided and readers are
expected to recognize the miraculous event. If special training in philosophy and theology is
needed, authors would not provide such hypothetical examples since most will not be able to
recognize them as such since they do not have the formal training. If it is not possible for us to
identify a miracle in the past, then we are similarly unable to recognize a hypothetical miracle in
the past? Of course, if it is possible that we can identify a miracle in the hypothetical past, then it
is certainly possible that we can recognize a real miracle historically if a divine agent should act
in the actual past.

Licona argues that historians should cross-discipline and take into account the doctrine of God as it
relates to a historical question (particularly miracles). Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 155–60, 166–67. Cf.
Keener, Miracles, 2011, 2:665–66. Deines highlights the inverse relationship, that divine acts could potentially
impact other disciplines. Deines, Acts of God in History, 26.
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Allison draws from psychology in order to compare and contrast the disciples experiences of the risen
Jesus with bereavement visions. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 269–99, 364–75. Those engaging in Allison’s work
have suggested that not only was such a move legitimate, but also “impressive.” Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus,
626. See also Allison’s drawing from psychological research with respect to memory studies in Dale C. Allison,
Constructing Jesus: Memory, Imagination, and History (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013). Examples of
his drawing from the field of psychology can be found at the opening of this work (2-10).
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One might object to this last response by saying that we argued above that the historian cannot address
metaphysical questions. To clarify, we did not say that historians cannot address metaphysical questions. History
presupposes a variety of metaphysical beliefs (Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 156). The point we were making
is that these must be held tentatively and bracket them when appropriate. This maintains the balance between an
open approach to history, while also recognizing that we cannot help but approach the data from some perspective.
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Final Comments
When we consider the historian’s epistemic access to the past, we find that there do not
appear to be any reasons a priori that a historian could not, in principle, investigate the actions of
divine agents. Moreover, given the nature of the discipline as an open inquiry into the past,
examining the alleged actions of divine agents is similar to historical investigation into human or
non-human agents. This also means that they, like other claims about past events, should be
critically assessed. Historians should not shy away from these investigations. Rather, given their
training, they can be incredibly helpful in the discussion. While some historians have already
begun doing this, it would be great to see others likewise enter the dialogue.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
“We have seen that these three challenges are not nearly as difficult to overcome as those who
posit them imagine….I have contended that none of them prohibit historians from conducting a
sound investigation into the question, ‘Did Jesus rise from the dead?’” 475
- Mike Licona
Independently of Michael Licona’s recent assessment, we have come to the same
conclusions in this present work. Beyond what Licona concluded, we have found that these three
roadblocks to studying the resurrection do not inhibit one from studying whether Jesus rose from
the dead any more than they prevent other historical investigations that have reportedly occurred.
Ultimately, these roadblocks may more appropriately be understood as bumps in the road for
those studying the past. They do not prevent us from investigating or knowing past events such
as Jesus’ resurrection in particular or other reported historical events in general. They can,
however, give us a reason to slow down. By helping us avoid rushing down the road, they can
help us refine our inquiry into the past. We will now summarize our findings then offer some
final comments.
Can We Know the Past?
For Licona, “the standard challenges to historical knowledge noted by postmodern
historians do not prevent historians from adjudicating on the historicity of miracles in general
and the resurrection of Jesus in particular.” 476 We similarly concluded that the challenges
presented by the fact that inquirers are subjective beings with limited perspectives and horizons
that filter our view of the world do not inhibit one from studying past events. Rather, we found
that the relationship between objectivity and our subjectivity is deeply connected.
Michael R. Licona, “Jesus’s Resurrection, Realism, and the Role of Criteria,” in Jesus, Skepticism and
the Problem of History: Criteria and Context in the Study of Christian Origins, ed. Darrell L. Bock and J. Ed
Komoszewski (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2019), 302.
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Licona, “Jesus’s Resurrection, Realism, and the Role of Criteria,” 292.
147

We argued that as active subjects, we should strive toward the virtues that such
subjectivity enables. These include things like allowing free and open disclosure of one’s views
pertaining to their object of inquiry which is done by refusing to impose inappropriate a priori
conceptual frameworks upon the object. Along similar lines, one must be willing to bracket their
own worldview when conducting research and evaluate the data from multiple perspectives. In
doing so, they allow the object to be understood on its own terms.
On the other hand, we should be vigilant in guarding ourselves from embracing the vices
that can compromise the integrity of our research us as subjective agents. These include
imposing one’s own preconceived notions upon the data such that only what fits into this
network will be revealed and contrary evidence will be ignored or discarded. Such a method
risks refusing to “love thy neighbor” since it forbids them from speaking freely. Lastly, the
subject is tempted to define reality (as opposed to discover it) based upon their desires,
ideologies, presuppositions, and so on.
We concluded that the subjective component is vital to historical studies in general and
historical Jesus research and the resurrection in particular. Subjective agents are those that can
weigh different hypotheses and revise them in light of the evidence. Moreover, our conclusions
can and must be held tentatively as new evidence comes to light. This means that we must be
content with probable historical conclusions that are provided from limited historical-cultural
positions.
How Do We Know the Past?
In this chapter we discussed two “tools” that were available for helping one know past
events. The first was the Minimal Facts Approach (MFA) which seeks only data that is (1)
highly evidenced and (2) widely agreed upon by a heterogenous group of scholars. While the
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first criterion includes a variety of different tools one could use in knowing the past, the second
criterion helps us evaluate the potential influence of our biases (either appropriate or
inappropriate) since it requires agreement from scholars with wide ranging backgrounds. Such
diverse agreement suggests the event is evidenced from multiple different vantage points (i.e.
criterion one) and does not require an idiosyncratic position in order to be accepted.
The second tool historians can use when investigating the past is the use of historical
criteria. These historical criteria add to the probability of an event having occurred and rarely,
with the exception of contextual credibility, can they suggest that an event was unhistorical. It
was important for us to discuss the role of the historical criteria so that realistic expectations
could be set rather than ones that give the appearance of being overly objective or overly
subjective. Licona makes a similar point when he writes, “Rather than jettisoning the criteria, a
better route may be to admit that one’s expectations of the criteria have been idealistic and then
revise those expectations accordingly.” 477 Wise use of the criteria is required, and such wisdom
necessitates the inquirer to recognize which context is appropriate for the criteria to apply and
how much weight to place upon them. We then applied the criteria to the claim that Jesus was
crucified as a test case in order to see how the criteria could be applied. We found that several
criteria were met and that this can increase our confidence in the historical reality of that event.
Can Historians Investigate Divine Action?
Lastly, we argued that a historian qua historian is within their epistemic rights to
comment upon divine action. We noted several reasons for this, many of which were related to
issues we addressed when discussing the subjective components of historical inquiry. Namely,
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Licona, 297–98.
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the historical method must be one that is free and open to investigate past events without any
possible explanations excluded a priori. Methodological naturalism as it is most often practiced
does precisely this by imposing inappropriate conceptual frameworks which thereby can distort
one’s understanding of the past. As Licona argues, “One problem is MN would actually prevent
scientists and historians from discovering the true cause if the nature of the cause is
supernatural.” 478 Accordingly, such a method should be rejected in favor of one that is more free,
open, and dynamic.
We then noted two central elements that the historian needs to consider when
investigating alleged miracle claims. The first is that of agency. Miracles could occur through
natural means or in ways contrary to our understanding of nature. One of the factors that
distinguishes whether or not an event is a miracle is whether or not it can be attributed to an
agent who is acting with intentionality and purpose. The second element is related in that it
requires the context in which the event occurred to be taken into account, as should be done in
any historical inquiry. In order to understand whether or not there was a divine agent acting with
intentionality, the context must be taken into account. 479 In so doing, it can demonstrate how the
agent’s intentions and aims could be recognized.
We then considered two common objections to our conclusion. The first had to do with
the relationship of faith to history. We addressed this by noting that those who are believers in a
miraculous event can operate the same as historians when presenting their case for a miracle and,
conversely, that a historian could operate in a similar manner to that of a believer when arguing
their case for a given historical event. Second, we considered whether or not the historian had the
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This can include divine action patterns.
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tools to discuss events that were so intertwined with other disciplines such as philosophy and
theology. We saw that some philosophers have acknowledged that historians already have these
tools. Perhaps more importantly, historians frequently cross-discipline when investigating the
past and should not be restricted in this area either.
Conclusion
Jörn Rüsen points out that the “need for orientation in the practical day-to-day living of
human beings is at the core of the historical cognitive process.” 480 One of the reasons the past is
studied is precisely because of the significance it can have in the present. Given the significance
of its claims and impact of Christianity in the world, we should freely and openly explore its
claims, especially the resurrection.
Although we noted that one can accept the historical reality of Jesus’ resurrection without
becoming a Christian, many have accepted the historical reality of Jesus’ resurrection and then
became Christians. The potential for this event to provide orientation and significance to one’s
life is not lost on Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:12-19. He recognized several areas of his life that
would be radically different if Jesus was not raised from the dead before going on to discuss
some of the implications that would follow if Jesus did rise.
By seeking to address the above three roadblocks to resurrection research, we have
sought to provide fertile ground for those interested in studying the past. Although we have not
discussed the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection itself, our goal was to remove these roadblocks in
order to show that such an investigation can be responsibly conducted. The freedom to pursue

Jörn Rüsen, Evidence and Meaning: A Theory of Historical Studies, trans. Diane Kerns and Katie Digan,
Making Sense of History 28 (NY: Berghahn Books, 2017), 45.
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such an inquiry is critical for those who are seeking orientation and significance for their lives in
the present (and possibly…the future).
Moving forward from this project, various avenues of research are presented. First, the
issues related to the virtues and vices of our biases can be further investigated by drawing from
other disciplines (i.e. psychology, philosophy, ethics, etc.). Second, further elaboration of the
various criteria or principles for knowing the past can be identified beyond the broad methods we
proposed. Lastly, further development regarding specific criteria used to identify a miracle can
be pursued, such as a divine action pattern. 481 Each of these three areas would provide a helpful
development of the arguments we have presented here.
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See fn. 442 above.
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APPENDIX: LIST OF LISTS
In this appendix we will present lists from various scholars who either acknowledged a
consensus regarding the various facts they list concerning Jesus and early Christianity or
provided their own a general list or outline of facts that they accept. The appendix will be broken
up into two different parts. The first will be lists that focus on historical Jesus studies more
broadly. The second part will present lists that have data which are more relevant to investigating
Jesus’ resurrection specifically. No commentary will be offered in this appendix as its goal is to
present as clearly as possible the differing lists presented by scholars.
Historical Jesus Studies in General
David Strauss
Peter C. Hodgson, editor of Strauss’ Life of Jesus, provides a list of facts accepted and
acknowledged by David Strauss. Despite Strauss’ skepticism, the list presented by Hodgson is
surprisingly significant. 482
1. Jesus lived.
2. He was a disciple of John the Baptist.
3. Ministered in Galilee.
4. Jesus believed he was the Messiah.
5. Called disciples.
6. His discourses in Matthew, Mark, and Luke are largely authentic.
7. Jesus traveled to Jerusalem.
8. He proclaimed a second coming.
9. Jesus anticipated his death.
10. Jesus told the disciples farewell.
11. Jesus was arrested.
12. He was tried.
13. He was condemned.
14. Jesus was crucified.

David F. Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. George Eliot, 4th
ed. (Ramsey, NJ: Sigler Press, 2002), xxvii. Cf. 107, 640.
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Günter Bornkamm
Günter Bornkamm noted the “indisputable” facts of Jesus’ life in his work on the historical
Jesus.483
1. His home was Galilee.
2. But he was a native of Nazareth.
3. He was Jewish.
4. His father was a carpenter.
5. The names of His parents (Joseph and Mary).
6. The names of His brothers (James, Joses, Judas, and Simon).
7. His brothers, and mother, were originally unbelievers.
8. They later became believers.
9. Jesus spoke a Galilean version of Aramaic.
10. There is “no trace of the influence of Greek philosophy or the Greek manner of
living” in His life.
11. Jesus was active in the areas around the hill country and Sea of Galilee.
12. He was baptized by John.
13. He proclaimed the Kingdom of God.
14. People flocked to Him.
15. He had disciples.
16. Jesus had enemies.
17. He died on the cross.
E. P. Sanders
E. P. Sanders provides multiple lists of undisputed facts regarding Jesus.
Sanders’ Lists of “Indisputable Facts”
The Historical Figure of Jesus 485
Jesus and Judaism 484
Jesus was baptized by John the
During Jesus’ Life
Immediately After
Baptist.
Jesus’ Life
Jesus was a Galilean.
Jesus was born around the
Jesus’ disciples initially
time of Herod the Great’s
fled.
death (4 B.C.E.).

Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, trans. James M. Robinson, NY (London: Harper and Row,
1960), 53-55 (quote from 55).
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E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1985), 11. Cf. 321-322, 326. It
should be noted that while we have ten facts listed, Sanders combines Jesus as a Galilean preacher and healer for his
total of eight facts.
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E. P. Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 10-14 (list from 10154

Jesus was a preacher.
Jesus was a healer.

He grew up in Nazareth, a
Galilean village.
Jesus was baptized by John
the Baptist.

Jesus called disciples (and spoke
of twelve).

He taught in towns (not
cities).

Jesus was only active in Israel.

His proclaimed the Kingdom
of God.

Jesus was involved in a
controversy regarding the temple.
Jesus was crucified outside
Jerusalem by the Romans.
Jesus’ followers continued a
specific movement after Jesus
died.
Some Jews persecuted portions of
this movement.

Around 30 C.E. Jesus went
to Jerusalem for Passover.
Jesus created a disturbance in
the temple area.
A final meal was eaten with
Jesus’ disciples.

They saw Jesus (in what
sense is not certain).
As a result, they believed
Jesus was going to return
and found the Kingdom of
God.
Followers started a
community that awaited
Jesus’ return.
They also sought to show
others that Jesus was
God’s Messiah.

He was executed by the
order of Pontius Pilate, the
Roman prefect.
Craig Evans

Craig Evans provides a list of factors that have come to a consensus in historical Jesus
research. 486
1. Gospels provide significant historical data.
2. Jesus’ ministry makes sense of what we know of first-century Palestine.
3. The church is understood as having been grounded in Jesus’ ministry (as opposed to
Easter faith alone).
4. Jesus was a miracle worker.
5. Romans were the primary actors in Jesus’ death and Jewish involvement and
responsibility are exaggerated.

486

(1993): 34.

Craig A Evans, “Life-of-Jesus Research and the Eclipse of Mythology,” Theological Studies 54, no. 1

155

James H. Charlesworth
James H. Charlesworth notes twenty areas of consensus among experts regarding both Jesus and
Jesus research. 487
1. Jesus was Jewish.
a. Noting only one scholar denying this fact, H. Stewart Chamberlain.
2. It is impossible to write a biography of Jesus, but his early followers were interested
in his Jesus’ life and teachings.
3. We can know several things about Jesus and the broad outline presented in the
Gospels is largely reliable.
4. Scholars are trying to better understand the Jewish context of Jesus.
5. He led a “renewal” movement of some sort.
6. Jesus’ actions at the temple was likely the major impetus for his death.
7. Scholars have paid increased attention to Galilee.
8. Jesus was a devout Jew.
9. Scholars are using newly discovered primary sources from Jesus’ time in order to see
how and in what ways they might help us better understand Jesus.
10. Jesus never quoted from these new primary sources but did frequently quote the Old
Testament.
11. Jesus was highly influenced by apocalyptical thought and Jesus’ message was
eschatological.
12. Jesus’ parables were Jewish.
13. Pre-70 Palestine archeology is stimulating Jesus research while also creating
challenges.
14. Sociology, anthropology, and areas of psychology have been growing in importance
regarding our understanding of Jesus.
15. Jesus was recognized as unusual since he claimed significant power and authority.
16. More scholars are defending the thesis that Jesus thought of himself in messianic and
eschatological terms.
17. Scholars are also recognizing Jesus was a miracle worker and that many of his
healing miracles are authentic.
18. Jesus’ ministry began with John the Baptist and his message used similar
eschatological tones.
19. Jesus clashed with all known Jewish groups and was not a Pharisee, Zealot, or
Essene.
20. Jesus was sometimes offensive in his responses.

James H. Charlesworth, “Jesus Research Expands with Chaotic Creativity,” in Images of Jesus Today,
ed. James H. Charlesworth and Walter P. Weaver (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994), 5–15. It is
important to note he then goes on to note various challenges to this consensus in the following pages (15-27).
487
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Two additional points he makes,
21. Jesus’ quoted the Old Testament because he accepted the authority of these writings.
22. Jesus proclaimed the dawning of the Kingdom of God is one of the strongest
consensuses.
Paula Fredriksen
Paula Fredriksen of Boston University points out that there are various “indisputable facts” that
no “reconstruction of the historical Jesus can persuade if it cannot meaningfully accommodate
[them].”488
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Jesus encountered John the Baptist.
He had a popular following.
Jesus preached the Kingdom of God.
He was crucified by Pilate.
Jesus’ core followers began proclaiming the Kingdom of God and that Jesus was the
Christ who had risen from the dead.
6. The message extended beyond the Jews and included Gentiles.
Géza Vermès
The noted Jewish scholar Géza Vermès likewise highlighted “non-controversial facts concerning
Jesus’ life and activity, and [endeavored] to build on these foundations.” 489
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Jesus lived in Galilee.
Jesus’ hometown was Nazareth.
John the Baptist “inaugurated” Jesus’ preaching.
He was successful in Galilee.
Jesus had a dispute with the Jerusalem authorities.
He was crucified under Pilate sometime around 26-36 C.E.

488
Paula Fredriksen, Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews: A Jewish Life and the Emergence of Christianity
(New York: Vintage, 2000), 268.

Géza Vermès, Jesus and the World of Judaism (London: SCM Press, 1983), 3ff., 19-20 (quote from 3).
Similar comments two decades later Géza Vermès, Jesus in His Jewish Context (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
2003), 2ff., 18.
489
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Robert Funk
Robert Funk of the Jesus Seminar observed that “there are a few assorted facts to which most
critical scholars subscribe.” 490
1. There is substantial evidence that Jesus existed.
2. He was born around 6 or 7 B.C.E. and died by 36 C.E.
3. Jesus lived in Palestine.
4. He was “attracted” to John the Baptist’s movement.
5. Jesus was baptized by John.
6. He had male followers (Simon Peter, James, John).
7. Jesus was “linked” with the reign of King Herod.
8. Herod Antipas was the Tetrarch that ruled Galilee during Jesus’ life.
9. Jesus was crucified under Pilate.
10. Jesus had women followers (Mary of Magdala).
11. His home was Galilee and his hometown was Nazareth.
12. He was a Jew.
13. His mother’s name was Mary.
14. He had four brothers: James, Joses, Judas, and Simon (whom Mark reports as
originally skeptical although they later join the Christian movement).
15. He was an itinerant sage.
16. Jesus practiced exorcism.
17. He was popular the common people.
18. Some authorities opposed him in Galilee.
19. He was also opposed in Jerusalem.
20. His ministry lasted from one to three years.
21. Jesus challenged the temple and authorities.
22. He was executed by the Romans.
Dale C. Allison*
Although Dale Allison is not providing a list of facts, he presents a list that any “objective
inventory of the major themes and motifs that appear again and again in the Jesus tradition would
surely include the following:” 491

490
Robert W. Funk, Honest to Jesus: Jesus for a New Millennium (San Francisco, CA:
HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), 32-35 (quote from 32).

Dale C. Allison, Jesus of Nazareth: Millenarian Prophet (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), 4648 (quote from 46). He also notes that “the same is true of certain formal literary features” (49). He then provides a
list of eight different rhetorical strategies.
491
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1. Kingdom of God.
2. Future reward.
3. Future judgment.
4. Suffering and persecution for believers.
5. Victory over evil.
6. Sense of something new is present.
7. Significance of John the Baptist.
8. “Son of Man” references.
9. God as Father.
10. Loving, serving, and forgiving others.
11. Special concern for the unfortunate.
12. Intention matters most.
13. Hostility to wealth.
14. Extraordinary or difficult demands.
15. Conflict with the religious authorities.
16. Disciples as students and helpers.
17. Jesus as a miracle worker.
Bart Ehrman
In his introductory work, Bart Ehrman offers a brief list of accepted facts about Jesus. 492
1. Jesus was baptized.
2. He associated with sinners.
3. Jesus called twelve disciples.
4. Near the end of Jesus’ life he caused a disturbance in the temple.
5. He was crucified under Pilate.
6. After Jesus’ death his followers established Christian communities.
Luke Timothy Johnson
Luke Timothy Johnson presents a list of facts that historians can assert “with the highest degree
of probability.” 493
1.
2.
3.
4.

Jesus lived in the first century.
He was Jewish.
Jesus was executed by the Roman authorities.
A movement began in which Jesus was proclaimed as risen Lord.

492
Bart D. Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings, 3rd ed.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 264.

Luke Timothy Johnson, “Learning the Human Jesus: Historical Criticism and Literary Criticism,” in The
Historical Jesus: Five Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009),
159.
493

159

5. The movement spread across the Mediterranean world within twenty-five years.
6. During this period some writings were made by believers in order to interpret their
“experiences and convictions” about Jesus.
Morna Hooker
Morna Hooker, former University of Cambridge professor, notes that we know “quite a lot about
Jesus” and then goes on to provide an overview. 494
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Jesus spoke with impressive authority.
He taught in parables.
His main teaching was the Kingdom of God.
Jesus was known for working miracles.
He was friends with social outcasts (which offended various leaders).
He called disciples.
Jesus demanded and inspired incredible devotion from followers.
He was killed by the Roman authorities.
Jesus’ disciples came to believe that he was raised from the dead.
David A. deSilva

David deSilva provides a list of ten facts that “historians” would answer as being “highly
probable.” 495
1. Jesus was from Nazareth.
2. His public ministry began with Jesus as a disciple of John the Baptist.
3. Jesus was a teacher, healer, and exorcist.
4. He had a group of followers, including a core group of twelve.
5. His mission was focused on Israel.
6. He preached that the Kingdom of God was coming.
7. Jesus challenged the Jerusalem authorities regarding the temple.
8. He was crucified by Pontius Pilate as a messianic pretender.
9. Jesus’ followers believed they had “encountered” him after his death.
10. His followers then started a movement.

Morna D. Hooker, “Foreward: Forty Years On,” in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, ed.
Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne (London: T & T Clark, 2012), xv.
494

David A. deSilva, An Introduction to the New Testament: Contexts, Methods and Ministry Formation,
2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2018), 167.
495
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Robert M. Bowman Jr. and Ed Komoszewski
Robert M. Bowman Jr. and Ed Komoszewski suggest that the following eighteen facts are “so
well supported historically as to be widely acknowledged by most scholars, whether Christian (of
any stripe) or not.” 496
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Jesus was born around 6 or 4 BCE.
He was a Jew from Galilee.
Jesus was raised in Nazareth.
He spoke Aramaic and possibly knew Hebrew and Greek.
He was baptized by John the Baptist before John was arrested and executed by Herod
Antipas, who was the tetrarch of Galilee.
6. He was an itinerant minster and traveled throughout Galilee and surrounding areas.
7. He had a number of disciples who followed him (including men and women).
8. Jesus preached the Kingdom of God.
9. He used parables.
10. He was known to be a wonder worker who conducted exorcisms and healings.
11. Jesus was compassionate to those regarded as outcasts (unclean, wicked, etc.).
12. Jesus engaged in debates with the Pharisees concerning the Torah.
13. He traveled to Jerusalem during the Passover, the same week of the crucifixion.
14. He caused a commotion at the Jerusalem temple just prior to being arrested.
15. Jesus ate a meal with the closest disciples which later Christians referred to as the
Last Supper.
16. At the request of the Jerusalem high priest and the head of the Sanhedrin, Jesus was
arrested.
17. He was then crucified around 30 or 33 CE just outside of Jerusalem, under the
authority of prefect of Judea, Pontius Pilate.
18. His disciples had experiences that convinced them that God raised Jesus from the
dead and appeared to them.

Robert M. Bowman Jr. and J. Ed Komoszewski, “The Historical Jesus and the Biblical Church: Why the
Quest Matters,” in Jesus, Skepticism and the Problem of History: Criteria and Context in the Study of Christian
Origins, ed. Darrell L. Bock and J. Ed Komoszewski (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2019), 22-23 (quote
from 22).
496
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Resurrection Related Lists
Gary R. Habermas
In 1976 Gary Habermas first presented a general list of facts in his Michigan State University
dissertation. 497
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Jesus died on the cross.
He was buried in a tomb.
The disciples were distraught and lost all hope.
The tomb Jesus was buried in was found empty a few days later.
The disciples had experiences they believed to have been of the risen Jesus.
The disciples were then radically transformed, being willing to suffer and die for their
beliefs.
7. The disciples began their preaching in Jerusalem.
8. The church started.
9. Sunday, not Saturday, was the primary day of worship.
10. Paul was converted from being a persecutor of the church to a follower of Jesus
because of an experience he believed he had with the risen Jesus.
In Habermas’ debate with Antony Flew he presented the following “known historical facts.” 498
1. Jesus died by crucifixion.
2. He was then buried.
3. After Jesus’ death they were distraught and without hope.
4. Although not as widely recognized, the tomb was found empty a few days later.
5. The disciples had experiences they believed to have been of the risen Jesus.
6. As a result of these experiences, the disciples were transformed.
7. Jesus’ resurrection was central to the preaching in the early church.
8. The message was especially proclaimed in Jerusalem.
9. The church began and grew.
10. Sunday became the primary day of worship.
11. James, Jesus’ brother and skeptic, converted to Christianity.
12. Paul, the early church persecutor, converted by an experience he believed to have
been with the risen Jesus.

497
Gary R. Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Rational Inquiry (Ann Arbor, MI: University
Microfilms, 1976), 315–16. Although G. E. Ladd’s book was published prior to Habermas’ dissertation, we included
Habermas first since he reported that he had developed these facts years earlier. See chapter two.

Gary R. Habermas, “Affirmative Statement: Habermas,” in Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The
Resurrection Debate, ed. Terry L. Miethe (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1987), 19–20.
498
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In Risen Jesus and Future Hope, Habermas has noted the acceptability of using different lists of
facts. The table below presents two varying lists that he believes could be used depending on the
context or the skepticism of one’s interlocutor.
Habermas’ Lists from Risen Jesus Future Hope
Known Historical Facts (Larger List) 499
Minimal Facts (Smaller List) 500
Jesus died by (Roman) crucifixion.
Jesus died by (Roman) crucifixion.
He was buried, probably in a private tomb.
The disciples had experiences that they
thought were of the risen Jesus.
Afterward Jesus’ death, the disciples were
The disciples were transformed and willing to
discouraged and lost hope.
die for this belief.
The tomb was empty shortly after the burial.
The disciple’s proclamation of the resurrection
began at the beginning of the church (i.e. it was
very early).
The disciples had experiences that they
James, the brother of Jesus and a former
thought were of the risen Jesus.
skeptic, became a Christian due to an
experience that he believed was an appearance
of the risen Jesus.
The disciples were transformed and willing to Saul (Paul), the church persecutor, became a
die for this belief.
Christian due to an experience that he believed
was the risen Jesus.
The disciple’s proclamation of the
resurrection began at the beginning of the
church (i.e. it was very early).
They proclaimed it in Jerusalem, where Jesus
had just recently been crucified and buried.
Jesus’ resurrection is central to the Gospel.
Sunday became the day for Christians to
gather and worship together.
James, the brother of Jesus and a former
skeptic, became a Christian due to an
experience that he believed was an
appearance of the risen Jesus.
Saul (Paul), the church persecutor, became a
Christian due to an experience that he
believed was the risen Jesus.

Gary R. Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2003), 9–10.
499

500

Habermas, 26–27.
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G. E. Ladd
Although very similar to Habermas, G. E. Ladd provides a list of facts on three separate
occasions in his work on Jesus’ resurrection, though he does not specify why his list changes.
List 1 501
Jesus’ death.
Jesus’ burial.
Disciples were discouraged
and disillusioned.
Disciples (sudden)
transformation to be
witnesses for the risen Jesus.
Empty tomb.
Rise of the Christian church.
Conversion of Saul.

Ladd’s Lists
List 2 502
Jesus’ death.
Jesus’ burial.
Disciples were not expecting
Jesus’ death and were
confused as a result.
Empty tomb.
Empty Tomb alone is not
proof of the resurrection.
Disciples had experiences
which they interpreted as
Jesus risen from the dead.
Judaism at that time did not
have a concept of a dying and
rising Messiah.
Resurrection proclaimed in
Jerusalem.

List 3 503
Dying and rising Messiah
was totally unexpected.
Jesus’ death.
Jesus’ burial.
Disciples were discouraged
and disheartened.
Empty tomb.
Grave clothes were not
disturbed.
Disciples had experiences of
the risen Jesus.
The experiences led to the
resurrection faith.
Rise of the Christian church
and its belief on the risen
Jesus.
Conversion of Paul.

Stephen Davis
The philosopher Stephen Davis presents the following lists of facts in his work on Jesus’
resurrection.

501

George Eldon Ladd, I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 13.

502

Ladd, 93.

503

Ladd, 132–33.
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Stephen T. Davis’ Facts from Risen Indeed
List 1 504
List 2 505
Jesus died on a cross.
First-century Jews had no concept of a
dying and rising Messiah.
Christians later came to believe God raised him Jesus died.
from the dead.
Resurrection was the center of their message.
He was buried.
They claimed it was the resurrection that
The disciples were initially discouraged.
transformed them.
They were initially disheartened after Jesus’ He tomb was found empty soon after the
crucifixion.
burial.
They were transformed into being bold and Some of the disciples had experiences they
courageous.
understood to be with the risen Jesus.
These experiences convinced them that
Jesus was raised from the dead.
They started a movement that grew.
The movement was based on the belief that
Jesus rose from the dead.
Jürgen Moltmann
Jürgen Moltmann’s lists some “relatively well-attested historical facts.” 506 The implication is that
they would be well accepted by most scholars. However, he notes, due to his historical
methodology, that “all that can actually be proved about them are the assurances of the women
that at Jesus’ empty tomb they heard an angelic message telling them of his resurrection, and the
assertions of the disciples that they had seen appearances of Christ in Galilee.” 507
1. Jesus was crucified and died publicly.
2. The women were the ones who learned of resurrection at Jesus’ tomb in Jerusalem.
3. The disciples fled to Galilee.
504

1993), 15.
505

Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
Davis, 180.

Jürgen Moltmann, “The Resurrection of Christ: Hope for the World,” in Resurrection Reconsidered, ed.
Gavin D’Costa (Oxford: Oneworld, 1996), 74.
506

507

Moltmann, 74.
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4. The disciples returned to Jerusalem and openly shared that Jesus, who was crucified,
was raised from the dead by God and was Lord and redeemer of the world.
Michael R. Licona
In his massive study, Michael Licona presents the following list of facts with Jesus predicting his
death (and vindication) bracketed out of his investigation, while the conversion of James and
empty tomb are considered second-order facts. 508
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Jesus was understood to be a miracle-worker and exorcist.
Jesus understood himself as God’s eschatological agent.
*Jesus’ predictions of death and vindication.
Jesus’ death by crucifixion.
Appearances to the disciples.
Conversion of the church persecutor Paul.
*Conversion of James the skeptical brother of Jesus.
*The tomb was found empty.
David Mishkin

David Mishkin notes the following list of facts as generally accepted by Jewish scholars who
have written on the subject. 509
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Jesus was crucified.
He was then buried.
Disciples’ believed they saw the risen Jesus.
The tomb in which Jesus was buried was found empty.
Paul converted to Christianity.

508
Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL:
IVP Academic, 2010), 277–464.

David Mishkin, Jewish Scholarship on the Resurrection of Jesus (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications,
2017), 203–10. In his dissertation, he also included the growth of the early church David Mishkin, “Jewish
Scholarship on the Resurrection of Jesus” (PhD, diss., University of Pretoria, 2015), 194.
509
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Justin Bass
The most recent list of facts surrounding Jesus’ resurrection are presented by Justin Bass. He
concludes the following are “bedrock facts.” 510
1. In the early 30s AD, Jesus was killed by crucifixion.
2. Claims about Jesus being raised from the dead is “unparalleled” in three ways:
a. Optimism evaluation of a crucified Messiah.
b. Two-stage resurrection plan with Jesus first and the general resurrection later.
c. Divine claims associated with the one crucified.
3. Jesus’ followers (both individually and in groups) and at least one enemy were
convinced Jesus appeared to them shortly after the crucifixion.
4. Peter, James, and Paul were among those who saw Jesus individually and at least on
of the group appearances was to the Twelve.
5. Paul was a Pharisee who persecuted the early church prior to converting to
Christianity after becoming convinced Jesus appeared to him.
6. Paul was with Peter for two weeks while also meeting with Jesus’ brother, James.
7. Shortly after Jesus died, Paul received various traditions regarding Jesus. The
tradition in 1 Corinthians 15:3-7 should be dated within ten years of Jesus’ death.
8. Those who believed that Jesus appeared to them created a movement that was
founded upon “love and sacrifice” which captured the Roman empire, establish
Western civilization, continues to influence nations and billions of people today, and
is referred to as Christianity.
Andrew Ter Ern Loke
Andrew Loke makes several historical considerations that he argues are “well established” but
does not comment upon their being widely agreed upon. 511 These include the following:
1. Jesus was crucified around AD 30.
2. Groups, such as the apostles who knew Jesus, and individuals, including skeptics like
Paul, reported seeing a resurrected Jesus soon after the crucifixion.
Justin Bass, The Bedrock of Christianity: The Unalterable Facts of Jesus’ Death and Resurrection
(Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2020), 200–201.
510

Andrew Loke, Investigating the Resurrection of Jesus Christ: A New Transdisciplinary Approach (New
York: Routledge, 2020), 202. Cf. 17. Loke also includes five general considerations (202-203) which are:
511

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

No group would be willing to suffer, die, and be condemned by God for what they do not believe.
Without an external stimulation, groups would be unable to agree upon details regarding a perceived
visual experience of the external world.
Many who had hallucinations subsequently recognized that they, in fact, had a hallucination.
No mere human would, naturalistically, have a transphysical body such as that of the resurrected Jesus.
Strauss’ critique is still an important consideration against the Swoon Hypothesis.
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

They were threatened but willing to die for their religion.
The claim that Jesus resurrected was very important for the earliest believers.
They had a reverent fear towards bearing false witness about YHWH.
There was skepticism about bodily resurrection within the group as well as outsiders.
They followed the commonsense notion of inquiring with available eyewitnesses.
There was “mobility and networking” within the earliest Christians.
It is not likely that the author of Matthew would have risked blatant falsification by
creating or inventing the guards at the tomb.
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